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PREFACE
The research for this thesis was carried out in the course of 
a three-year scholarship at the Australian National University between 
1968 and 1971.
The first six months of research for this thesis was spent by 
the writer in general reading, formulating the model, preparing the 
questionnaire and the inventory of data to be collected, and selecting 
towns for field survey in India. From April 1969 to November 1969 the 
writer made an extensive field trip to Delhi, West Bengal, Madhya Pradesh 
and Bihar to collect polling-booth maps and election statistics, and to 
carry out a field survey.
It had been intended to conduct the field-work in the district 
of Burdwan in West Bengal and the writer spent nearly two months there 
drawing the sample and training interviewers. But owing to the local pol­
itical instability at that time -- those were the days of the CPIM-led 
united front government, when every researcher was branded as a CIA-agent -- 
he had to abandon this plan and go to Madhya Pradesh where he carried out 
the survey in Bhilainagar (referred to in the text as Bhilai) and Raipur. 
Survey work in both Bhilai and Raipur was a rewarding experience. The 
writer himself interviewed more than three hundred electors and dozens 
of leaders of political parties and voluntary associations. The aggregate 
data and survey material were coded by the writer, and the data were 
analysed on the IBM 360/50 computer at the Computer Centre, Australian 
National University.
It is impossible to thank all those who helped the writer in the 
course of the three years, but particular reference must be made to those 
persons and institutions whose assistance has been vital.
The writer owes a special debt to his brother Gutta Vidyasagar 
for the personal assistance and encouragement he provided in initiating 
the writer to a research career.
The writer pays a special tribute to the officers and staff of 
the Election Commission of India. By Western standards the Election 
Commission is one of the best-administered and most efficient organizations 
in India. Without its help this research project would not have been 
successful. Mr A.N. Sen, Secretary, Election Commission of India facili­
tated the work by issuing necessary official orders and introductory 
letters to the State Chief Electoral Officers and District Election Officers
Vconcerned. Messrs. A.K. Chatarjee, J.K. Sibbu, A.K. Bansal, T.D. Gupta and 
R.D. Sharma, all Research Officers with the Research and Reference Branch 
of the Commission treated the writer as a friend and were helpful beyond the 
call of duty. They took extra care and collected polling-booth data from 
different state headquarters. The writer expresses grateful thanks to 
them.
Mr A.N. Murthy and Mr P. Seshagiri Rao of the Department of Town 
Administration in Bhilai helped the writer by relaxing official rules and 
regulations and supplying detailed lists of residential units, streets and 
sectors, so facilitating drawing the sample in Bhilai.
Messrs. B.M. Rao, A.P. Ranga Rao, B.S. Chandel, N.A.S. Reddy and 
P. Vishnumurthy -- all interviewers -- did an excellent job in carrying out 
the field survey in Bhilai. The first three later joined the interviewing 
team in Raipur. The descriptive information collected by Mr Reddy along 
with his interviews was most useful in interpreting the survey material from 
Bhilai.
Professor R.N. Srivastava and Dr S.L. Sharma, both of the Department 
of Sociology, Ravishankar University, Raipur, assisted the writer in recruit­
ing the interviewers for field survey in Raipur. Messrs. Anadkumar Chaubey, 
Ramesh Rothkar, and Prashant Kumar Thawait -- the Raipur interviewers -- were 
cooperative, and but for their assistance the survey work in Raipur would not 
have been completed in time. Mr Chaubey worked hard both as an interviewer 
in the field and as an interpreter for the writer. His knowledge of the 
ecological layout of Raipur, his initiative and drive in contacting the 
respondents and his familiarity with the local community leaders made survey 
work and leadership interviews in Raipur relatively easy. The writer 
expresses thanks to him.
Mr B. Madhusudhana Rao and his wife, Mrs B. Rajyalakshmi helped 
the writer in several ways. The writer enjoyed their friendship and 
hospitality for nearly five months. Mr Rao helped in recruiting the inter­
viewers in Bhilai, himself worked as an interviewer and also devoted much 
of his time as an extremely patient interpreter for the writer in sun and 
rain and by day and night. The writer expresses special thanks to Mrs 
Rajyalakshmi for her forbearance.
The diagrams, maps, and charts were the creation of Mrs Lilian 
Wittig of the Visual Aids section of the Australian National University.
Mrs Wittig spent much of her precious spare time and weekends in preparing
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them. The writer expresses his thanks to her.
The writer would like to express his thanks to Mr R.S. Crago and 
to Mr M.W. Ray for their general assistance in computer programming and 
to his colleage Brian Embury for the assistance he provided in preparing 
programmes for regression models.
The writer would like to thank Dr Don Rawson for his helpful 
suggestions in interpreting the results of the regression models.
Professor V. Subramaniam of the University of Zambia took a keen 
interest in the project and made helpful suggestions during the course of 
this research project. The writer expresses his grateful thanks to him.
The writer owes a special debt to Dr Don Aitkin, his supervisor 
over the three years, whose enthusiasm for the project was accompanied by 
an unfailing patience with the writer. The writer is very grateful to 
Professor R.S. Parker, his second supervisor, who made many useful suggest­
ions at different stages in the course of this project. Both Dr Aitkin 
and Professor Parker patiently read and criticized several drafts of the 
thesis. Their help, assistance and encouragement were a constant source of 
inspiration in successful completion of this thesis. The writer will cherish 
the memory of his association with both of them as an honour and privilege.
The writer would like to thank the members of his department, 
staff and students whose assistance and friendship have helped to make the 
preparation of this thesis a rewarding experience.
Finally, the writer owes special thanks to Miss B. Condon for 
having excellently typed the thesis.
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INTRODUCTION
PRE-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS
The Role of Western-Educated Middle-Class Elites
In India the western-educated urban professional elites 
(such as the lawyers, landed gentry, journalists, businessmen, 
and academics) who had implicit faith in British parliamentary 
democracy played an important role in forming, organizing, and 
supporting the nationalist movement mainly under the banner of 
the Indian National Congress (Ghosh 1960:11,12; Krishna 1966b).^ 
It was a small elite, homogeneous in social background and mainly 
upper caste, and it constituted almost a one-class ensemble. 
Sections of this class joined the British administrative structure 
and in a sense shared power with the British (Weiner 1968:38). 
According to Kothari, the new middle class created by English 
education and drawn by the concepts of liberty, democracy, and 
socialism, was indeed the greatest legacy of the British Raj.
This class eventually inherited power from the British and de­
clared itself a modern nation and a sovereign democratic republic 
(Kothari 1970d:40).
Area of Political Activity
The British-administered Indian provinces and the urban 
centres such as Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras were the principal 
centres of the political activities of these elites. For example, 
from its inception in 1885 up to 1947, the year of Indian inde­
pendence, the Congress held its annual sessions ten times in 
Calcutta, seven times in Madras, six times in Bombay, four times 
in Lahore, three times each in Allahabad and Lucknow and twice 
each in Delhi, Karachi, and Ahmedabad -- all traditional cities 
in British-administered Indian provinces. The Congress rarely
held its annual session in any of the native Indian princely
2states until after independence. In fact, in several princely 
states, and in some of the princely areas which made up Orissa,
1
2Rajastan, Madhya Pradesh, Mysore, and Kerala, there was no Congress 
Party organization at the time of independence. Congress was first 
created in these areas after 1947 (Weiner 1967:13).
Aims and Objectives
For a long time these middle-class elites primarily sought
social reforms, increased representation in the legislatures and
responsive government (Crane 1959). The demand for self-government
was an early political development, and it grew into a desire to
built a national polity cutting across the loyalties of region,
3religion, caste and language. But until after the arrival of 
Gandhi on the political scene the freedom movement remained a 
preoccupation of the urban professional class, and for a long time 
the influence and appeal of this middle-class leadership was 
limited to the upper section of Indian society. Gandhi transformed 
the freedom movement into a mass movement; the ideas of freedom 
and political independence percolated into the lower sections of 
the society; and the Congress organization fast expanded into the 
countryside (Krishna 1966b).
Limited Franchise
Until some time after independence the leadership con­
tinued to be dominated by urban professional classes -- lawyers, 
journalists, academics, and traders who mostly belonged to the 
elite castes. There were two principal reasons. Before inde­
pendence the franchise was limited to the wealthy, the educated, 
and those involved with civil service or special interest asso­
ciations. Most of these people belonged to the middle or upper 
middle class, and lived in towns and cities. Secondly, the pre­
independence election system was based on separate electorates 
for different communities such as Muslims, Christians and Sikhs 
and special interest groups such as chambers of commerce and 
planting communities; this added extra weight to the urban elites.
3Early Reforms and Extension of Franchise
The Morley-Minto reforms of 1909 heralded a new era in 
the development of the Indian political system by introducing the 
method of electing the representatives, though only indirectly.^
In the case of provincial legislative councils separate elector­
ates were created for Muslims, zamindars, landholders, municipal 
corporations, universities, chambers of commerce, trades assoc­
iations, planting communities, municipal councils, and taluk 
boards. The qualifications of property and membership in that 
particular interest group were imposed on candidates seeking 
election. The electors who were about 30,000 in total in India 
did not exceed a few hundred in any constituency.
The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms of 1919 extended sep­
arate electorates in provincial legislative councils to Sikhs, 
Anglo-Indians, and Indian Christians. The system of direct 
election was introduced on the basis of a slightly liberalised 
franchise. Residence in the constituency, payment of municipal 
or income tax, ownership or occupation of a house, possession of 
agricultural land, military service, membership in a special 
interest association such as a chamber of commerce, entitled one 
to the right to vote. Any eligible voter 25 years of age and 
above could contest the election. Yet in 1920 out of a total of 
242 million people only 5.3 millions (2.2%) were eligible to vote.
The Federal Act of 1935 further extended the principle of 
separate electorates to scheduled castes, backward areas and tribes, 
Europeans, women, and labour. Franchise qualifications were further 
liberalised but varied from state to state. In general, literacy, 
payment of certain taxes, land revenue, house rent, were the 
necessary qualifications of electors for the lower house. Women 
whose husbands had the right to vote were also enfranchised. Even 
then, only 14 per cent of the total population in British India 
was entitled to vote.
It was to this narrow social base that the Congress 
electoral machinery was geared before independence and it secured 
significant electoral victories (Krishna 1966b). In the elections
4held in 1946 for the Constituent Assembly, the Congress won 205 
out of a total of 296 seats allotted to the British Indian provinces.
Because the urban middle classes were the initial organ­
izers and the earliest supporters of the nationalist movement, they 
also played a leading role in taking that movement and the Congress 
to the countryside. They built an organized network of communica­
tions and patronage across rural-urban boundaries. Rural elites 
were drawn into the nationalist movement and supplied local leaders 
in the 1930s. Büt leadership at the district and state levels 
remained in the hands of the urban elites. When adult franchise 
was adopted and country-wide direct elections were introduced for 
local community, state and federal legislatures immediately after 
independence, it was these urban leaders who had the power over 
pre-selection of candidates and decided the pattern of expansion 
of the party by winning over the local personalised power structures. 
It took many years for the rural elites to challenge the power of 
their urban political mentors.
POST-INDEPENDENCE POLITICS 
Introduction of Adult Franchise
The Congress leaders were not, however, ignorant of the 
social and political consequences of the adoption of adult franchise. 
Since the 1920s political parties, especially the Congress, had 
been far too committed to the ideas of adult franchise, and direct 
and secret voting, to be able to modify their stand. In fact, the 
Constituent Assembly approved these principles unanimously and 
without much controversy.
In his final speech to the Constituent Assembly, Dr 
Rajendra Prasad, the President, said that in making the decision 
on adult franchise they had indeed taken 'a very big step'. He 
went on: 'I am not dismayed by it...I know the village people
who will constitute the bulk of this vast electorate. In my opinion, 
our people possess intelligence and common sense. They also have 
a culture which the sophisticated may not appreciate but which is 
solid.... They are able to take measure of their own interest and
5also of the interests of the country at large if things are ex­
plained to them' (quoted in Morris-Jones 1957).
Impact of Adult Franchise on Voting
Veteran statesman K.M. Pannikar, referring to the social 
implications of the adoption of adult franchise, said: 'Adult
suffrage has social implications far beyond its political signi­
ficance ... many social groups previously unaware of their strength 
and barely touched by the political changes that had taken place,ß
suddenly realised that they were in a position to wield power'.
But it is doubtful whether the leaders of the Congress 
Party or even political scientists in general were at that time 
fully aware that a new agriculture-based rural leadership would 
emerge and gradually move upward because of the adoption of 
adult franchise and the location of more than 80 per cent of the 
electors in rural areas.
Writing in 1970, Rajni Kothari said: 'The elections
held in February 1952 took place under conditions of much suspense 
and anxiety. The politically alive public was as yet essentially 
urban where the challenge to the Congress appeared to be well 
articulated. No one was sure how the rural and illiterate would 
respond to this wholly new ceremony in the relationship between 
government and society' (Kothari 1970d:170).
Most of those who studied elections ignored the demo­
graphic implications of the adoption of adult franchise until 
almost a decade after the first general election. But they were 
prompt to discover that parties were cautious and took into 
account the religious and caste distributions of the electors 
when nominating candidates. The contributions and sacrifices 
made by a man to the cause of independence and the interest he 
evinced in social services were the most important considerations 
in nominating party candidates (Venkata Rao 1956) and this 
favoured candidates of urban origin.
a) Party fortunes
The contributors to the work edited by Kogekar and Park
6on the first general election in 1952 (Kogekar and Park 1956) 
wrote at length about the lack of well-formulated political issues 
and the excessive importance of traditional social cleavages in 
the voting patterns. Only two contributors pointed out that the 
declining fortunes of the Congress were due to the adoption of 
adult franchise. Sharma commented: 'The huge majorities that
the Congress won in 1946 have become a matter of the past, and 
the vacuum created by the Congress has not yet been filled by any 
other party' (Sharma 1956:201). The trend was more obvious in 
the state of Madras. Here, Nayar commented that 'adult franchise 
on the basis of which the general elections of 1951-1952 were held 
was indeed a powerful factor that was responsible for upsetting 
established party politics in the state. Congress which had 165 
out of 215 (or 77%) seats in 1945 in the state legislative 
assembly under conditions of restricted franchise, was able to 
secure only 152 out of 375, or little over 40% of the seats'
(Nayar 1956:108).
b) Socio-economic background of legislators
Morris-Jones put together all the available socio­
economic and political background data about the central legis­
lators and the state legislators of Bombay and Madras (just before 
and immediately after independence) and convincingly showed that 
adult franchise resulted in the broadening of lower educational 
and occupational categories among the legislators (Morris-Jones 
1957:114-128). This trend was more visible in the lower houses 
than in the upper houses and at the state level than at the 
central level. The proportion of legislators elected without any 
previous parliamentary experience was higher at the state level 
than at the central level. Although Morris-Jones exercised 
restraint in drawing inferences and making generalizations, there 
is evidence in his tables that the power of the urban elites was 
being challenged from the first general election.
Morris-Jones' data revealed that from 1909 to 1916,
26 to 37 per cent of the central legislative councillors and 38 
to 48 per cent of the provincial councillors were lawyers. If
7separate communal and special interest electorates were excluded 
the proportion of lawyers was as high as 70 per cent.
Moreover, 78 per cent of the members of the provisional 
parliament, 71 per cent of the members of the first Lok Sabha, 
and 39 per cent of the members of the first Bombay legislative 
assembly had university education. Also 67 per cent of the members 
of the provisional parliament, 61 per cent members of the first 
Lok Sabha and 82 per cent of the members of the first Bombay 
legislative assembly had no previous parliamentary experience.
It is a fair assumption that a majority of those who had no 
university education, no previous parliamentary experience at 
any level (local, state or central) must have come from the 
countryside. This was much more obvious with regard to the 
Madras legislative assembly (1952). Here only 36 per cent of 
the members had university education, while as many as 59 per 
cent claimed agriculture as their occupation, and 39 per cent 
belonged to backward or scheduled castes (Morris-Jones 1957:126). 
The change of leadership from urban to rural was quicker in 
Madras than elsewhere.
The Rise of Rural Elites
The shift of political leadership from urban to rural 
areas was not properly assessed in the early stages. The urban 
elites who played a dominant role in the freedom struggle were 
still at the helm of affairs and in some states the rural elites 
were dormant and docile. The relationship between the rural and 
urban elites at this time was not one of mutual opposition, nor 
of close alliance (Avasti 1956). For the poorly educated, econ­
omically strong rural elites who commanded the loyalties of 
numerically large groups it was a kind of political apprentice­
ship to work with state and central level representative insti­
tutions. In some states there were not yet any signs of the rise 
of rural elites. For example, of the 117 legislators who were 
elected to the Assam legislative assembly in 1952, 85 per cent 
had university education, 24 per cent were agriculturists, and 
76 per cent had urban middle-class or professional occupations.
8In fact, 33 per cent of the legislators were lawyers (Venkata Rao 
1956). Such urban dominance coupled with high educational quali­
fications, and participation in the freedom movement was character­
istic also of Travancore-Cochin (Pillay 1956:255).
a) Pre-occupation with the role of caste in politics
The excessive pre-occupation of social anthropologists 
and election researchers with the role of caste in Indian politics 
made them overlook the long-term implications of the change in 
the franchise. The discussion on the role of caste centred around 
two important points. Did caste loyalty play an important role in 
politics and particularly in elections? If it did, was it a 
hindrance or a help to democratic institutions? The answer to 
the first question was relatively settled. Despite wide varia­
tions and exceptions, in the behaviour of caste groups based on 
Jati subdivisions, economic status and factions, it was agreed by 
most of the researchers that caste played an important role, 
though not the only important one, in shaping voting patterns 
(Park and Tinker 1959; Kogekar and Park 1956). But a controversy 
centred on which was more important: the impact of caste and
religion on electoral politics, or the impact of electoral politics 
on caste and religion. Some, like Srinivas and Harrison, viewed 
castes essentially as homogeneous groups with a high tendency to 
uniform behaviour, and characterized the cleavages in rural society 
essentially as a conflict between higher and lower, or between the 
numerically large and economically powerful castes (Srinivas 1962; 
Harrison 1960).
Referring to this situation Srinivas wrote: '...tensions
between the upper castes and the Harijans are likely to increase 
in the near future. This conflict will overlap to some extent 
with the tensions brought about by development. All in all, I 
fear that we are in for a period of increasing unrest in our 
villages. This fear has been given an edge by the introduction 
of panchayat raj in some of the states. It has placed much 
power in the hands of the dominant castes, and there is no guar­
antee that they will not use it to oppress those who have trad-
9itionally obeyed them but are now beginning to assert their inde­
pendence. Apart from this it will introduce a bitter, and perhaps 
violent, scramble for power in the rural areas' (Srinivas 1962).^
b) Secularization of caste cleavages
Some political scientists thought on the other hand that 
castes, communities and even caste associations participated in 
politics not as traditional communal groups but as political groups. 
In this process traditional social cleavages were politicised and 
new identifications created. In this sense politics was 'the 
great leveller of social distances and dominance positions found 
in a peasant society' (Kothari, Shah 1965; Rudolph and Rudolph 
1960, 1967; Weiner 1963:8; Kothari 1970c). In a non-politicised 
society the influence of caste on politics is obvious. In the 
transitional stage of politicisation caste performs both tradi­
tional and political functions (Goyal 1965). Where democratic 
institutions are introduced into a highly traditional and hier­
archical society both of these functions may be discharged by a 
single set of leaders who try to retain their traditional social 
power through modern institutions (Lakshmana Rao 1964; Chaturvedi 
1969). In a politicised society on the other hand, one would expect 
the impact of politics on caste to be greater than the impact of 
caste on politics (Goyal 1965).
Shift in Power from Urban to Rural Elites
By the early 1960s the lack of recognition of shift in 
political power from urban to rural elites was partly remedied by 
intensive research in state politics. The investigations carried 
out by Weiner, Mayer, Bailey, Beteille and Kothari and his asso­
ciates in different parts of India proved beyond doubt that the 
political participation of the rural masses had three important 
consequences (Weiner 1959; Mayer 1961; Bailey 1963; Beteille 
1963; Kothari and Shah 1965; Kothari and Sheth 1965). Firstly, 
political power was percolating from urban trade-based traditional- 
elite castes to rural agriculture-based intermediate-Hindu castes. 
Secondly, the social groups which did not previously participate
10
in politics developed into effective pressure groups. They were 
not bold enough to claim a share of political power at the local 
level, owing to long-prevailing social relationships, but because 
of special reservations provided by the constitution they secured 
legislative (and often ministerial) representation proportional to 
their numerical strength in the population (Weiner 1968:39-40).
The situation was well summarized by Kothari in 1962. 
Writing on the eve of the third general election he said that 
'Indian politics has entered a new phase in which the old, awe­
inspiring, civil and urbanized leadership has come face to face 
with a new generation of leaders which has its roots in the rural 
side, which has its grip on local organizations, which is also 
fired by its own romanticism, a contempt for the westernised, a 
regard for strict order and discipline, a chronic inferiority 
complex, and a sense of certainty and conviction in what it is out 
to do. This rural elite is an entirely new force on the Indian 
political scene. It has begun to assert itself in not a few 
places. It will soon capture strategic positions in the establish­
ment' (Kothari 1962a).
This interpretation was later supported by a number of 
studies in state politics. The main theme of these studies was 
that after independence and particularly after the reorganization 
of the Indian states on a linguistic basis, a significant shift 
occurred in political power. But this shift was characterized 
more as power-mobility across the caste boundaries than as an 
inevitable consequence of the skewed distribution of electors 
over the rural-urban continuum. In the Indian electoral system 
based on single-member constituencies, and first-past-the-post 
voting, numbers were very important. Because the society was 
highly stratified even relative majorities concentrated in 
particular regions, if they were combined with economic power 
and common occupational interests, could give a far-reaching 
electoral advantage to certain social groups. Castes such as the 
Kammas and Reddys in Andhra, the Veil alas, Mudaliars, Gounders, 
and the Nadars in Tamil Nadu, the Lingayats in Mysore, the 
Marathas in Maharastra, and the Rajputs, Ahirs, and Jats in north
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India possessed these qualifications. These castes happened to be 
resident in rural areas. By coalescing with some smaller groups 
and skilfully exploiting existing loyalties they acquired political 
power and reaped great benefits from it (Roy 1966a, 1967).
It should be stressed here that it was not the caste 
rivalry but the introduction of adult franchise and modern rep­
resentative institutions that shifted political power from urban 
to rural elites. For example, strong movements launched against 
Brahmin social and political dominance were successful only in Madras 
Presidency before the introduction of adult franchise.
The situation was well described by Weiner when, 
referring to 'rising castes', he said: 'Among these groups it
has been the rural gentry with massive electoral backing that 
has moved readily into politics, gradually displacing the more 
educated urban classes. The critical factor in this development 
is the growing importance of numbers in an open electoral system, 
particularly when the numerically large groups are also in the 
possession of some economic means. Thus neither the numerically 
large, poor castes nor the small, wealthy upper castes are now 
as important as the large and moderately prosperous middle castes' 
(Weiner 1968:39). I will explain in a moment how this develop­
ment in itself is transitory and why the political interests of 
the rural rich and the urban wealthy sections are not similar.
a) Rural elites in local community government
The quantitative data available on the shift of political 
power from urban to rural elites indicate that it was not uniform 
over the local and federal political power continuum. Firstly, 
the participation of the rural elites was highest at the lowest 
level (panchayat raj institutions) and lowest at the highest 
level (Central ministry) of democratic institutions and the power 
hierarchy.
A study carried out by Ram Reddy (Reddy 1967) into the 
social composition and political background of panchayat raj 
executives in Andhra Pradesh revealed that 95 per cent of village
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panchayat heads, 83 per cent of panchayat samithi heads, and 64 
per cent of zilla parishad heads had agricultural occupations.
It is reasonable to assume that almost all of them came from 
rural areas. Political power then up to the level of the district 
was very much the domain of agriculture-based rural elites.
According to Reddy's study only 4 per cent of village 
panchayat heads, 24 per cent of panchayat samithi heads, and 
36 per cent of zilla parishad heads had university education.
In other words, the higher the level of representative institu­
tion, the higher the educational attainments of the political 
executives.
Reddy also found that the domination of the rising 
castes was complete at all the levels of local self-government. 
Nearly two-thirds of the village panchayat and panchayat samithi 
heads and all zilla parishad heads were from the Kammas and the 
Reddys. Brahmins formed about 3 per cent of village panchayat 
heads, less than 1 per cent of panchayat samithi heads, and were 
not to be found at all among zilla parishad heads. A majority 
of the village panchayat heads (59%) and 17 to 18 per cent of 
panchayat samithi and zilla parishad heads had no previous ex­
perience with representative institutions. It is likely that 
the situation was not different in other south and west Indian 
states, though this kind of rural and agricultural predominance 
in local community governments became apparent only recently in 
north India, where nearly half of the population belonged to 
traditional elite castes such as Brahmins, Vaisyas and Kayastas. 
These new shifts were well described by Weiner in his case studies 
of the districts of Kaira (Gujarat), Guntur (Andhra Pradesh), 
Belguam (Mysore), and Madurai (Tamil Nadu) (Weiner 1967:111-117, 
201-209, 298-302, 419-421).
b) Rural elites at the state level
Studies on socio-economic background of state legislators 
are few, and the available data indicate that by 1967 political 
power in most states passed into the hands of the rural landed 
gentry, who were often described as 'rising castes'. In the
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south and west Indian states this process was already complete.
For example, the ministry in Maharastra did not include a single 
Brahmin and the ministry in. Tamil Nadu did not include more than 
one Brahmin for quite some time (Dastur 1967; Forrester 1970).
In Andhra Pradesh and Mysore it was customary to include a lone 
Brahmin in the ministries, and most of the ministers came from 
villages and agricultural occupations. In the north the political 
power monopoly of the urban middle-class elites was broken only 
after the 1967 election (Dilip Mukherjee 1970, 1971a, 1971b).
A study carried out by Morris-Jones (Morris-Jones 1969) 
into the socio-economic and political background of Congress 
nomination seekers in Maharastra and Bihar in 1967 revealed that 
a majority of the nomination seekers and also those who secured 
the nominations (60 to 65%) were middle-aged; while about five 
in ten who secured nomination had university education. Of those 
who secured nomination, 73 per cent in Bihar and 64 per cent in 
Maharastra had no previous experience in representative institu­
tions (Morris-Jones 1969:130-134). Most of these poorly-educated 
new entrants into electoral competition were from the rural gentry.
Interestingly an investigation being carried out by 
V. Subramaniam and the writer into the socio-economic and political 
background of the DMK nomination seekers in 1967 also confirmed 
the shift from urban to rural areas. Our preliminary tables of 
this analysis based on data drawn from the files of the DMK office 
in Madras showed that about eight in ten nomination seekers were 
residents of small towns and rural areas, about six in ten had 
agricultural occupations, and only a fifth had university educa­
tion. Sitting members of the state assembly or federal parlia­
ment, political sufferers in party agitations and party leaders 
with long history usually secured nominations.
The situation in Himachal Pradesh was also in line with 
the general trend in the states at large. Here after the 1967 
election more than half of the assembly members were agricultur­
ists and only about a third had university education (Tyagi 1968).
But the situation was not the same in all states. In Assam, 
for example, more than 80 per cent of assembly candidates and about 
70 per cent of parliamentary candidates in 1967 had university 
education, and only 25 per cent of assembly candidates and 18 per cent
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of parliamentary candidates were agriculturists (Venkata Rao, 1968). The 
trend was similar in the state of Haryana (Sinha 1968). Here for one 
reason or another the urban professionals and traders continued to dominate 
the state legislatures though the rural agricultural elites were making 
sustained attempts to enter politics.
c) Rural elites at the centre
g
The trend at the federal level was clear though less impressive.
Here from 1952 to 1967, the representation of agriculturists increased 
from 16 to 32 per cent, that of the lawyers decreased from 25 to 17 per 
cent, that of the professionals decreased from 13 to 3 per cent, and that 
of the 'political and social workers' increased from 12 to 21 per cent.
It was customary for the agriculture-based rural political leaders to call 
themselves social and political workers as a status category; a majority 
of those so classed probably came from rural areas (Kochanek 1968:37).
The proportion of Lok Sabha members with university education declined 
from 82 per cent in 1952 to 75 per cent in 1967; the urban membership 
of Lok Sabha was no doubt declining but very slowly. In fact it may take 
many more elections before the rural sectors are proportionately represented 
in the membership of Lok Sabha.
In terms of place of birth some 45 to 50 per cent of the members 
come from small towns (i.e. below 100,000 population); these probably 
retained their political influence in rural areas through personal and 
group networks. If so, it is more appropriate to describe this group 
as link-men between the rural and urban leaderships, because they have 
their roots in the rural areas though they mostly live and work in urban 
areas.
The predominance of urban elites continued unhindered among the 
central ministers, the top-most political executives in the country. Here, 
from 1952 to 1967, about nine in ten had university education, three in 
ten were lawyers, one in ten were professionals, 13 to 16 per cent were 
social workers, and only 14 to 18 per cent were agriculturists. Data were 
not available for the ministries formed after 1967, but as most of the pre­
vious ministers were retained in the successive ministries one can assume 
that the occupational and educational composition did not change significantly. 
An investigation of the soico-economic and political background of the
members of the first, second and third Lok Sabhas classified 98 per cent of
9the members in each Lok Sabha as middle or upper middle class.
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The conclusions that follow from the above discussion 
are obvious. Up to the district level the representative institu­
tions were, dominated by rural agricultural elites. At the state 
level, rural agricultural elites predominated; urban interests 
and educated sections were represented though they did not have 
an effective say in formulating policies or implementing them.
At the federal level representatives were still drawn from edu­
cated sections mostly coming from towns and cities. But the 
representation of agriculturists was increasing slowly. At the 
central government level, most ministers had university education, 
were drawn from towns or cities, and belonged to the middle or 
upper middle class. On the other hand state governments were 
controlled by the rural agricultural interests. The chances 
of securing a party ticket and winning a seat in the Lok Sabha 
depended on the support that a candidate derived from and the 
loyalty that he owed to the state party organization. So rural 
and state-based political pressure was increasingly felt at the 
centre after the third general election and particularly after 
the death of Nehru (Brecher 1968; Lakshmana Rao 1969).
Policy Conflicts of Rural and Urban Elites
It was in this context that the persistent pressure from 
the bureaucracy (particularly from the Planning Commission) and 
the Union ministry to impose agriculture, income and wealth taxes 
and the stiff opposition from the state governments to such 
measures became meaningful (Rosen 1966:146-149). In fact to 
retain the support of the agriculturists and the state govern­
ments abolished land revenue and implemented the land reforms 
only half heartedly (Franda 1968; Brass 1968; Gray 1968;
Shrader 1968). It was customary for the state governments to 
raise the issue of ceilings on urban income and wealth whenever 
the central government brought up the issues of agricultural 
income and wealth taxes. On such issues party differences were 
not significant in the behaviour of states (Weiner 1968:48-51).
The attitudes of Congress legislators on issues such as 
ceilings on land holdings, urban income, and cooperative farming
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were, closely related to their caste, occupation, major source of 
income, size of personal land holding, and place of residence 
(Kochanek 1968). The major opposition to land ceilings came from 
agriculturists while support came from social sections which were 
completely divorced from the land and from those whose land 
holdings were small. Opposition to ceilings on urban income 
came from urban resident and occupational groups. The rural 
landless labourers and tribal groups supported ceilings on both 
urban and agricultural incomes. It was precisely for this reason 
that the rural landed gentry and urban industrialists could not 
make common political cause in India. The central leadership 
was urban oriented and economic reforms such as abolition of 
feudal land relations, reduction in economic inequalities, and 
diverting rural economic resources for industrialization were 
usually initiated by this leadership. These aims and goals often 
directly threatened the economic interests of social sections from 
which the state party organizations drew their support. Conse­
quently, taking the electoral, realities into consideration, the 
central leadership had to yield to the pressures of rural, and 
agriculture-oriented state leadership. The hesitation of the 
central government to impose agricultural wealth and income taxes 
and its reluctance, to strongly press for the implementation of 
land reforms, illustrate this situation well.^
Future Power Patterns.
But what will happen in future? Will this aggregation 
and consolidation of rural-based political power continue? Or 
will it stabilize at the state level leaving the centre open to 
urban leadership but imposing certain constraints on its policies?
The answer to these questions would have been considered 
relatively easy after the death of Nehru and before the snap 
election called by Indira Gandhi in 1971. That was a period in 
which state leaders successfully exerted enormous pressure on 
the central leadership, actively participated twice in deciding 
the succession (first after the death of Nehru and later after 
the. death of Shastri), and acquired commanding positions in the
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central ministries and the party high command. In practice, 
though not by law, power devolved from the centre to the states 
(Morris-Jones 1966; Brecher 1966) .  Analysts who predicted con­
tinued Congress dominance on the eve of the 1967 election were 
surprised at the sudden decline of Congress power that followed, 
and concluded that the Indian political system had entered an 
era of coalitions and instability (Kothari 1967c, 1967d), The 
controversy over the presidential election after the death of 
President Zakir Hussian and the consequent split in the Congress 
further confirmed the trend toward a weakening of the centre 
and a strengthening of the power of the states. In parliament 
the government had to depend on support extended by regional 
parties that demanded state autonomy (Lakshmana Rao 1970).
But Indira Gandhi dramatically nationalised the banks, 
about one year later called for a snap election, approached the 
electorate with a promising socialist programme, and romped back 
into the parliament with increased percentage of votes and two- 
thirds of the seats. Indira Gandhi became as popular as her 
father. Many members of the new (fifth) Lok Sabha owed their 
success to her charisma and policies. So she had neither the 
need nor the desire to succumb to the pressure of state leaders. 
The ministry that Indira Gandhi formed while riding the new wave 
of popularity was much more urban and middle-class than any of 
its predecessors. At the state level, however, the old pattern 
continued.
POLITICAL SIGNIFICANCE OF DEMOGRAPHIC SHIFTS
It can be argued at length whether the rural based 
political interests could again challenge the centre when an 
opportunity arose. Irrespective of personalities, temporary 
political issues and electoral gains and losses, three things 
are quite obvious to a political demographer.
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Rural to Urban Movement of Electors
When speaking of movement of electors from rural to urban areas in 
developing countries in general and in India in particular four points have to 
be kept in mind.
firstly, in developing countries the proportion of population living 
in urban areas is small and the pace of urbanisation is yet slow. Past 
experience in the West showed that the pace of urbanization increases after 
picking up momentum. But research scholars who worked on urbanization in India 
suggest that there are no indications yet that the process of urbanization in 
India is following the pattern experienced by the Western countries (Bose 1970; 
Zachariach 1968). The level and pace of urbanization in the long run will 
depend on several 'urban puli' and 'rural push' factors such as pace of industrial­
ization, creation of employment opportunities in urban areas, migration from 
rural to urban areas for education, trade and commerce, increasing labour 
pressure on scarce land, mechanization of agriculture (ladejinsky 1969; Rudra 
1969, 197l), and the movement of educated and trained rural youth into urban 
occupations.
Secondly, analysis of 1951 and 1961 census data shows that though the 
proportion of urban population is small (less than a fifth) about one fifth of 
the urban population in 1951 and about one-seventh of the urban population in 
1961 represented net gains from rural areas. The sharp rise in the decennial 
growth rate of migrants from 9 per cent between 1941 and 1951 to 34 per cent 
between 1951 and 1961 was attributed to the rural push and urban pull factors 
mentioned above (Gupta and Sadasyuk 1968: 80-8l). Several urban socio-economic 
surveys conducted in different parts of India in cities such as Madras, Kanpur, 
Bhopal, Lucknow and Jamshedpur clearly suggest that a majority of the migrants 
to these cities had come from rural areas (Balakrishna 1961; Majumdar I960;
Malhotra 1964; Mukerjee and Singh 1961; Misra 1959)• It has to be remembered, 
however, that the level and pace of urbanization were not uniform all over India, 
as was shown by the 1961 census. The proportion of 'urban population in India 
as a whole was then 18 per cent; in states such as Maharastra, Madras, and 
Gujarat it was more than 25 per cent, while in states such as Orissa, Assam, and 
Bihar it was less than 10 per cent. The preliminary figures from the 1971 
census indicate that the urban population in India was about 20 per cent of the 
total while in the states of Tamil Nadu, Maharastra, and Gujarat nearly a third 
of the population was living in urban areas.
Thirdly, as urbanization gathers momentum the present distribution of 
electors between rural and urban areas will gradually change. Even at the 
present pace of urbanization it is not unreasonable to assume that after five or 
six decades about half of the electors in states such as Maharastra, Tamil Nadu, 
and Gujarat will be living in urban areas. This process will be accentuated by 
another factor. A majority of migrants to urban areas are young males of working- 
age (20 to 45) so most of them are of voting age (21 and above).
finally, the political consequences of rural to urban movement of 
electors could be studied at several different points on the rural-urban 
continuum. Depending on the rural push and urban pull pressures that operate 
people could migrate to nearby small and middle-size towns, to traditional cities 
which developed as centres of trade, commerce and administration, to old 
industrial cities such as Bombay, Calcutta, Kanpur, and Ahmedabad, or to new 
industrial towns which grew up around newly constructed heavy industrial plants. 
When industrialization and urbanization pick up momentum migrants from rural
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areas would move primarily to industrial towns because they would be the main 
sources of employment opportunities.
This thesis is primarily concerned with the movement of population from 
rirral areas to new industrial towns, with the consequences of occupational 
mobility,^disintegration of old loyalties and the political resocialization of 
migrants. concerned with the rate or optimum level of urbanization,
but with the political consequences of a major demographic trend that is likely 
to occur m  almost all developing countries.1  ^ Hie selection of a new industrial 
town for field work was preferred for two reasons. firstly, industrial towns 
provide clues to the future patterns of political resocialization of industrial­
ization-fed rural-urban migrants. Secondly, migrants are available as groups 
in industrial towns. On the other hand, migrants constitute only a small 
proportion of the total population in traditional cities. It should also be 
remembered here that Bhilai was selected for field work primarily because it is 
a new heavy industrial town and is located close to the industrial belt of east 
India and not because a majority of the migrants in Bhilai were inter-state.
Bor example, if the survey was done in Durgapur as planned originally the 
proportion of intra-state migrants would have constituted a majority (see page 55).
Re socialization
As urbanization increases and the rural people move into urban areas they 
find themselves in a new social and occupational environment. Hie occupations 
they seek in urban areas are not usually hereditary. Hie migrants may have 
a few friends who help them find jobs and settle down in the new area. But 
in the workplace, when commuting to the workplace, and in the residential 
neighbourhood, a migrant has to seek new friendships. According to his 
occupation he may have to join a labour union, a professional association or 
a traders T association. To satisfy his cultural interests he may have to 
join a state cultural association or a regional association on the basis of 
his mother tongue, and to pursue his hobbies he may join organizations such 
as sports clubs, dramatic associations and libraries. Most of the above 
associations cut across religious, caste and often state loyalties. Such 
associations may often be called upon to exert pressure on government in 
general and particularly on the political parties at election time, either 
to protect their own occupational and professional interests, or to meet 
some special need of the occupational or interest group concerned. The 
migrants themselves may change their political attitudes and allegiance as 
their occupational status moves up or down. It is in this process that their 
primordial loyalties will gradually disintegrate or become irrelevant, and 
they will re-align their political affiliations on the bases of secular 
interests and associations.
Political Implications
The social characteristics and places of origin of migrants may 
also have immediate political implications. In India as in most other 
developing countries a great majority of migrants to urban areas are young 
males, with higher educational attainments on the average than those of the 
population from which they are drawn (Zachariah 1964). Election studies in 
the past revealed that electors of this type had no definite political loyalties,
MAP I. 1
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were highly emotional and easily swayed by temporary issues. A 
high proportion of these younger electors were thought to have been 
attracted to the non-Congress parties (Sheth 1970). This would 
suggest that rural to urban migration was likely to swell the 
non-Congress vote.
Between 1951 and 1961 'the pull of industrial and commercial 
magnets in urban areas' became increasingly important (Gupta and 
Sadasyak 1968: 82). States which were relatively industrially 
developed and states such as Madhya Pradesh, Mysore and Assam in 
which new industries were coming up fast were the net gainers in 
inter-state migration. On the other hand the states of Kerala and 
Andhra Pradesh where Communism was fairly influential, and the states 
of Tamil Nadu, Orissa and Punjab in which regional parties were 
fairly strong, and the states of Uttar Pradesh and Eihar in which 
the Jana Sangh was popular, were the principal states of origin of 
these inter-state migrants (see MAP l.l). Some scholars, such as 
Selig Harrison, have suggested that inter-state migrants of other 
language groups in Bombay worked as cliques within the leftist 
parties (Harrison I960: 266). Others, like Norman Palmer, thought 
that these groups preferred to vote for a candidate of their own 
language or of their own region if one was available (Palmer 1963; 
Hart I960). Such conclusions suggest that inter-state migration 
if it happens on a sufficiently large scale would be likely to 
modify local party structures and party systems in the states that 
attracted migrants.
RESEARCH METHOD
Once the theme of the research investigation was thus 
pinpointed there were two obvious methodological options. The 
1961 census of India collected and tabulated a wide variety of 
socio-economic and demographic data for all administrative units 
down to taluk level and for all places recognized as urban. The 
Election Commission of India collected and published election
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statistics at constituency level while polling-booth voting 
details were available (up to 1969) at the district election 
offices.
Some scholars made a joint analysis of these census 
data and election statistics to make broad generalizations and 
inferences and provide explanations of the emerging electoral 
trends (Gopalkrishna 1964; Murthy and Rao 1968; Morris-Jones 
and Gupta 1970; Zagoria 1971). The degree of freedom with 
which a research worker can speak of individual voting prefer­
ences on the basis of aggregate voting trends is limited. Yet 
such an investigation could be highly useful in explaining some 
broad trends at the aggregate level, and help in generating some 
hypotheses that might be tested through a field survey. In our 
case such an analysis could be done for all new industrial towns 
and traditional cities with ease.
In India there are 113 traditional cities (including 
town-groups) with more than 100,000 population each and about 22 
new industrial towns with more than 20,000 population each, spread 
out all over the country. One could undertake a field survey of 
some of these towns and collect primary data on socio-economic 
and occupational mobility patterns, associational activities, 
and political attitudes.
I decided to carry out an aggregate analysis for all 
traditional cities and industrial towns, to explain some major 
voting patterns and generate some hypotheses that could be tested 
by a field survey in one industrial town and one traditional city. 
Further interviews with the leaders in the towns surveyed would 
be helpful in understanding the local situations. So the strategy 
was to use a combination of both methods in the first project of 
its kind in the study of Indian politics.
The quantitative analyses for this thesis were based 
mostly on data derived from the census and election report, 
polling-booth data, about 1200 cross-section interviews and dozens 
of interviews with local leaders. In developing the theme of the 
thesis and carrying on the discussion I had to be selective, and 
relied mostly on quantitative studies in India, but I did not 
ignore relevant material from other types of studies. What follows 
in the later chapters are the findings of such an analysis.
FOOTNOTES
For detailed account of the role played by the 
Western-educated elites in the freedom struggle see 
T. McCulley, English Education and the Origins of 
Indian Nationalism. New York: Columbia University
Press 1940; and A.R. Desai, Social Background of 
Indian Nationalism. Bombay: Popular Book Depot
1954. For a general understanding of the growth 
of the middle classes in India see B.B. Misra,
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were Tripura in 1938 and Ramagarh in 1940. These 
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addresses published by G.A. Natesan and Company, 
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obvious. The twin points which most of the Congress 
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Longmans 1957. See especially his second chapter.
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and 1935, see W.A.J. Archbald, Outlines of Indian 
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P.N. King and Son Ltd. 1926; R. Coupland, The 
Constitutional Problem of India. Vol. I, The Indian 
Problem 1833-1935; Vol. II, Indian Politics 1936- 
1942; Vol. Ill, The Future of India. London:
Oxford University Press 1942, 1943 and 1944.
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Representation in the Democratic System'. A mono-
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community in electoral politics carried out under 
the supervision of M.N. Srinivas see Imtiaz Ahmed, 
General Elections of 1967 in a Rural Constituency. 
Economic and Political Weekly, VI, 1971 and 
Khadija A. Gupta, General Elections of 1967 in a 
Small Town. Economic and Political Weekly VI,
1971.
8. The statistics of socio-economic and political 
background of members of Lok Sabha and Rajya Sabha 
and Ministers of the Union Government are based on 
a comparison of data from different sources. For 
details see Lok Sabha Secretariat, Activities of 
First Lok Sabha in Brief 1952-1957. New Delhi:
Lok Sabha Secretariat 1957; Lok Sabha Secretariat, 
Activities of the Second Lok Sabha (Statistics and 
Charts) 1957-1962. New Delhi: Lok Sabha Secretariat
1962; Lok Sabha Secretariat, Activities of the 
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of Indian Legislators. Journal of Commonwealth 
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9. Details on the socio-economic and political back­
ground of Union Ministers, their class origins and 
place of birth were obtained from S.N. Misras' work 
at Syracuse University.
10. Finally, when the Union Government made up its mind 
to impose agricultural wealth and income taxes it 
tried to persuade the state governments by a call 
for a ceiling on urban property and agricultural 
income and wealth taxes simultaneously. Presently 
such a proposal is being discussed both at the 
state and central levels. For a report of the 
Central Land Reforms Committee on ceilings on land­
holdings, see Times of India, 5 August 1971. The 
State Government of Bihar has already approved 
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urban property and at the same time assured that 
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11» Here one may agree with the argument of Kothari and
his associates that in a country like India where 
eight in ten persons live in rural areas, it is the 
introduction of modern representative institutions, 
election politics, and voter participation that 
play a vital role in weakening the primordial 
loyalties of the rural society. On the other hand, 
for the same reasons one may argue perhaps more 
effectively, that so long as the social and occu­
pational structures in the rural areas continue 
as they are today primordial loyalties will con­
tinue to be a key factor in politics in Indian 
rural areas. The working population in rural 
areas can be divided into three broad occupational 
categories: owner and tenant cultivators, agri­
cultural labourers, and artisans. Petty govern­
ment officials, school teachers and development 
officials are a distinct category of workers in 
rural areas but they are few. As primordial 
loyalties in rural areas are closely linked to 
agriculture based occupational interests and as 
occupations are unlikely to change as long as 
rural people remain in the rural areas, one can 
in fact speculate about an upper ceiling for the 
process of secularization of politics in rural 
areas. On the other hand, migration to urban areas 
will mean a complete change in the social and occu­
pational situation of a person. For an interesting 
article on the distance between the political 
sophistication of different segments of Indian 
society see W.H. Morris-Jones, India's Political 
Idioms. In Philips (ed.), Politics and Society in 
India. London: George Allen and Unwin 1963.
12. For studies on urbanization in India see Roy Turner
(ed.), India's Urban Future. Berkeley and Los 
Angeles: University of California Press 1.962;
Gerald Breese (ed.), The City in Newly Developing 
Countries: Readings on Urbanism and Urbanization.
Prentice Hall 1969.
MAP I I . 1
INDIA, SH O W IN G  N EW  TO W N S INCLUDED 
IN AGGREGATE ANALYSIS
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AGGREGATE ANALYSIS1 
PRINCIPLES FOR PICKING TOWNS
In selecting an appropriate control set of cities for aggre­
gate analysis, it was necessary to adopt different principles for the
2new industrial towns and for the old 'traditional' cities, though in 
both cases the principles were simple and straightforward.
Industrial Towns
II
The census of 1961 recognized for the first time as urban units 
a total of 483 new towns, with an aggregate population of 4.5 millions.
A majority of these towns (340) had a population of fewer 
than 10,000; 31 of them, with a combined population of 1.1 millions,
had more than 25,000 people each.
First, all towns with a population of 20,000 or less were 
eliminated from the sample. There were two reasons for this. Most of 
the smaller 'new towns' as listed in the census were in fact old settle­
ments or outer suburbs of traditional towns with stable populations -- 
whereas this study is focussed on migrants to the new industrial areas.
In addition, in the smaller towns there would be insufficient scope for 
significant political activity among the different types of migrants.
In a town with under 20,000 population and about 8,000 electors, the 
potential supporters of minority parties like the Communists or Socialists 
might number only a few hundred. In the Indian situation such numbers
would be too small to organize a party branch or put up a candidate to
** 3contest an assembly election; they could only become minor pressure 
groups within the main parties or lose interest in politics altogether.
They would not provide fruitful data for this study.
Second, towns in the vicinity of an older metropolis like Bombay 
or Calcutta were eliminated as their politics might be unduly influenced 
by those of the larger centres.
Third, two new state administrative capitals, Chandigarh (Punjab) 
and Bhubaneswar (Orissa) were eliminated as likely to be inhabited largely 
by confirmed city dwellers.
This left a sample of twenty-two towns -- three from south India, 
one from west India, nine each from north and east India -- a selection
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which satisfactorily matched the distribution of industrial development 
in India. For example, the main industrial belt is usually thought to 
comprise eastern Madhya Pradesh, the Chota-Nagpur area in Bihar, and the 
Burdwan district of West Bengal. Eight of the selected industrial towns 
are located in this region, most of them with heavy industrial establish­
ments such as steel or fertilizer factories.
Traditional Cities
According to the 1961 census, 113 traditional cities had a 
population of more than one hundred thousand. Of these, 17 traditional 
cities such as Bombay, Calcutta, Delhi, and Madras were too big to be 
treated as single units and for election purposes all of them were
4divided into more than three state legislative assembly constituencies.
On the other hand, to include towns with less than one hundred thousand 
population would have involved collecting polling-booth data from more 
than one hundred district headquarters. So it was considered advisable 
to include all traditional cities having more than one hundred thousand 
population which were divided into not more than two state legislative 
assembly constituencies. In cases where it was found that sizeable pro­
portions of rural electors had been added to city constituencies, such 
cities were eliminated from the aggregate analysis. This left a sample 
of 88 cities (comprising 105 state legislative assembly constituencies),
28 from south India, 6 from east India, 15 from west India, and 39 from 
north India. Almost every state in India was represented by at least one 
city while the largest number of cities (15) came from the most populous 
state of Uttar Pradesh. Considering its level of industrial development 
and urbanization West Bengal, with only three traditional cities, was 
under-represented. But a number of population conglomerations presented 
by the 1961 census as independent cities were in reality parts of greater 
Calcutta, and had to be eliminated.
Matching Voting Statistics and Socio-economic Data
The matching of voting statistics to socio-economic data needs 
to be explained. The boundaries of traditional cities and of the assembly 
constituencies in which they were located usually coincided. But it was 
observed that the electors in industrial towns constituted only a small 
proportion of the total electorates of the assembly constituencies in 
which they were located.^ So polling booth data specially supplied by
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the Election Commission of India were recast to match the boundaries of 
the industrial towns. As the general election of 1962 was the closest to 
the census of India 1.961, the demographic data of the 1961 census and 
the state legislative assembly constituency voting data of 1962 were 
used for this aggregate analysis.
The variables selected as the likely determinants of voting 
behaviour fell into three principal categories; firstly, demographic 
variables, i.e. size of population, sex ratio (females per hundred males), 
and the region in which the town is located; secondly, socio-economic 
variables, i.e. literacy, sales tax per capita, and entertainment tax 
per capita; and thirdly, exposure to mass media, i.e. number of radiosg
per thousand population. In the case of traditional cities, in addition 
to the above-mentioned variables, major economic function of the work 
force (manufacturing trade and commerce or service)percentage of 
migrants to total population, and the growth in population of the city 
from 1951 to 1961 were added. The selection of the above-mentioned 
indicators was based primarily on the significance and availability of 
data; it is not suggested here that these are the only variables that 
influence voting behaviour. If available, level of income, education, 
membership in voluntary associations and trade unions, newspaper circu­
lation and consumption patterns would have proved useful.
In this chapter I first analyse the performance of different 
political parties (or groups of parties) in terms of votes secured and 
seats won and the distribution of votes and seats over the constituencies 
in industrial towns, traditional cities and India as a whole. Later I 
examine the effect of the selected independent variables on the electoral 
performances of different political parties in industrial towns and 
produce a multiple regression analysis of the selected independent 
variables and voting patterns in traditional cities. This in turn is 
followed by an explanation of the comparative voting patterns ing
different kinds of towns and cities and at the all-India level. Finally 
I develop hypotheses to be ultimately tested by our survey data, mostly 
on the basis of the present aggregate analysis but also liberally drawing 
upon the existing urban election literature.
PARTY PERFORMANCE IN INDUSTRIAL TOWNS 
Votes Secured and Seats Won
The aggregate analysis revealed some obvious voting patterns. 
Out of the 22 industrial-town assembly constituencies, the Congress
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c o n t e s t e d  a l l  and won 17,  t h e  Communists c o n t e s t e d  17 and won 3, and
t h e  S w a t a n t r a  P a r t y  c o n t e s t e d  6 and won two.
Out of  105 t r a d i t i o n a l  c i t y  a s se m b ly  c o n s t i t u e n c i e s ,  t h e  Congress
c o n t e s t e d  103 and won 69, t h e  Communists c o n t e s t e d  46 and won 9, t h e  r e l i g i o u s  
9
r i g h t i s t  p a r t i e s  nom in a ted  101 c a n d i d a t e s  i n  81 c o n s t i t u e n c i e s  and won 3
s e a t s .  The c o r r e s p o n d i n g  f i g u r e s  f o r  t h e  P r a j a  S o c i a l i s t  P a r t y  (PSP) were
1044 and 6.  The r e g i o n a l  p a r t i e s  and n o n - p a r t y  c a n d i d a t e s  ( i n d e p e n d e n t  
c a n d i d a t e s )  won 9 s e a t s  e a c h . ^ '
C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  Votes  and S e a t s
The c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  C ongress  v o t e  ( p e r c e n t a g e  o f  C ong re s s  v o t e  as  
a p r o p o r t i o n  o f  t h e  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  i t s  v o t e  a t  t h e  n a t i o n a l  l e v e l )  was 
s l i g h t l y  lower t h a n  u n i t y  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  c i t i e s  and m a r g i n a l l y  h i g h e r  i n  
i n d u s t r i a l  towns (TABLE I I . 1 ) .  I n  c o n t r a s t ,  t h e  c o e f f i c i e n t  o f  Communist 
v o t e  was s i g n i f i c a n t l y  h i g h e r  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  c i t i e s  ( 1 .3 5 )  and v e ry  much 
h i g h e r  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  towns ( 2 . 3 6 ) .  I n  bo th  t h e s e  a r e a s  the  v o t e  s e c u r e d  
by o t h e r  l e f t i s t  p a r t i e s  and i n d e p e n d e n t  c a n d i d a t e s  was low. The S w a t a n t r a  
P a r t y  f a r e d  p o o r l y  bo th  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  and i n d u s t r i a l  towns.  The c o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  Hindu r e l i g i o u s  v o t e  was h i g h e r  t h a n  f o r  any o t h e r  p a r t y  i n  t r a d i t i o n a l  
c i t i e s  ( 1 . 8 6 )  and s l i g h t l y  lower  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  towns ( 0 . 9 6 ) .
I n  an e l e c t i o n  s y s te m  based  on p l u r a l i t y  c o u n t i n g  ( f i r s t  p a s t  t h e  
p o s t ) ,  t h e r e  need n o t  be any c o n s t a n t  a s s o c i a t i o n  between  p e r c e n t a g e  o f  
v o t e s  s e c u r e d  and p r o p o r t i o n  o f  s e a t s  won. Given  the  f r a g m e n te d  p a r t y  
s y s te m ,  u n t i l  1967 the  e l e c t i o n  s y s te m  was a boon to  t h e  Cong res s  and a 
s o u r c e  o f  f r u s t r a t i o n  to  t h e  o p p o s i t i o n .  The Congress  a lways  won more t h a n  
t w o - t h i r d s  o f  s e a t s  by s e c u r i n g  l e s s  t h a n  h a l f  t h e  v o t e s  c a s t .  The c o e f f i ­
c i e n t  of  s e a t s  won by t h e  Congres s  was s l i g h t l y  h i g h e r  t h a n  u n i t y  i n  t r a d ­
i t i o n a l  c i t i e s  ( 1 . 0 6 )  and c o n s i d e r a b l y  h i g h e r  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  towns ( 1 . 2 5 ) .
I n  t h e  c a s e  o f  Communists t h e  above t r e n d  was much a c c e n t u a t e d .  The 
S w a t a n t r a  P a r t y ,  b e c a u s e  o f  t h e  c o n c e n t r a t i o n  o f  i t s  v o t i n g  s u p p o r t  i n  a 
few p o c k e t s  was a b l e  t o  win two s e a t s  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  towns bu t  a l l  o t h e r  
p a r t i e s  f a i l e d  to  win  any s e a t s .  I n  t r a d i t i o n a l  c i t i e s  t h e  S w a t a n t r a  P a r t y  
drew a b l a n k ,  r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t  p a r t i e s  d id  s l i g h t l y  b e t t e r  and non-Communist  
l e f t  p a r t i e s  v e r y  much b e t t e r .  So, e x c l u d i n g  the  o c c a s i o n a l  v i c t o r y  o f  t h e  
S w a t a n t r a  P a r t y  t h e  e l e c t o r a l  i n f l u e n c e  i n  i n d u s t r i a l  towns was p o l a r i z e d  
be tw een  t h e  C ongre s s  and th e  Communists .
The Communists were c a u t i o u s  i n  n o m in a t i n g  c a n d i d a t e s  i n  c on ­
s t i t u e n c i e s  where t h e y  had o n l y  f a i r  chances  of  w in n in g ,  w h i l e  o t h e r
TABLE 11.2
The Coefficient* of Votes Secured by Different Political 
Parties by Different Types of Industrial Towns
Type of industrial town INC CPI SWA Religious
Rightist
Non-
Communist
Left
Big 0.96 0.91 0.36 1.02 1.50
Small 1.07 1.15 2.06 0. 97 0. 17
High sex ratio 1.02 1.06 0.88 1.11 0. 75
Low sex ratio 0.98 0. 91 1.18 0.85 1.36
High literacy 1.04 1.04 0.86 1.57 0.80
Low literacy 0.96 0.96 1.14 0.43 1. 19
High employment 0. 97 0.80 1.31 0.42 1.78
Low employment 1.03 1.17 0. 75 1.47 0.35
High sales tax 1.02 0.82 1.61 1.01 1.17
Low sales tax 0.97 1.30 -- 0.98 0. 72
High entertainment 0.98 0. 96 1.18 1.64 1.14
Low entertainment 1.02 1.03 0.87 0.52 0.90
High radio 0.98 0.88 1.00 1.27 1.27
Low radio 1.02 1.16 1.00 0. 74 0.74
Eastern region 0.95 1.27 1.17 0.37 1.11
Other regions 1.05 0.74 0.84 1.61 0.90
Percentage of votes secured
All industrial towns 46.77 23.09 2.51 6.32 12.72
All traditional cities 43.01 13.17 3.30 12.29 15.26
All India 44.38 8.59 7.42 6.99 17. 10
Note : Independent candidates and other regional parties are not rep­
resented in the above table. They secured 8.59 per cent of votes 
in industrial towns, 12.97 per cent in traditional towns, and 
15.52 per cent at the all India level.
* The coefficient of votes secured is a simple index. It is the 
percentage of votes secured by a party in a category of industrial 
towns as proportion of the percentage of votes secured by that 
party in all industrial towns.
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parties, particularly the religious rightist parties, the PSP, 
the Samyuktha Socialist Party (SSP) liberally nominated candidates in 
as many constituencies as possible and forfeited a large proportion of 
deposits.
Religious Rightist Candidates in Traditional Cities
The strength of the religous rightist and independent candidates 
in traditional cities was not even all over the country. An analysis 
of the state figures indicated that the average number of religious 
rightist candidates contesting each traditional city seat decreased as one 
moved from north to south India -- their highest concentration being in 
Madhya Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh (about 1.5 per seat) while in Kerala it 
was negligible (0.2). The trend was the same in the case of leftist 
parties other than Communists and non-party candidates. For example the 
number of independent candidates per seat was 3.6 in Rajasthan, 2.8 
in Bihar, 2.6 in UP, 2.4 in Punjab, 2.0 in MP, 1.3 in Andhra Pradesh 
and Mysore, 0.9 in Tamil Nadu, and it was nil in Kerala. Hence it is 
clear that the splintering of vote in traditional cities characterized 
by a high frequency of religious rightist and independent candidates was 
considerable in north India. This leads us to the conclusion that 
voting preferences in south India occur within the framework of the 
national or state party system, and confirms the generalization that 
social groupings in south India found it more profitable to operate 
within the ranks of national and regional political parties rather than 
set up their own candidates. The enthusiasm of rising dominant castes 
such as Kammas, Reddys, Lingayats, Okkaligas, Nadars, Vellalas, Nayars 
and Thiyas to work inside political parties rather than outside helped 
this process of politicization and expansion of political parties.
Voting Support for Congress
The voting support for Congress was fairly high and evenly 
spread in all kinds of industrial towns (TABLE II.2). Further, the 
different regions showed only marginal variations in Congress voting.
For example even in industrial towns in east India (in which region the 
total voting support of Congress was weak) Congress secured far more 
votes than any other party. Our multiple regression analysis of traditional 
cities that follows this section also indicated that the Congress vote 
was to a significant level positively associated with higher purchasing
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power, workforces predominantly occupied in trade and commerce, and 
higher rates of literacy. But the electoral performance of various non- 
Congress parties in different kinds of industrial towns may also help 
to explain the even spread of Congress Party predominance.
Voting Support for Communists
Communist performance seemed better where there was economic 
backwardness and a low standard of living. Their performance was also 
fairly high in towns in east India, thereby indicating that industrial 
towns within the existing industrial belt or areas of strong Communist 
influence are more likely to vote Communist than towns situated else­
where. The Communists also fared considerably better in small towns. 
According to two electoral analyses in Kerala and Tamil Nadu, Communists 
were popular in towns of 25,000 to 50,000 population where literacy and
wage levels are low and a higher proportion of the workforce is employed
12in unmechanized industries and handicrafts (Murthy and Rao 1968). So 
it is possible that industrial workers on low salaries, and having low 
literacy rates may feel inclined to vote Communist wherever they exist.
Low percentage of the population at work and low number of 
females per hundred males in the context of this study have two impli­
cations. Metropolitan cities which are the hubs of regional and national 
elite activities nearly always reported very low percentages of working 
population. But the nascent industrial towns we are dealing with are not 
of that kind. These towns are based on a single industry, and are often 
located in backward and remote areas. So, in the beginning, only the 
workers moved to these areas, and the proportion of workers in their 
populations was very high. As dependents moved to join them or as 
bachelors got married and children were born to them, the working propor­
tion of the population steadily decreased. This is a clear indication 
of economic and occupational security and peaceful settled life with a 
stake in the industry on which they depended for their livelihood. 
Normally, under Indian circumstances, such workers and their dependents 
with a secure life should exhibit a preference for the centre or right of 
centre parties that support the status quo. Surprisingly the Communists 
fared nearly as well in industrial towns with low employment and a low 
sex ratio as in the towns in the eastern region. In fact, a marginal 
trend in traditonal cities also indicated the same pattern.
However, the better performance of Communists in industrial
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towns with low percentages of workers can be explained in a number of 
ways, It is possible that Communist trade union officials and party 
organization need time to establish contacts and cultivate support and 
that such contacts and support would be available only when the newly 
arrived workers feel a sense of job security and settle down to normal 
living. Further, as feelings of deprivation, frustration and alienation 
are based on comparison of one's own position with that of others, workers 
do not feel comparatively deprived until people in a town are more diver­
sified. In the Indian industrial town this is particularly applicable 
because a majority of the semi-skilled and manual labourers move to 
industrial towns with a low level of occupational and economic aspiration. 
In the initial stages such people are likely to be content with modest 
achievements, though they may later support parties that advocate radical 
socio-economic measures. In other words, previous Communist sympathizers 
or contacts of migrants may offer the Communist organizers people ready 
and willing to establish their organization; while local job dissatis­
faction and discontent if any exists may help the Communists to expand 
their activities and voting support.
Voting Support for Swatantra Party
The voting support of the Swatantra Party on the other hand was 
generally associated with the indicators of higher purchasing power and 
higher standard of living. A good performance in low literacy areas was 
exceptional. But we have to bear in mind three facts in relation to the 
performance of the Swatantra Party. Firstly, it contested only 6 of the 
22 industrial town constituencies. Secondly, four of these six constit­
uencies are located in east India (Bihar). Finally, the electoral
strength of the Party in Bihar was highly dependent on the personal
13influence of the Raja of Ramagarh. One may however argue that voters 
in industrial towns are probably vulnerable to the surrounding political 
environment and personal influences and that the Swatantra Party was a 
beneficiary from this. How these personal influences are extended over 
the migrants and what channels of communication are most effective in 
this regard have to be examined through the survey data.
Voting Support for Religious Rightist Parties
The coefficient of religious rightist vote in relation to 
almost all the variables is consistent with previous findings. The
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industrial towns which extended significantly higher support to the 
rightist parties have all the attributes of old administrative towns.
The available literature on elections suggests that voting support 
for the religious rightist parties is associated with the northern region, 
with traditional administrative cities, with Hindu Muslim religious 
tensions, and with the presence of the highly educated and urban-employed 
elite castes (Baxter 1969:154; Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969). So the 
voting pattern in relation to the religous rightist parties in industrial 
towns may be interpreted in two ways. It may be that within the compara­
tively developed industrial towns, higher social and occupational classes 
still retain their loyalty to traditional religious and caste values and 
hence extend their support to the religious parties. Alternatively, 
it is possible that a large number of hitherto widely scattered potential 
religious rightist sympathizers find themselves in the new situation in 
sufficiently large numbers to participate actively in parties of their 
choice. Migrants to north Indian towns in general possess characteristics 
of potential religious rightist sympathizers -- being displaced from 
Pakistan, belonging to the Brahmin Vaisya castes, already being influenced 
by the RSS, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Arya Samaj. One can also argue 
that in industrial towns the large scale recruitment and upward mobility 
of hitherto disabled social sections reduce the economic and occupational 
distances between them and the traditional elite castes. The latter may 
then support the Jana Sangh as a protective measure.
The category of other left parties in Table II.3 comprises the 
Praja Socialist Party, the then Indian Socialist Party, Revolutionary 
Socialist Party and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. As already pointed 
out the support for these parties was widely scattered over all the 
towns. The leftist parties fared better (1.11) in towns located in non­
eastern regions and in new towns (1.40). But in all other categories 
the performance of the other leftist parties was in inverse ratio to 
that of the Communists. This indicates that the non-Congress parties 
could not affect the Congress vote significantly, and that the Communist 
and non-Communist leftist parties were competing with each other.
REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF TRADITIONAL CITIES
In the case of traditional cities I carried out a multiple 
regression analysis of the independent and real variables of sex ratio, 
literacy, employment, per capita sales and entertainment taxes, number
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of radios per thousand population, percentage of migrants, and the 
decennial growth rate in population. In addition to these I created 
two classes of dummy variables based on geographical location of the 
city (region), whether the workforce in the city was engaged predomin­
antly in manufacturing, trade and commerce, or in the service sector 
(function). In carrying out the regression analysis the independent 
real variables were standardized and made comparable with the dummy 
variables.
The reasons for creating the dummy variables based on geo­
graphical location and function of workforce are the following. The 
electoral support of the non-Congress parties is limited to a few 
states or regions. For example in the general election of 1967 the 
opposition parties secured more than ten per cent of votes each only 
in a few states -- the Jana Sangh in Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh,
Bihar, Haryana, Jammu and Kashmir; the Communists in Kerala, Andhra, 
and West Bengal; the Swatantra Party in Orissa, Rajastan, and Gujarat; 
the SSP in Bihar; and the PSP in Orissa. So the variable of geograph­
ical location of city will enable us to ascertain how a political party 
is faring in the traditional cities of the region in which it is influ­
ential in relation to other states in which it is not so influential.
If a party's vote is high in the traditional cities in the regions in 
which its electoral support is generally weak one may speculate that the
party may in future penetrate into small towns and rural areas.
The major function of workforce on the other hand gives us a
broad measure as to which of the traditional cities contain large numbers
of industrial workers and which of them contain workers in trade and 
commerce and service sectors. An electoral study in Kerala suggested 
that big towns with relatively large numbers of workers engaged in 
service occupations voted for the Congress. On the other hand, towns 
with unmechanized industries and comparatively large numbers of workers 
engaged in handicrafts voted for the Communists. Though one cannot assert 
that a good performance by a party in trade-oriented cities is essen­
tially due to the support of workers engaged in trade, or a good perfor­
mance of a party in cities with manufacturing industries is primarily 
due to the support of industrial workers, it will provide us with a basis 
for generating hypotheses. In general I expect that the parties which 
gathered good electoral support in industrial towns would also gather 
good support from manufacturing traditional cities because both contain 
the same type of workers. On the other hand, a party like the Jana Sangh
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which is said to be popular with workers engaged in petty trading may gather 
good electoral support from cities with workers engaged mostly in trade and 
commerce.
The Congress, the Communists, and the religious rightists were the 
only parties which contested a considerable number of traditional city assembly 
constituencies. So I preferred only the votes secured by these parties as 
dependent variables in the regression models. Further in the case of a party 
or a group of parties the analysis covered only those constituencies that 
it contested.
Aims of Regression Analysis
The reasons for choosing a multiple regression analysis are simple. 
With the exception of the studies carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta, and 
Zagoria (Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969; Zagoria 197l), aggregate electoral 
studies in India were based mostly on two-way tables (Kothari and Sheth 1965; 
Krishna 1966a; Chandidas 1967; Murthy and Rao 1968). In such a method it 
is difficult to discern the relation between different independent variables 
and if the variables are related to one another it will be difficult to 
estimate the proportion of total variation explained by each or all of such 
variables put together. On the other hand, my aim here is to examine whether 
the independent variables are related to one another, and to see which of the 
independent variables influence the voting support of different parties.
Later I will estimate the proportion of total variation explained by all the 
independent variables which significantly influenced the voting support of a 
party.
The reasons for undertaking regression analysis of traditional cities 
while confining ourselves to two-way tables in the case of industrial towns are 
as follows. Firstly, the total number of industrial towns was too small (22) 
to carry out a regression analysis. Only the Congress contested in all 
of these towns, the non-Congress parties contested only in a few, the 
Communists in 17, religious rightist parties in 12, PSP in 9, Swatantra 
Party in 6, and regional parties in only one. On the other hand there were 
105 traditional city constituencies and each of the major parties contested 
in a sufficiently large number of constituencies,. Congress in 103, the 
religious rightist parties in 81, and the Communists in 46. Secondly
TABLE II.3
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Total 
Votes Secured by the Congress in the 
Traditional City Seats it Contested
Number of cases = 103
Constant term = +0.438
Coefficient of ^
determination, R = .141
Variables Estimated coefficient
Literacy level 0.031 
Per cent of migrants 0.031 
Sales Tax 0.022
F
7
8
4
TABLE 11.4
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Total Votes 
Secured by the Communists in the Seats They 
Contested
Number of cases = 46
Constant term = 0.305
Coefficient of ^
determination, R = .271
Variable Estimated coefficient
North India -0.100 
Per capita sales tax 0.039 
Sex ratio 0.036
-Value
.804
.200
.157
-Value
4.695
3.603
3.045
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some data which were available for traditional cities were not available for 
industrial towns or were inapplicable in their case. for example function of 
workforce, decennial growth rate, and percentage of migrants were additional 
variables included in the analysis of traditional cities. So I decided to 
use these data in a critical analysis to make the comparison of voting patterns 
in industrial towns and traditional cities more reliable.
Method of Analysis
The analysis was done in two stages. In the first stage I examined
the influence of all independent real and dummy variables separately on the
vote secured by each party. In the second stage I deleted variables whose P
14statistic was below the 10 per cent level of significance and worked out
the overall coefficient of determination of all the independent variables
whose P statistic was significant enough to be included in the model.
The proportion of total variation accounted for by the independent 
15variables was highest in relation to the religious rightist vote, next 
highest in relation to the Communist vote and least in relation to the Congress 
vote. Of all the independent variables included in the analysis, the class 
of dummy variables based on the geographical location of the city was associated 
most closely with the voting patterns.
Voting Support for Congress
In general the cities which had registered a high, level of Congress 
vote were characterised by high literacy, low percentage of migrants, and high 
sales tax per capita. In general Congress was less popular in the traditional 
cities of north India than elsewhere. It may be observed in Table II.3 that 
the variables of literacy, percentage of migrants, and sales tax per capita 
accounted for 14.1 per cent of the variation in votes secured by the Congress. 
The dummy variables based on function of workforce, and geographical location 
of city did not affect the Congress vote in any way.
Voting Support for Communists
The results of the regression are much clearer in the case of the 
Communists. Of the ten independent variables, three —  northern region, sales 
tax per capita, and sex ratio —  produced P statistic above the ten per cent
TAELE II.5
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Total
Votes Secured by the Religious Rightist 
Parties in the Seats ^hey Contested
Number of cases 
Constant term 
Coefficient of 
determination
81
0.056
0.397
Variable Regression
coefficient
Computed
P-Value
North India 0.178 50.624
Entertainment Tax - 0.037 9-982
Percentage of migrants 0.029 5.953
East India 0.090 5.658
Manufacturing Cities 0.042 3-398
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l e v e l  o f  s ig n i f i c a n c e .  The p ro p o r tio n  o f  t o t a l  v a r i a t i o n  i n  th e  communist 
v o te  acco u n ted  f o r  by th e se  th re e  v a r ia b le s  was as h ig h  as  27*1 p e r  cen t 
(TABLE I I . 4 ) .  The F s t a t i s t i c  o f  none o f th e  o th e r  v a r ia b le s  was above th e  
10 p e r  c e n t l e v e l  o f s i g n i f i c a n c e . But th e  in c lu s io n  o f  f iv e  such  v a r ia b le s  
i n  th e  model im proved th e  e x p la n a tio n  by 2 .6  p e r c e n t .  One would ex p ec t th a t  
th e  c i t i e s  i n  w hich i n d u s t r i a l  la b o u r  was n u m e ric a lly  dom inant i n  th e  work­
fo rc e  would v o te  more h e a v i ly  f o r  th e  Com m unists. But th e  a d d i t io n  o f 
dummy v a r i a b le s  based  on fu n c t io n  o f  w ork fo rce  d id  n o t im prove th e  c o e f f i c i e n t  
o f  d e te rm in a tio n .
V oting  Support f o r  R e l ig io u s  R ig h t i s t s
Of th e  e ig h t  in d e p en d en t v a r i a b l e s ,  f iv e  — n o r th  I n d ia ,  e n te r ta in m e n t 
ta x  p e r c a p i t a ,  p e rc e n ta g e  o f  m ig ra n ts ,  e a s t  In d ia  and m an u fa c tu rin g  c i t i e s  — 
w ere s i g n i f i c a n t l y  a s s o c ia te d  w ith  th e  v o te  o f  th e  r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t i s t  p a r t i e s .
The p ro p o r tio n  o f  t o t a l  v a r i a t i o n  acco u n ted  f o r  by a l l  th e se  v a r ia b le s  was 
39 .7  p e r c e n t (TABLE I I . 5 ) .
The t r a d i t i o n a l  c i t i e s  t h a t  ex ten d ed  g r e a t e r  su p p o rt to  r e l i g io u s  
r i g h t i s t  p a n t ie s  were lo c a te d  i n  n o r th  and e a s t  I n d ia .  They w ere g e n e ra l ly  
backw ard, t h e i r  p o p u la tio n  c h a r a c te r i s e d  by low er p u rch as in g  pow er, low 
s ta n d a rd  o f  l i v i n g ,  low e d u c a t io n a l  ach iev em en ts  b u t a  h ig h e r  p ro p o r tio n  o f 
m ig ra n t p o p u la tio n . A lso a  m a jo r i ty  o f  th e  w ork fo rce  i n  th e  c i t i e s  th a t  
ex ten d ed  r e l a t i v e l y  h ig h e r  su p p o rt f o r  th e  Jan a  Sangh was engaged i n  m a n u fa c tu rin g  
i n d u s t r i e s .  U ndoubtedly th e s e  a re  th e  t y p i c a l  c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s  o f  th e  n o r th  
In d ia n  t r a d i t i o n a l  c i t i e s  where th e  u rb a n  p o p u la tio n  h as  been g r e a t l y  a f f e c te d  
by th e  i n  and o u t m ig ra tio n  o f  th e  re fu g e e  p o p u la tio n  owing to  th e  p a r t i t i o n  
o f  th e  c o u n try  i n  1947»"^ W ith in  th e  c i t i e s  w ith  th e  above a g g re g a te  
c h a r a c t e r i s t i c  one w ould, how ever, wonder w hether th e  co m p a ra tiv e ly  p o o r, 
■uneducated, unem ployed, and m ig ra n ts  o r  t h e i r  c o u n te rp a r ts  had v o te d  f o r  th e  
r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t i s t  p a r t i e s .  F u r th e r ,  when a l l  th e  in d e p en d en t and r e a l  
v a r ia b le s  and a l l  th e  c l a s s e s  o f  dummy v a r i a b le s  w ere in c lu d e d  i n  th e  m odel, 
th e  dummy v a r ia b le  o f  n o r th e rn  re g io n  em erged a s  the  m ost e f f e c t i v e  v a r ia b le  
i n  a c c o u n tin g  f o r  th e  v a r i a t i o n s  i n  th e  r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t i s t  v o te  (TABLE I I . 5 ) .
P a s t e l e c t i o n  l i t e r a t u r e  i n  g e n e r a l  su g g e s ts  th a t  o c c u p a tio n a l 
econom ic and c u l t u r a l  d i f f e r e n c e s  betw een d i f f e r e n t  segm ents o f th e  s o c ie ty ,  
co u p led  w ith  th e  e f f e c t s  o f  a  h ig h  d eg ree  o f  i n / o u t  flo w  o f r e fu g e e s ,  ag g ra v a te d  
th e  s o c i a l  and r e l i g io u s  c le a v a g e s , th e re b y  en co u ra g in g  th e  re fu g e e s  and 
r e l i g i o u s  l o y a l i s t s  to  v o te  f o r  th e  r e l i g i o u s  r i g h t i s t  p a r t i e s .  The su c c e ss
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of the PSP which was significantly associated with the Communist vote was 
negatively associated with religious rightist vote.
COMPARISON OP PARTY VOTE IN INDUSTRIAL AND TRADITIONAL CITIES
Comparison of Congress Vote in Industrial and 
Traditional Cities
A comparison of Congress voting support in the industrial towns 
and traditional cities makes the following differentials obvious. The voting 
support for the Congress was fairly high and evenly spread out in all kinds of 
industrial towns while it was significantly associated with some socio-economic 
variables in the case of traditional cities.
While industrial towns whose population solely comprised migrants 
extended good voting support to the Congress, in traditional cities the higher 
the proportion of migrants, the lower the proportion of the Congress vote.
So it is possible to speculate that migrants in industrial towns and traditional 
cities may have different voting attitudes towards the Congress. Wbat makes 
a migrant in an industrial town more likely to vote Congress and a migrant in 
a traditional city less likely to vote Congress perhaps depends on the pattern 
of migration and the characteristics of migrants rather than on migration 
itself.
It is surprising that the Congress which fared so well in new 
industrial towns (inhabited predominantly by industrial labourers) did not 
show any positive or negative association in its electoral performance with 
manufacturing traditional cities. It is possible to hypothesize that 
industrial workers in traditional cities and industrial towns vote differently 
and it may also mean that the sources of Congress voting support are essentially 
different in industrial towns and traditional cities.
Unlike its voting support in industrial towns, the Congress vote in 
traditional cities was significantly positively related to the variables of 
literacy, and sales tax per capita. It is however a debatable question 
whether the Congress was securing its votes from the highly literate and 
economically well off social sections or from economically weak and illiterate 
sections for some other reasons.
38
The effect of the variable region on Congress voting in industrial 
towns was only marginal while the proportion of total variation in Congress 
vote accounted for by region was considerable in traditional cities. for 
example, even in the industrial towns of east India (where the voting support 
for Congress was poor) the percentage of votes secured by the Congress was 
far higher than that of any other party. In other words industrial towns were 
comparatively immune from regional political influences, while traditional 
cities were not.
One would think that the population in industrial towns is more mobile, 
territorially and socially, than the population in traditional cities. So one 
may speculate that people who are more mobile may extend higher support to 
the Congress than the people who are relatively stable.
Comparison of Communist Vote in Industrial and 
Traditional Cities
A comparison of the Communist vote in industrial towns and traditional 
cities makes the following differences and similarities obvious.
The sources of the Communist vote in traditional cities and industrial 
towns appear to be different, because while a large proportion of the variation 
in the Communist vote in traditional cities was ’explained’ by the indicators 
of social and economic development, such as higher purchasing power, even sex 
ratio and large number of radios per thousand population, in the case of 
industrial towns the trend was exactly the opposite.
In the case of industrial towns the region of east India accounted for 
a considerable proportion of the variation in the Communist vote while in the 
case of traditional cities the region of south India was responsible for that. 
Yet in both types of cities the performance of the communists was very poor 
in north and west India.
As might be expected of a party championing the cause of the industrial 
workers, the percentage of votes secured by the Communists in industrial towns 
(23%) was almost twice as high as its vote in traditional cities (13%), and 
three times as high as its vote at the all India level {9%). Yet it is 
surprising that the Communist vote did not show any sign of positive or 
negative association with traditional manufacturing cities. So, it is
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possible that workers in manufacturing industries in traditional cities are 
probably not as vulnerable to Communist propaganda as workers in the new 
industrial towns.
In both industrial towns and traditional cities the percentage of 
votes secured by the Communists was highly sensitive to the level of votes 
secured by the other leftist parties. For example, the lower the vote of 
other leftist parties the higher the Communist vote in all kinds of industrial 
towns.
Comparison of Religious Rightist Vote in Industrial 
and Traditional Cities
A comparison of the religious rightist voting support in the industrial 
towns and the traditional cities justified the following observations:
The percentage of votes secured by the religious rightists in 
industrial towns (6%) was just equal to the vote they secured at the all India 
level {l%) and was just half Of the vote they secured in traditional cities 
{l2%) . So one may speculate that industrial workers were less likely to vote 
for religious rightist parties than those employed in urban middle class 
occupations.
The electoral performance of the religious rightists was significantly 
high in industrial towns with high literacy, high per capita sales and 
entertainment taxes paid. In traditional cities also these variables had a 
significant effect on the religious rightist vote but in the negative direction. 
Is it possible that the socio-economic characteristics of the supporters of 
the religious rightist parties are essentially different in industrial towns 
and traditional cities?
It is surprising that the electoral performance of the religious 
rightist parties was so poor in industrial towns which consisted solely of 
migrants, while in the case of traditional cities quite a significant proportion 
of the total variation in the religious rightist vote was accounted for by the 
factor of migration. One may hypothesize that the places of origin, the 
socio-economic background and the political attitudes of the migrants in 
traditional cities and industrial towns were different.
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As already pointed out, the vote secured by the religious 
rightists was poor in the industrial towns as a whole: on the other 
hand, the manufacturing traditional cities rather than the ones engaged 
in trade and service voted more strongly for the religious rightist parties.
EXPLANATION OF VOTING PATTERNS 
Historical Role of Traditional Cities
There are many plausible explanations for the above trends and 
a majority of the election studies in India are in line with our findings. 
Traditional cities in India have played a unique historical and adminis­
trative role. For more than a century these cities have been district 
administrative and local self-government headquarters.^ These were the 
places where the first signs of urbanization, expansion of western edu­
cation, trade, commerce, the nucleus of modern civil services, and 
industrialization first took root. On the economic front these cities 
remained, for a long time, wholesale trading centres, importing manu­
factured items from industrial centres like Bombay, Calcutta, and 
Ahmedabad and purchasing and exporting the surplus primary products 
from the rural hinterland. It was only after the second world war, and 
particularly after the country's independence, that these cities acquired 
an added significance with mushrooming small, medium scale and servicing 
industries, and an enormously expanding educational system and government 
bureaucracy. So the cities, by providing employment opportunities, served 
as stepping stones in territorial and upward social mobility. The pre­
dominance of service occupations in these cities has been a continuing 
feature. According to the census of 1961, in 54 out of a total of 105 
traditional city assembly constituencies, a majority of the work force 
was engaged in trade and service occupations.
Social Composition of Traditional Cities
The social composition of traditional urban centres in British
India and the gradual but periodical changes that occurred there always
had far-reaching political implications. The social groups which first
exchanged agricultural occupations and dependence on the rural economy
for western education, the professions, trade, commerce and urban living
were the Brahmins, the Vaisyas, the traditional money-lending Jains, and
the northern Kayastas who had manned the civil bureaucracy since the 
18Mughal days. Many feudal and landed elements lived in cities but drew
41
financial support from their farms in rural areas. Artisans, other skilled 
and unskilled workers -- mostly lower Hindu castes and the Muslims -- 
were the other major social groups. The Brahmins in the cities of south 
India, Maharastra, the old Central Provinces, and Orissa, the Kayastas in 
Bengal, and the Banias and Brahmins in north India were the social and 
political elites (Subramaniam 1969b; Baker 1969): to these may be added
the numerically small but economically quite enterprising and powerful 
Parsi community.
a) Role of elite castes
The earlier censuses from 1911 to 1931 threw a flood of light 
on the social composition of the traditional urban centres and they 
clearly indicate that by the 1920s a majority of the above mentioned 
elite castes already lived in such centres. Later, the adoption of 
western education and civil service jobs produced the last wave of the 
movement of these elite castes from rural areas to urban areas. So, 
by the late 1930s in most of the traditional urban centres in south, 
west and central India the above mentioned elite castes constituted a 
majority of the important occupational groups. The occupational and 
cultural tables of the census of 1931 provided irrefutable proof that 
the elite castes were in a majority among the professionals and workers 
in the secondary and tertiary sectors and quite excessively out of pro­
portion to their numerical strength in the total population. Their 
literacy rates were high, a considerable proportion of them had English 
and they played a leading role in the freedom movement of the country.
So they effectively combined in themselves higher ascriptive and achieved 
status and political influence. The immediate political consequences of 
all this was that the elite castes rose to power in urban community gov­
ernment (Bashiruddin Ahmed 1965; Maru 1965).
b) Changes in caste composition in towns
The numerical majority of the elite castes and their political 
predominance in urban areas were short lived for two principal reasons. 
Firstly, the anti-Brahmin movements launched in south and west India 
had an adverse effect on Brahmin influence. Secondly, the decades between 
1941 and 1961 saw the first wave of migrants from rural areas seeking 
higher education, skilled and unskilled work and trade and commerce.
Often these were the sons and daughters of parents with an agricultural 
background, usually from medium and lower caste groups. The protective
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social legislation passed and implemented by the government, reserving 
government jobs and educational facilities at all levels for candidates 
of scheduled castes and tribes, facilitated their movement to urban areas. 
This gradually changed the majority of the elite castes into pluralities 
in urban areas. The immediate political consequence of this change in 
the social composition of traditional cities was the displacement of old 
elite castes from political power by the newly rising middle and agri­
cultural castes. This development, however, was obvious earlier in 
south, west and east India where the traditional elite caste proportion
of the population was only 2 to 6 per cent than in north India where the
19elite caste proportion of the population was as high as 35 per cent. 
Election Studies in Urban Areas
Recent studies of urban elections in India provide valuable 
data about the role of personalized power structures and primordial groups 
in traditional cities. Religion and caste were important considerations 
in traditional towns in nominating candidates to local, state and federal 
elections (Venkatarangaiaya 1956). Local candidates were preferred to 
outsiders. In regions where religious minorities (Muslims, Christians) 
were particularly sparsely distributed, a majority were concentrated 
in urban areas and a majority usually voted for the Congress or a 
leftist party but certainly not for the Hindu-oriented parties (Sirsikar 
1965a; Bashiruddin Ahmed 1965). This rule, however, did not hold good 
where they were territorially concentrated and numerous enough to elect 
significant numbers of their own candidates as in Kerala and Hyderabad 
city, and successfully press the government to protect their community 
interests (Navaneeth 1967).
Personal ambitions, group loyalties, status conflicts and caste 
divisions which were the major elements in the factional conflicts of 
the ruling party were a part of urban and particularly of traditional 
city politics. However, political party loyalties competed with con­
siderable success with sectional caste and communal loyalties. Further, 
when traditional social groupings chose to operate within the framework 
of secular political parties because of political expediency or ethnic 
and economic compulsions, the existing loyalties and cleavages were 
radically politicized and in turn new loyalties and identifications 
were created on a secular basis (Kothari and Sheth 1965).
A number of impressionistic election studies in the states have
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suggested that initially the social base of the Jana Sangh was provided 
by the Brahmin, Bania castes and urban middle class trading communities 
who were strongly committed to traditional Hindu values (Weiner 1957:234; 
Maheshwari 1962; Gupta and Nevaneeth 1968; Singh 1971). In Maharastra, 
Andhra and Mysore whatever influence the Jana Sangh had was limited to 
urban areas and was probably derived from a section of the old elite 
castes.
a) Impact of refugee population
In the traditional cities of north India the above changes in
social composition and political preferences were further complicated by
a heavy in and out flow of refugees. The sheer enormity of the numbers
of displaced persons, their socio-economic characteristics, and the
pattern of their rehabitation had far-reaching social and economic effects
20on the traditional cities of north India. Firstly, a vast majority of 
the persons who were forced to leave Pakistan in the wake of the partition 
of the Indian sub-continent had lost all their immovable and most of 
their movable properties and brought tragic memories of partition along 
with them. It can be observed from Table II.8 that when compared with 
the stationary population in each country, two or three times as many 
of those that moved across the borders now lived in urban areas, twice 
as many were literate and twice as many were engaged in trading, commer­
cial or service occupations. Quantitative evidence from the censuses 
of India and Pakistan confirms that a majority of the people who migrated 
belonged to upper castes, and were economically better off. In fact, 
according to the Pakistan census of 1951, out of a total of 10 million 
Hindus who chose to stay in Pakistan (mostly in East Bengal), 56 per cent
belonged to scheduled castes; the rest most probably belonged to the
21backward castes. The classic example of this was seen in the pattern 
of migration from Karachi to India. A comparison of the 1941 and 1951 
populations of Karachi by caste shows that of 175,000 upper cast Hindus, 
97.5 per cent had migrated to India while out of a total of 11,000 
scheduled caste Hindus only 1.8 per cent had moved out (Census of Pakistan 
1951, 1955:84).
As already indicated, the brunt of this dislocation was felt by 
the traditional cities of north India. The Census of India 1951 reveals 
that of 7.3 million people who moved from Pakistan to India, 4.3 millions 
settled down in north India, and of these nearly 2.5 millions streamed 
into the traditional urban areas. As against this only about 0.4 million
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and 0,02 million refugees from Pakistan settled down (most of them in 
urban areas) in west and south India respectively. In other words the 
migrants that were received by the traditional cities of south and west 
India were essentially internal migrants in search of a living while 
in the north a considerable proportion were refugees from Pakistan or 
the children born to them.
b) Consequences of migration
Few studies have been made of the political consequences of 
migration to urban areas, or of the improved standards of living brought 
about by the economic development plans. Two studies of the traditional 
industrial city of Bombay indicated that the internal migrants were 
likely to work as power cliques and pressure groups within the ranks 
of trade unions and political parties that they patronised. Selig 
Harrison in his book, India: The Most Dangerous Decades, concluded
that language and regional differences within the leadership of Indian 
political parties would ultimately lead to the disintegration of the 
country (Harrison 1960). Norman Palmer in his study of North Bombay 
parliamentary constituency, said that internal migrants preferred to 
vote for a candidate of their own language and region if an effective 
one was available (Palmer 1963; also see Hart 1960).
Myron Weiner, in his study of the distribution of refugees 
from Pakistan, internal migrants and the Congress vote among different 
wards of Calcutta, concluded that in three successive general elections 
(1952, 1957, 1962) the Congress vote was consistently low in areas where 
there were large concentrations of refugees and high where there were few 
refugees. Conversely, the Congress vote was higher in electorates with 
larger numbers of internal migrants and low in electorates with larger 
numbers of local residents. He found that among internal migrants to 
Calcutta there were lower expectations, more single member households, 
lower educational achievements, more inadequate accommodation, a deter­
mined struggle to improve one's own circumstances, and a higher degree 
of contact with the Congress organization in the places of their origin 
(mostly rural areas). Weiner concluded that since disaffection and 
frustration were higher among the more aspiring local residents and 
refugees from Pakistan than among the internal migrants, the former were 
more likely to vote against the Congress and for the Communist or Marxist 
left parties (Weiner 1967a:360-367). In other words, refugees from
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Pakistan both in north and east India most probably voted against the 
Congress but in favour of the religious rightist parties in north India 
and the leftist parties in east India.
Traditional Cities as Centres of Political Activity
The comparative discomfiture suffered by the Congress in trad­
itional cities can be examined from another angle. For a long time these 
cities were the nerve centres of the Indian freedom struggle and were the 
local community headquarters of the Congress. It was from these places 
that the Congress had reached out into rural areas and mobilised public 
support. The Congress always had an efficient organization and effective 
leadership in these cities. An analysis of the composition of the dele­
gations of pre-independence annual Congress sessions revealed that these 
traditional cities were the main sources of Congress leaders.
This did not mean that other parties had no footing in trad­
itional cities or that they were operating primarily from rural areas.
In India the institutional arrangements of political parties have always 
tended to correspond with the administrative structure of the government. 
As most of the cities were the headquarters of districts, they served as 
the main centres of political activity for most of the political parties.
The growing numbers of industrial labourers provided a good base 
for the leftist parties. Thus the traditional cities in coastal Andhra, 
Tamil Nadu, Kerala and West Bengal have been for a long time the centres 
of Communist activity. The cities of Maharastra, Madhya Pradesh, and UP 
were the centres of activity of the Hindu religious parties. But the 
political penetration of these non-Congress parties into different social 
groups was much more limited and often lopsided than that of the Congress 
which always maintained its pluralities. Further the Congress as a 
dominant party wielding power and with its interests spread out all over 
the country could i'll afford to take up the cause of one region, religion, 
language or caste against another. On the other hand, some of the region­
ally based leftist parties and the religious rightist parties did so 
with considerable though temporary electoral success. The Jana Sangh 
for example pledged itself to the promotion of Bharatiya Sanskriti; it 
was vociferous in its criticism of religious and caste minorities, uncom­
promising in its stand on promoting Hindi as the national language, and 
pleaded for the protection and promotion of the interests of the business 
community (Upadhyaya 1963). In espousing the regional and language
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causes of south and east India the Communists were second to none. It 
was no wonder that the variables of region and the percentage of migrants 
explained a significant proportion of the total variation in the votes 
of the major parties in traditional cities.
Though the Congress enjoyed the support of a cross-section of 
the society, it was always supported most strongly by the middle and 
rich peasants in the countryside and the high income professional groups 
and business sections. The reasons are fairly simple. The abolition 
of feudal land relations and later the abolition of the land revenue, 
the construction of irrigation projects and the incentives given to the 
development of agriculture by the Congress government benefited the 
cultivators directly. Compared to the hired agricultural labourers and 
rural artisans, cultivators are the wealthy sections of rural society 
and as already pointed out they have access to power both at local and 
state levels. In the urban areas the higher middle classes, including 
the business sections, benefited more than the working class from the 
policies of the Congress. These social sections had a stake in the 
government, and in its stability, but because of their high aspirations 
and political consciousness, they are much less satisfied with the 
Congress. On the other hand any change in the government that would 
result in drastic socio-economic measures would be highly to their dis­
advantage. So the Congress, the Swatantra Party or a religious rightist 
party is the choice of this section of the society.
Most of the election studies in India agree that the electoral 
support of the Congress is fairly evenly spread over different sections 
of the society but they do not agree on the sections of the society 
from which the Congress draws its highest support. It appears that the 
findings depend mostly on how the sample is drawn and the kind of 
aggregate data one is dealing with. A study in 1967 based on a nation­
wide sample (urban and rural) found that the Congress drew marginally 
higher support from groups with lower literacy, low income, low-caste 
status, and from religious minorities and old voters, than from others 
(Madsen 1970).
According to the report of the 1967 election survey prepared 
by Srinivasan and Subramaniam, within the traditional cities males, 
middle-aged persons, those who completed high school studies, religious 
minorities, and those with high socio-economic status voted slightly 
more strongly for the Congress than others. In the traditional cities
47
again the vote of the religious rightist parties was obtained mostly 
from-the Hindus (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 1969b:11).
On the other hand an ecological analysis based on district 
data carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta found that the areas of 
Congress support were those at the lower levels of development.
Compared to the earlier elections the Congress lost more votes in 1967 
in areas with high percentages of literacy, density of population, 
immigrants, hired attached labourers in agriculture, and low percentages 
of minorities and secheduled castes and tribes. At the same time when 
the districts were divided into four developmental blocks the share 
of the Congress vote was low in backward districts and high in developed 
districts (Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969). To help reduce this uncertainty, 
the survey analysis which will be discussed below aimed at investigating 
the structure of support for different political parties and the 
rationale of the support from different social sections for different 
parties.
Characteristics of Industrial Towns
Industrial towns are very different from traditional cities 
in their socio-economic and occupational composition. The population 
is wholly migrant, the workforce is dependent on a single industry, 
it is relatively multi-lingual, multi-regional in origins, mobile, 
better educated, and enterprising. The towns are well planned and 
living conditions are good, or at any rate better than in traditional 
cities. Primordial loyalties are now out of context and the insti­
tutions which catered to the migrants' need in rural areas or other 
places of origin are no longer available to them. In the work place, 
in the neighbourhood, in the market place and in the sports club they 
now have to live with a variety of people and seek new identifications, 
loyalties and associations. To protect their employment interests, 
depending on the level of their occupation, they have to join a trade 
union or a professional association or establish identity with a cultural 
group or association.
Studies by Paul Brass in Kanpur and by Wayne Wilcox in 
Indore showed that in industrial areas trade unions played a key role 
in selecting party candidates and rallying voters to parties of their 
choice. In general the labour unions organized by the Communists 
followed the advice of the party at the time of voting. The same thing
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was not true with regard to the Congress-led unions. Election studies 
showed that the voting preferences of industrial labourers need not be 
similar in federal and state elections. Also, in industrial towns, a 
leftist political leader who constantly cultivated his constituency by 
being always accessible to the needy sections of the society, had every 
chance of securing the support of poorer and minority communities and 
also of drawing support away from other parties. The Congress drew 
its voting support both from the commercial and professional middle 
class and from industrial workers. But often there were rifts between 
the Congress labour union and the commercial and professional elites who 
supported the Congress in matters of organizing the party and candidate 
pre-selection. It resulted in the division of the Congress vote and 
the defeat of the Congress candidate. These two studies (Brass 1965b; 
Wilcox 1965) also indicated that the Communist vote came mainly from 
poorer and uneducated working communities while the Congress vote came 
from comparatively better-off sections.
The better performance of the Congress in industrial towns, 
despite tough competition from both rightist and leftist forces, was 
probably due to a variety of factors. Its success in building heavy 
industrial plants, earlier contacts of the migrants with the Congress 
organization in places of their origin, the creation of vast employment 
opportunities, an upward occupational and economic mobility, the swift 
establishment of its trade unions with wide membership and official 
recognition in all the industrial towns, might be mentioned as some of 
the most important factors.
It was observed that states such as Kerala, West Bengal, and 
Andhra in which Communists have been relatively powerful for a long 
time, had sent out large numbers of migrants to these industrial towns. 
Whether a large proportion of these migrants were Communist sympathizers 
who retained their old political preferences in new areas can be dis­
covered only from the survey data.
Where the religious parties were strong it might be due to 
large concentrations of tradition-oriented high caste Hindus, or to 
the existence of social sections highly vulnerable to anti-Muslim 
propaganda. It is, however, reasonable to assume that owing to prolonged 
residence, common problems and goals, and the frictions developing for 
some decades between the traditional elite castes and the newly emerging 
castes, the solidarity of the traditional elite castes has been far 
higher in traditional cities than in industrial towns. On the basis of
CHART II. 1
Profiles of Industrial Towns and Traditional Cities
Industrial Towns Traditional Cities
Settlement
pattern
Recognised as urban in 1961 
census
Old, urban for at least 50 to 60 
years
Employment
pattern
Mostly public sector, based 
on a single industry, mostly 
industrial workers
Mostly private sector, wide range 
of occupations, small proportion of 
industrial workers
Migration pattern Long distance, inter-regional, 
inter-lingual
Short distance, surrounding areas, 
same language, refugees from Pakistan 
(in east and north India)
Occupational
mobility
opportunities
Quite high, encouraged through 
reservation of jobs to 
scheduled castes and tribes
Moderate
Past political 
contacts
Exposed to political influences 
in the places of origin
Exposed to only local party system
Trade union 
activity
Quite high, most workers union- 
isable. Unions promoted by 
different parties
Low, few unionisable workers
Electoral choices 
available
The Congress Party, most of the 
leftist parties, religious 
rightist parties
The Congress Party, parties popular 
in the region, non-party community 
leaders
Sources of 
Congress support
Cross-section white and blue 
collar workers; probably high 
salaried workers with past 
Congress contacts
West India, higher middle classes, 
religious, caste minorities, poor 
people
Voting support 
for the Congress 
in IT, TC and AI*
Highest (47%) Low (43%), not much lower than at 
all India level (44%)
Sources of
Communist
support
East India, middle class leader­
ship, low income, low literacy 
groups, industrial workers, 
migrants with previous Communist 
contacts
East India, South India, middle class 
leaders, rising caste groups, manual 
labourers, industrial workers, 
refugees from East Pakistan
Communist voting 
support in IT,
TC and AI*
Highest (23%) Moderate (13%), higher than at 
national level (107>)
Sources of RR 
parties support
North India, high income groups 
groups, low literacy groups
North India, tradition-minded caste 
Hindus, petty businessmen, refugees 
from Pakistan
Voting support 
for RR parties 
in IT, TC and AI*
Lowest (6%), lower than at 
national level (7%)
Highest (12%)
Voting support for 
other leftist 
parties in IT, TC 
and AI*
Lowest (137o), also lower than 
in traditional cities (15%)
Moderate (15%)
* IT stands for industrial towns, TC stands for traditional cities, and AI stands 
for All India
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our aggregate analysis and the information from the existing literature 
we may draw a chart (CHART II. 1) to help generate hypotheses.
HYPOTHESES
Migrants who have already absorbed some political information 
and ideas and developed certain political sympathies in the places of 
their origin are most likely to continue to hold the same opinions in 
the new areas.
If the above hypothesis is proved to be correct, the pattern 
of migration to industrial towns (in terms of region of origin, language 
and social composition) is most likely to influence the pattern of the 
birth and development of different trade unions and political parties.
Maintenance of constant contact with one's own native place 
is likely to result in continuation of past political attitudes, while 
complete severance of associations with one's native place may change 
political attitudes.
However, in a plural society with conflicting group interests, 
if a political party or a trade union associates itself very closely 
with a particular social or cultural group it is likely to be difficult 
for it to penetrate the rest of the society.
We also hypothesize that there would be at least a few 
individuals who try to resocialize the migrants in the new towns by 
stressing wider and non-traditional bonds of unity and common cultural, 
professional, or economic interests.
At the local level both in traditional cities and industrial 
towns upward socio-economic mobility is likely to muster support for 
centre (the Congress) or rightist political parties while a downward 
socio-economic mobility might result in support for leftist parties 
that advocate radical socio-economic reforms. It may be hypothesized 
that opportunities for such upward social mobility are likely to be 
higher in industrial towns than in traditional cities.
The electoral success of a political party in an industrial 
town is likely to be dependent on the amount of trade union work that 
the party puts in, while in traditional cities it is more likely to be 
dependent on successfully inducting into the party fold the community 
leaders (religious, caste or economic) who control the vote banks. On 
both these counts, the Congress (being a party in power) by distributing
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favours to community leaders, and by organizing its own trade union -- 
often favoured, encouraged and recognised by the plant managements -- 
had an advantage over all the other parties»
It may be hypothesized that the higher level of Congress vote 
and its even distribution over different regional and social and economic 
groups in industrial towns were a token of appreciation of the economic 
and industrial development achieved by the Congress government. So it 
is most probable that the Congress has a wider social base than any other 
party. This may not, however, be true in traditional cities where social 
cleavages are acute and where the Congress is associated by choice or by 
force of circumstances with only some sections of the society.
Industrial towns in India represent areas of highly intensive 
economic activity and such places are usually noted for corruption, 
administrative inefficiency, and heavy financial losses. Migrants to 
these towns have a first hand knowledge of these failings. However, a 
higher and consistent preference by the migrants for the Congress 
suggests that the Congress rule on the whole is seen as more beneficial 
than detrimental to peoples' welfare.
The Communist Party secured its highest vote in industrial 
towns and most probably from the working class, but available information 
suggests that the Communist supporters are most likely to belong to 
specific regional and language groups among whom the party had already 
been popular in their areas of origin. In the industrial town we surveyed, 
we may hypothesize that a majority of the leftist supporters are migrants 
from east or south India.
A high proportion of the rightist vote (religious rightist 
vote and the vote secured by the Swatantra Party) both in traditional 
cities (79%) and industrial towns (72%,) was secured by the religious 
rightist parties. It may be hypothesized that the sources of support 
of the religious rightist parties are the same social groups in both 
cities and towns. On the other hand, the support drawn by the Swatantra 
Party may be interpreted as a vote of disapproval of the concept of 
planning and governmental control in the economy. But our data indicate 
that we can expect only a small proportion of this kind of respondent.
Neither the aggregate analysis nor the existing literature on 
social mobility throws any light on a number of crucial aspects of the 
social life of the migrants.
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Firstly, once a sufficiently large number of people from a 
non-local language group are present in an industrial town the formation 
of a cultural association of their own will naturally follow. We do not 
know the frequency and popularity of these groups, or whether some language 
groups are more active than others. We do not know the socio-economic 
background of their members nor whether these associations are exploited 
by trade unions and political parties to rally voting support.
Secondly, we do not know anything about the socio-economic 
back-ground of the leaders of the trade unions, of contestants in the 
election or of political parties. It is logical to hypothesize that 
the socio-economic background of leaders in industrial towns would be 
different from that of the leaders in traditional cities. The methods 
of political integration of diverse social groups would also be different 
in industrial towns and traditional cities.
And finally, what is the political impact of these industrial 
towns on their surrounding areas? By bringing their former political 
sympathies the migrants may help some political parties in establishing 
new party branches in hitherto unpenetrated areas. But will this 
political process -- as more and more industrial towns are established -- 
expand and gradually change the regional political patterns, or will 
these migrant groups be assimilated into the regional party system?
These are some of the hypotheses and questions which I will investigate 
in the following chapters.
FOOTNOTES
In undertaking the aggregate analysis I am aware of the diffi­
culties involved in interpreting ecological correlations.
Under no circumstances can ecological correlations be substi- 
stutes for individual correlations and aggregate figures do 
not allow us complete freedom in making statements about the 
behaviour of particular groups of individuals. The ecological 
correlations in this chapter are interpreted cautiously to 
generate hypotheses bearing on the socio-economic and political 
situation in India, There is a vast amount of literature on 
this subject in Western countries, See W.S, Robinson,
Ecological Correlations and the Behaviour of Individuals.
American Sociological Review 15, 1950; Leo A. Goodman,
Ecological Regressions and Behaviour of Individuals. American 
Sociological Review 18, 1953; Otis Dudley Duncan and Beverly 
Davis, An Alternative to Ecological Correlation. American 
Sociological Review 18, 1953; W. Phillips Shively, ’Ecological' 
Inference; The Use of Aggregate Data to Study Individuals.
The American Political Science Review 63, 1969. For the problems 
involved in interpreting ecological correlations in the Indian 
situation, see W.H. Morris-Jones and Biplab Das Gupta, Fourth 
General Election in Madhya Pradesh. Economic and Political 
Weekly III, 1968.
The Census of India 1961 defined all urban units (town or 
towngroup) with 100,000 or more population as cities, and all 
those with less than 100,000 population as towns.
An analysis of the state assembly electorates as contained in 
the 1967 election report reveals that their size may vary from 
about 27,000 (Jammu and Kashmir) to about 100,000 (Uttar Pradesh). 
In 12 out of 16 major states in India the average size of the 
electorate was more than 60,000. In Madhya Pradesh in 1967 it 
was 62,144. With growing population in the country the average 
size of electorates has been significantly increasing since the 
first general election.
The traditional cities excluded from aggregate analysis were 
Hyderabad, Patna, Ahmedabad, Cochin, Indore, Jabalpur, Madras, 
Bombay, Poona, Nagpur, Bangalore, Amritsar, Kanpur, Lucknow, 
Jaipur, Calcutta and Delhi.
According to the polling-booth data supplied by the Election 
Commission, on average there were about 19,000 electors in each 
industrial town in 1962. There were 19,023 electors in the 
industrial town of Bhilai in 1962.
The information relating to per capita sales and income taxes 
paid and number of radios per thousand population was collected 
from Thompson's Consumer Index of Towns. Bombay; Thompson 
and Co. 1963.
The classification of towns by the economic function of the 
workforce was done by Ashok Mitra, former Registrar-General 
of India. I used the information from a typed copy supplied 
by him. All the demographic data were obtained from the
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General Population Tables and Social and Cultural Tables of 
different states.
8. There is an increasing number of aggregate analyses employing 
regression techniques. Most of these studies were based on 
district demographic data and election statistics. For an 
excellent analysis and cautious interpretation of this kind
see W.H. Morris-Jones and B. Das Gupta, India's Political Areas: 
Interim Report on an Ecological Electoral Investigation.
Asian Survey IX, 1969. Also see Zagoria, The Ecology of 
Peasant Communism in India. The American Political Science 
Review LXV, 1971. There were however no studies of urban areas 
on the same lines. For a state-wide analysis based on assembly 
constituency data see K.G. Krishna Murthy and G. Lakshmana Rao, 
Political Preferences in Kerala. New Delhi: Radhakrishna
Prakashan 1968.
9. I classified the Jana Sangh, the Hindu Mahasabha, and the Rama 
Rajya Parished as religious rightist parties. Among these the 
Jana Sangh contested the largest number of traditional city 
constituencies and obtained most of the votes secured by this 
group of parties. The Muslim League can be rightly classified 
as a religious rightist party but it did not contest any 
traditional city constituency in 1962.
10. I classified parties such as the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, 
the Akalidal, the Republican Party of India, the Peasants and 
Workers Party as regional parties.
11. For a general understanding of political parties, their support
structures and leadership patterns see Myron Weiner, Party 
Politics in India. Princeton: Princeton University Press 1957;
G.D, Overstreet and Marshall Windmiller, Communism in India. 
Berkely and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1959;
Craig Baxter, The Jana Sangh: A Biography of an Indian Political
Party. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press 1969;
Howard L. Erdman, The Swatantra Party and Indian Conservatism. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1967; Myron Weiner,
Party Building in a New Nation, the Indian National Congress. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1967; Stanley A. Kochanek,
The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Democracy.
Princeton: Princeton University Press 1968.
12. The aggregate analysis of Tamil Nadu based on assembly constit­
uency demographic data, election statistics and socio-economic 
background data of the DMK and the Congress nomination seekers 
is in progress. The analysis is being jointly done by V. 
Subramaniam and G. Lakshmana Rao. The preliminary computer 
runs confirm findings of the Kerala study.
13. The Swatantra Party secured one-fifth of the votes in Bihar 
in 1962, but could secure only about 2 per cent of the votes 
in 1967 after the Raja of Ramagarh and his followers defected 
from the party.
14. The degrees of freedom required for the estimation of the level 
of significance vary between 46 and 105 according to the party 
being considered, as the parties did not contest the same number 
of seats. However, this makes little difference with these 
data. The F statistics for all of the variables included met
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the requirements of the ten per cent level of significance by 
a considerable margin.
Here again the results of the regression analysis based on 
aggregate data have to be treated with caution. Regression 
analyses based on aggregate data in general accounted for a 
higher proportion of variation in voting or party support than 
regression analyses based on survey data. The investigations 
carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta, 1969; Zagoria, 1971; 
our present regression analysis in comparison to the investi­
gation carried out by Madsen, 1970; and our own regression 
equations based on survey data contained in the fourth and 
fifth chapters prove this point beyond doubt.
For an excellent account of the demographic and social character­
istics of cities of different regions in India see Qazi Ahmed, 
Indian Cities; Characteristics and Correlates. Chicago:
The University of Chicago Press, 1965.
According to the 1961 census, 104 out of a total of 113 cities 
in India were either district or state capitals. The remainder 
were mostly trade, commercial or port cities.
The report of the Census of India 1911 reveals that six out of 
seven Parsees, one in three Jains, and one in five Christians 
were already urban residents. In comparison to these figures 
one in eight Muslims, one in eleven Hindus and ten per cent 
of the whole population were urban residents. The report also 
noted that among the Hindus, traditional elite castes had 
shown a greater predilection for moving to towns, and that the 
growth of new industries in towns was attracting an increasing 
number of low-caste migrants (Census of India 1911, 1913).
For an elaboration of this point see G. Lakshmana Rao, Caste 
and Class as Research Categories in India, a paper delivered 
at the 12th annual conference, Australian Political Studies 
Association, Canberra 1970.
The figures mentioned in this section are recomputations of 
data derived from Paper No. 4, Displaced Persons -- 1951 Census. 
See especially the introductory part of this paper.
The figures for Pakistan mentioned in this section are recompu­
tations of data obtained from Census of Pakistan, 1951, Volume 
I: Pakistan: Report and Tables. Karachi: The Manager of
Publications, Government of Pakistan. See especially pages 84, 
and 4 - 2 to 4 - 20, 19 - 5, 19 - 6, and 19 - 7.
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S H O W IN G  A S S E M B L Y  CONSTITUENCIES
1967
BHILAI 'RAIPUR
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MIGRATION AND OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY PATTERNS 
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS 
Selecting Towns for Survey
The 22 new industrial towns included in the aggregate analysis 
were located in 10 different states, eight different language-speaking 
areas and as far apart as 2,000 miles from north to south and east to 
west. The survey was intended to be only a case study but it was intended 
that the industrial town to be surveyed should be as representative as 
possible and that the traditional city to be surveyed for comparative 
purposes should be within a manageable distance but far enough away not 
to be influenced by the new town.
As many as 12 of the 22 new industrial towns are situated in 
east India, and of these 12, seven are dependent on heavy industries, two 
each on mining and medium scale industries. Hence it was considered best 
to select an industrial town based on heavy industry from this region. 
After a process of elimination the initial choice fell on Durgapur, a 
British-built steel town and Burdwan, a traditional city, both in the 
district of Burdwan, West Bengal. However, owing to the prevailing 
political situation and labour and student unrest, survey work was not 
found feasible in Durgapur.^" Ultimately the choice fell on Bhilai, a 
Russian-built steel plant town located in east Madhya Pradesh about 200 
miles east of Nagpur. Bhilai is a heavy industry town and is located 
close to the industrial belt of east India. The population of Bhilai is 
known to have migrated from all parts of the country, and is highly cos­
mopolitan; it provides a good locale for a case study on trends in social 
mobility and political change. Lastly, the political situation in Madhya 
Pradesh was quiet. Once Bhilai was selected the nearby traditional city 
of Raipur was automatically selected.
Differences Between Bhilai and Raipur
III
Even to a casual observer Bhilai and Raipur present striking 
differences, By western standards Bhilai is a well planned, orderly and 
attractive town with modern houses, reticulated drinking water, under­
ground drainage, paved roads at right angles, schools, parks, shops, 
playgrounds, and entertainment centres. Most houses have well tended 
lawns, flower patches and kitchen gardens surrounded by green hedges --
D
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all symbols of private efforts and energies deplorably absent elsewhere 
in India. The residential quarters of manual and semi-skilled labourers 
were much less impressive though much better than the housing facilities 
available for labourers elsewhere.
On the other hand Raipur is an old city with narrow roads, 
open drains, dusty lanes, and closely packed houses of different descrip­
tions and in bad repair. Roads and lanes are a jig-saw puzzle, and 
houses are irregularly numbered. The town has more than a dozen small 
man-made lakes -- almost every one of them thick with a layer of fungus 
floating on the surface. The great majority of the work force depends 
on trade and commerce in the city and agriculture in the surrounding 
fields. The industrial pursuits in the town are limited to one textile 
mill, a few rice and oil mills, and automobile repair shops. A majority 
of the rich traders, merchants and landlords are concentrated in the 
centre of the city, while most of the poorer sections live on the out­
skirts. Statistics produced by the state government show that the region 
is backward with high morbidity rates and low income and literacy levels.
Socio-Economic Characterisitcs of Respondents in Bhilai
The socio-economic characterisitcs of the respondents inter­
viewed in Bhilai (see note on Sampling, Appendix V) indicated change, 
high educational and income levels, and a high proportion of employment 
in skilled and semi-skilled jobs, over-representation of religious 
minorities and among the Hindus over-representation of the Brahmin 
caste group.
The distribution of religions showed four times the national
proportion of Christians and a far lower than average representation
2of Muslims (Diagram III.l). As only a few government employees are 
likely to have been compulsorily transferred to this town, while the 
vast majority of the inhabitants would be voluntary migrants, the 
distribution suggests differential levels of enterprise among the sects, 
and perhaps also as between regions, since most of the Christians came 
from Kerala in south India, and most of the Sikhs from the Punjab.
Among the Hindus in Bhilai, the Brahmins were over-represented
as they are in traditional cities compared to the country as a whole
3(Diagram III.l), However, the proportion of Vaisyas in excess of the 
national average was far lower than in Raipur, the difference being made 
up by the caste Hindus. Three factors could have contributed to this
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DIAGRAM III. 3
Read occupational categories as:
Administrators 0
Professionals, Engineers 1
Businessmen 2
Lower Civil Servants 3
Skilled Workers 4
Semi-Skilled Workers 5
Cultivators 6
Manual Labourers 7
8Others
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difference:-
Vaisyas are reluctant to take employment except in trade 
and commerce -- occupations of lower numerical importance 
in an industrial city; and/or
As the shopping centres in Bhilai, unlike those in 
traditional towns, catered primarily for the local 
residents only, they provided relatively limited 
business opportunities; and/or
A major part of the wholesale and retail trade was 
handled by consumer co-operative stores owned and 
operated by the employees themselves.
Educational levels were much higher in Bhilai than in Raipur.
Up to 85 per cent of the respondents had been to school; about half of 
them had completed high school studies; and about 14 per cent had secured 
a technical diploma, degree, or postgraduate degree. More than half of 
the respondents also reported some on-the-job training (Diagram III.2).
Correspondingly, the proportions employed in engineering, 
skilled and semi-skilled occupations were relatively high, and those
4in clerical (167,) and manual (187>) work relatively low (Diagram III. 3). 
There were three main differences in occupation structure between Bhilai 
and Raipur. In Bhilai all th'e respondents except for the 2 per cent 
engaged in private business were employed by the government; in Raipur 
a majority were self-employed or wage-workers in the private sector. A 
large majority of the workers in Bhilai were in technical and skilled 
occupations, whereas in Raipur the occupations were distributed over a 
wide range and a relative majority of respondents were employed in business 
and lower civil service jobs. A majority of the Bhilai respondents were 
specially trained for their jobs, but this did not apply to Raipur.
Compared to Raipur, present income disparities were low in 
Bhilai. Of the 621 respondents only two (0.37,) secured less than one 
hundred rupees a month. In relation to about nine in ten respondents 
the differences between the highest and lowest salaries was only five 
times (Diagram III.3). Of the 14 per cent of respondents who secured 
more than 500 repees a month, only 3 per cent secured 1,000 to 1,800 
rupees a month. As respondents in Bhilai were mostly salaried workers, 
their income returns were more accurate and reliable than the income 
statements of the respondents in Raipur who were mostly engaged in 
business or irregular self-employment.
In relation to other socio-economic characteristics the differ-
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ences between the respondents in Bhilai and Raipur were minimal. In 
general Bhilai families were small in size, in nine out of ten families 
the housewife was the only dependant, about six in ten families had one 
to four children, and about nine in ten respondents were either young 
or middle-aged (DIAGRAMS III.l and III.2).
Associations Between Caste, Occupation and Income
There was a fairly high positive association between caste, literacy, 
occupation, income and type of residence in both Bhilai and Raipur, the 
differences being only of degree. The pattern observed in Bhilai particularly 
is indicative of the changes that are occurring in industrial areas. It may 
be observed from Table III.l that a higher than average percentage (sample 
norm in Bhilai) of caste Hindus and persons belonging to the scheduled castes 
migrated from rural areas to Bhilai. About an average percentage of caste 
Hindus and twice the average percentage of respondents belonging to the 
scheduled castes, had not been to school. In Bhilai a higher than average 
percentage of respondents belonging to the traditional elite castes depended 
on the civil services, professions, and business. At the same time about 
an average percentage of the caste-Hindus and a two to three times higher 
than average percentage of scheduled-caste respondents depended on skilled 
and manual occupations. Here is an indication that despite the large scale 
movement of medium and lower sections of the Hindus from rural to industrial 
towns the predominance of traditional elite castes (particularly of Brahmins) 
in high status occupations continues. It is, however, possible that after 
a few generations of urban residence caste-Hindu and scheduled-caste persons 
who are now mostly employed in skilled and manual occupations will success­
fully compete with the traditional elite castes. Finally, income levels 
were far higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. At the same time an absolute 
majority of the respondents of traditional elite castes were either in middle 
or high income groups while a majority of the scheduled castes respondents 
were either in low or middle income groups both in Bhilai and Raipur.
MIGRATION PATTERNS 
Existing Literature
The characteristics of the migrants to Indian cities and towns, 
as deduced from the existing studies, can be summarized as follows 
(Zachariah 1959, 1964, 1968). Migrants to Indian cities were predomin-
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antly males (unmarried) and this predominance of males was higher among 
short distance migrants to small towns than among long distance migrants 
to big cities. In fact a majority of the migrants to big cities were 
long distance migrants. Just as observed in other countries, young 
adults were over-represented and the old were under-represented among 
the migrants. Migrants to large cities usually had higher average 
educational attainments than the population of the localities of their 
origin, but lower than those of the population of their destination.
A majority of the migrants were engaged in the manufacturing and service 
industries. About one-fourth of all migration to urban areas was tempor­
ary .
It was noted in the first chapter that rural to urban migration 
was always higher than urban to urban migration. Migration from within 
the district and state to the city was always higher than from outside. 
Migration within the state and language area was always higher than 
across state and language boundaries. Inter-state and inter-linguistic 
migration was always higher to industrial towns than to traditional cities 
(Gupta and Sadasyak 1968:80-81; Mohsin 1964:30; B.R. Mistra 1959:26, 27) 
A relative majority of those who moved to urban areas were pushed out of 
rural areas because of unemployment at home, meagre income, and insuffic­
ient land to cultivate, and much fewer though significant numbers were 
pulled into the cities because of the help and assistance provided by 
their friends and relatives in securing employment for the migrants 
(Majumdar 1960:72, 73; Malhotra 1964:186-189; Balakrishna 1961:112-114).
Implications of Migration Patterns
From our point of view the implications of the above findings 
are two. Migrants to most of the traditional cities come mainly from the 
surrounding areas and share the local language and local culture. Hence 
they may be expected to have similar political attitudes to those of the 
non-migrant urban residents and be unlikely to introduce any new political 
ideas. At the same time, large-scale migration, upsetting the existing 
religious, caste, and income distribution patterns, may help to bring 
about a change in the local power structure. On the other hand, a consider 
able number of migrants to industrial towns are likely to come from far- 
off areas, and have higher educational attainments and technical training 
compared to those in the region to which they are migrating. Culturally 
they are different, economically and politically they are probably more
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differentiated than locals.
Looked at from the above point of view, employment opportunities 
in Bhilai were certainly greater than in the metropolitan cities. All 
the respondents, of course, were migrants. About two in three migrated 
from rural areas. Of a total of 210 who migrated from urban areas to 
Bhilai, about two in three came from towns with more than 50,000 popu­
lation.^ Less than a fifth of all the respondents came from the local 
state, less than half (477.) spoke the local language (Hindi) and three 
in four had moved from a distance of more than 600 kilometres. More 
than half (517) had lived in at least one place besides Bhilai and their 
native place (Diagram III. 2).
Factors Facilitating Inter-State Movement
Several factors favoured this high rate of inter-state movement 
of population to Bhilai. The steel plant at Bhilai, like all the other 
public sector steel plants, was financed and established by the Union 
Government. As it sought to eradicate regional imbalances by wide dis­
persal of the big industries, it gave preferential treatment to the local 
qualified unemployed people in matters of recruitment, but it could not 
impose any restriction on inter-state migrants. At the time the steel 
town was established in Bhilai there was not a single technical school 
or college worth mentioning in the Chattisgargh region of Madhya Pradesh.
So the big demand for technically trained personnel and skilled workers 
left no other option for the management in the matter of recruitment.
Once a few qualified and enterprising persons came in and 
secured employment, this encouraged the migration of their friends and 
relatives. For more than three in ten respondents in Bhilai, the first 
job contact was provided by friends or relatives. South Indian states 
in general have a tradition of sending out large numbers of migrants 
wherever job opportunities are available. In addition to this the 
steel plant needed skilled and trained workers on the operations side 
when it commenced production. Such specialised workers could be supplied 
only by traditional industrial centres such as West Bengal, Bihar, and 
Maharastra. Indeed these states supplied large numbers of migrants to 
Bhilai. Consequently, the barriers of language, distance, and type of 
residence which were so effective in limiting the immigration opportunities 
for outsiders in the case of traditional cities proved to be ineffective 
in the case of Bhilai. For example the states of Rajasthan, Orissa and
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Gujarat which have common borders with Madhya Pradesh, supplied fewer 
than 2 per cent each of the migrants to Bhilai, while the state of Kerala 
in the far south accounted for 15 per cent of the migrants, Punjab in 
the north-west accounted for 9 per cent, and West Bengal in the east 
accounted for nearly 8 per cent.
Implications of Location of Industries
In a country like India, the location of big industrial projects 
has two far-reaching implications. Firstly, it has always been (and 
remains) the backward regions that have clamoured for the location of big 
steel factories, oil refineries and shipbuilding yards in their states, to 
increase employment opportunities for local people. The government yielded 
on many occasions to these pressures (Weiner 1962:205; Gadgil 1961:XIV; 
Rosen 1966:152,153). It often declared that it would pursue a policy of 
reducing regional imbalances and made the future location of any big 
industrial project a political decision rather than a technical one 
(Roth 1970). On the other hand, backward regions have neither trained 
personnel nor individual intitiative and enterprise to realise the full 
benefit of location of such big projects. The local people are usually 
employed on the lowest rungs of the occupational ladder. This leaves the 
field relatively open to inter-state migrants, who serve as islands of 
multi-cultural life, fertile soil for new political ideas.
For example, our survey data revealed that more than a third of 
the respondents in Bhilai moved from the states (Andhra Pradesh, Kerala 
and West Bengal) in which the Communists had been traditionally influential, 
about a fifth moved from the states of Tamil Nadu, Orissa, and Punjab in 
which the regional parties had been elected in 1967 to lead the govern­
ments, and about four in ten came from the states of Madhya Pradesh,
Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and Rajasthan, in which the Jana Sangh has been fast 
expanding its influence. Our data on inter-generational and career 
mobility also clearly bear out this fact.
Characteristics of Migrants to Raipur
In line with the findings of the earlier studies the factors of 
language and distance appeared to be closely related to the pattern of 
migration to Raipur. More than half of the migrants were intra-state 
movers mostly from the surrounding rural areas (Diagram III.2). Inter­
state migration was far higher from the close-by regions in the neighbour-
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ing states of Maharastra and Andhra Pradesh than from far off states.
About three in four migrants spoke the language of the region -- 
Chattisgarhi dialect of Hindi. The principal reasons for migration 
to Raipur appear to be transfer of government employees and the increasing 
significance of the city as a commercial and educational centre.
Inter-state migration to Raipur was inhibited by a number of 
factors. Government jobs were almost solely reserved for the Hindi­
speaking people. Local people were given preference in the admission of 
students to educational and professional institutions. The scope for 
secondary industry and employment opportunities for technically trained 
graduates were limited. Finally, it would have been difficult for a 
newcomer to launch a business enterprise without any roots in the local 
society. Of all the migrants to Raipur, refugees from West Pakistan were 
the only people who successfully established themselves, mostly as petty 
retail traders.
Associations with Native Place
Migrants in general in India have a tendency to maintain close 
associations with their native places. In Bhilai this was particularly 
facilitated by an annual government travelling allowance for the migrant 
and his family to visit the native place. Consequently about nine in ten 
paid regular visits to their native place, about two in three retained 
some property interests there, about eight in ten regularly wrote letters 
to their friends and relatives, and two in three sent money home at least 
occasionally. The degree of association with one's own native place 
was far higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. Further, continued interest in 
one's own native place in the form of discussions with friends, and sub­
scriptions to native newspapers, was almost nil among the migrants in 
Raipur while it was almost universal among the migrants in Bhilai.
INTER-GENERATIONAL MOBILITY 
Existing Literature
Studies of social mobility in India are few but they agree on 
some important patterns (Sovani 1956; Nijhavan 1969). Firstly, about 
three fourths of the workforce in India remain in the occupational grades 
of their fathers. Of the others a majority move into higher occupational 
grades. The movement occurs primarily from agricultural to non-agricul-
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tural occupations. Those who move out from agricultural occupations 
usually move into unskilled, skilled, and lower civil service jobs.
This indirectly suggests that persons of agricultural origin require 
two or three generations of consistent upward movement to reach topmost 
(professional) occupational grades. In this process variables such as 
caste-stat us, level of education, and monthly income are significantly 
positively associated with occupational mobility rates. These studies 
also suggest in an indirect way that the process of urbanization is 
gradual, and that in the initial stages most of the rural to urban 
migrants retain their links with their native places.
In an article based on the date drawn from his Poona study, 
Sovani concluded that about 43 per cent of the heads of households 
remained in the occupational grades of their own fathers, and of those 
who moved, seven in ten moved up and three in ten moved down (Sovani 
1966:97,98). Going back another generation, about eight in ten fathers 
(of respondents) remained in the same occupational grades as the grand­
fathers (of respondents). Again, among those fathers who moved, eight 
in ten moved up and the rest moved down. Sovani also found than in 
general those who moved up from low grades spanned a larger social 
distance than those who moved up from intermediate or high occupational 
grades -- probably because the occupational system was wider and expanding 
in the middle ranges. For the same reason those who moved down from 
high occupational grades slid a larger social distance than those who 
moved down from low occupational grades. Summing up his arguments,
Sovani concluded that 'urbanization would seem to bring about the trans­
formation of unskilled manual workers into other types of skilled, highly 
skiller workers etc., even in centres like Poona, where the process of 
urbanization is not based on industrial development' (Sovani 1966:105).
Another study in the city of Coimbatore in Tamil Nadu, found 
that agriculture was the occupation of half of the grandfathers and of 
about a third of the fathers of the respondents (Bopegamage and 
Veeraraghavan 1967:128).
A recent study (Nijhavan 1969) based on a nationwide sample 
drawn from adult male voters (both rural and urban) confirmed in general 
the conclusions of Sovani. According to this study, inter-generational 
occupational mobility was higher from non-agricultural than from agri- 
cultural occupations. Of a total of 1593 respondents, compared with 
their fathers, about two thirds were immobile, about a fifth moved up
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and about a seventh moved down. Significantly, owner~cultivators consti­
tuted the largest category among both fathers (54%) and sons (46%,), and 
immobility between fathers and sons was the highest (78%) in this group.
Yet of a total of 295 who moved up from all occupational grades, the 
sons of owner-cultivators constituted about 43 per cent. Inter-generational 
outward and upward movement of owner-cultivators occurred into a whole 
range of occupations; a fifth each moved into unskilled, skilled and 
business occupations, a quarter moved into white collar jobs, and about 
a sixth moved up into professions. The same pattern, with a difference 
in degree, was also obvious in relation to agricultural labourers. Another 
analysis of data from the same survey indicated that caste status, level 
of education and monthly income were significantly and positively asso­
ciated with inter-generational occupational mobility (Nijhavan 1971).
In an agricultural country like India which is being industrial­
ised though slowly, the above patterns are to be expected. Our data in 
general confirmed some of the above findings but there are sufficient 
reasons to assume that occupational mobility patterns in Bhilai would be 
different in several ways. Firstly, all our respondents in Bhilai were 
migrants, and a majority of them moved from rural areas. So one might 
expect that movement from agricultural to non-agricultural occupations 
was logical and inevitable in Bhilai. Secondly, most of the jobs in 
Bhilai are skilled, highly skilled and in engineering. So one could 
expect that those who moved from rural areas and agricultural occupations 
into Bhilai took over manual, semi-skilled, skilled and lower civil 
service jobs. Further, the occupational structure in Bhilai expanded 
considerably at all levels over a period of ten years. A great majority
of the posts at the senior level were filled by internal promotion on
the basis of experience. So unlike the situation elsewhere in India, 
the occupational range in new industrial towns, if the situation in Bhilai 
is any guide, is fairly open at the intermediate and top levels also.
One can expect that there will be a high degree of both inter- and intra-
generational mobility in Bhilai. Here we first analyse the patterns of
movement into urban areas; we proceed to investigate the patterns of 
occupational mobility and then compare the situation in Bhilai with that 
in Raipur.
Inter-Gerierational Movement to Urban Areas
Our data in general confirmed the findings of earlier studies 
that urbanization is a gradual process over several generations, that a
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vast majority of the migrants to urban areas prefer to stay there despite their 
active contacts with their former native places, and the net gain of migrants 
from rural areas is far higher in the case of industrial towns than of 
traditional cities. In Bhilai both grandfathers and fathers of two in three 
respondents lived in rural areas, and those of a fifth lived in urban areas.
In the case of about a tenth of the respondents their grandfathers lived in 
rural areas but fathers moved to urban areas. In other words about 77 per 
cent of the grandfathers and 65 per cent of the fathers lived in rural areas 
while all the respondents were working and living in Bhilai at the time of 
the survey.
The real significance of the figures comes out only when we investigate 
the close assocation between residence, caste, education, occupation and 
income. While a close association between these variables has been generally 
recognised the monotonous regularity with which the patterns were repeated by 
our analysis is highly significant.
a) Parental residence and literacy
The level of literacy was very low among rural resident grandfathers 
and fathers and fairly high among urban residents. Among the grandfathers 
about a tenth of the rural residents and about half of the urban residents 
attended school, and among fathers four in ten rural residents and eight in 
ten 'urban residents attended school. These rural-urban differentials in 
literacy are not unexpected but the consistency with which they persisted among 
our respondents’ generation is highly significant. About eight in ten 
respondents from a rural native place and nine in ten respondents from an urban 
native place had been to school. Further, the proportion of those who completed 
high school was always higher among those from an urban native place than among 
those from a rural native place.
b) Parental residence and occupation
Rural residence in the case of both grandfathers and fathers meant 
engaging in owner cultivation. Of a total of 480 rural resident grandfathers, 
331 were owner cultivators. When the respondents were asked whether they would 
regard their grandfathers as 'rich', ’middle', or 'poor' seven in ten of these 
were named as 'rich' or 'middle', and three in ten were classified as 'poor'.
The situation was similar in father's generation. Such a classification was, 
of course, highly subjective. What was regarded as 'rich' or 'middle' during 
grandfathers ' and fathers' generation need not (in all probability did not) 
have the same connotation in respondents' time. Also the assessment of 
economic status as 'rich' or 'middle' by one respondent need not be identical 
with the assessment of another respondent. I, however, used this information 
for what it is worth to draw a line between the economically better off ('rich' 
and 'middle') and the economically worse off ('poor' cultivators and landless 
labourers) rural residents.
If the above division is a reasonable assumption it is not the sons and 
daughters of landless labourers and 'poor ' cultivators but mostly the sons 
and daughters of 'rich' and 'middle' cultivators that migrate to new industrial 
towns in large numbers. A majority of the migrants from rural areas whose 
parents were not cultivators or landless labourers came from families of school 
teachers and petty government officials.
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The above close association between type of residence, education and 
occupation of grandfathers and fathers appeared to have influenced the present 
occupational placement of the respondents. About eight in ten whose grand­
fathers and fathers were urban residents were presently engaged in civil services, 
professions, business or skilled work while seven in ten whose grandfathers and 
fathers were rural residents were presently engaged in semi-skilled or manual 
jobs.
c) Implications of differential movement patterns
The implications of the above differential movement patterns are 
obvious. The irregularly hired rural landless labourers who migrate to urban 
areas may be better off in the towns if they get regular work and a monthly 
salary, however small it may be. A large-scale migration of landless labourers 
from particular geographical regions to urban centres may also have far-reaching 
political consequences. for example, landless labourers in the states of 
Kerala, Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal have been the consistent 
supporters of the Communists, the DMK and the non-Communist left parties. In 
the north the strength of the SSP is said to be derived from social sections 
which combine low caste status, low level occupations, and low income. A 
large scale migration of these sections would certainly benefit the leftist 
parties to some extent. But in both Bhilai and Raipur their numbers were few.
In additio, while most of the landless labourers in Raipur came from the 
surrounding areas, those in Bhilai came from other states such as Andhra Pradesh 
and Orissa.
The large-scale migration of the sons of 'rich' and 'middle1 cultivators 
is not surprising. Traditionally the 'rich' and 'middle' cultivators enjoyed 
a relatively higher standard of living than 'poor' cultivators and landless 
labourers. Though a majority of them return themselves as cultivators for 
census purposes, they merely supervise agricultural operations and never soil 
their hands. Our data on the educational achievements of different communites 
clearly suggest that over generations these owner cultivators have fast 
improved their educational qualifications and professional training and prepared 
themselves to take up urban occupations and move over to the towns. It is 
already noted that these communities of 'rich' and 'middle' cultivators have 
appropriated for themselves political power and also the employment opportunities 
and the economic benefits that flow from it. No wonder that the sons of the 
cultivators are encouraged to move into the cities.
But here again there was a difference in the kinds of cultivators' sons 
migrating to Bhilai and Raipur. In the case of Bhilai it was the sons of the 
politically rising cultivator communites of the south that migrated and were 
more likely to contribute to new political ideas. In Raipur it was mostly 
cultivators from the surrounding areas who moved in. Further, the cultivators' 
sons migrating to Bhilai entered a relatively open employment market with 
opportunities (through on-the-job training, promotion by experience, etc.) for 
better jobs and higher incomes. We will see in the later chapters whether 
these are likely to become politcally more moderate than the corresponding group 
in Raipur, who entered low and middle range occupations with only remote 
chances of improving their lot.
Inter-Generational Occupational Mobility
The classification and regrouping of occupations is a difficult task 
in the Indian situation. In a country where more than eight in ten of the 
workforce live in rural areas and depend on agricultural and allied activities,
DIAGRAM I I I . 4
INTERGENE RATIONAL VARIATIONS IN EDUCATIONAL ACHIEVEMENTS
BHILAI
RAIPUR
GF„F. N O  SCHOOLING  
45
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INTERGENERATIONAL OCCUPATIONAL MOBItITY ACROSS D IV IS IO N  BOUNDARIES
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Note: Figures in the parenthesis are total numbers
G-.F. stands for grandfather and F. stands for father.
In this category in Raipur there were seven 
respondents whose grandfather was schooled 
but not father.
Gases in which the occupation of grandfather 
or father was unemployed were excluded from 
the diagram.
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and where social hierarchy is determined by ritual status and ownership of land, 
Western class concepts are obviously inapplicable. Even in urban areas where 
occupational and living patterns are considerably diversified there is much 
incongruity between ritual status, social prestige, administrative hierarchical 
order, and income lvel of different occupations. There is no uniform way of 
ranking or regrouping occupations into major divisions suitable to all studies 
and acceptable to all research scholars. A perusal of the socio-economic and 
social mobility studies makes two things obvious. Firstly, some occupations 
which are represented prominently in some studies do not figure at all or are 
represented very porrly in others (Dutta 1969; Reddy 1969; Lok Sabha 
Secretariat 1957, 1962, 1967). Secondly, many studies did not attempt to rank 
occupations or to regroup them into major divisions for assessing mobility rates 
(Mohsin 1964; Majumdar I960; Balakrishna 196l). These studies sidestepped this 
difficult task by classifying respondents in terms of the industry to which they 
were attached rather than assigning them to the precise occupation in which they 
were engaged. Subramaniam in his studies of India’s administrators and India’s 
managerial class attempted to rank occupations and combined civil servants, 
business owners, business executives, business employees, university and school 
teachers, doctors, half of all lawyers, half of those engaged in other learned 
occupations, and half of all cultivators and designated them as 'upper middle 
class’, the argument being that about half of all lawyers, others in learned 
professions, and cultivators would be poor and so they have to be excluded from 
’upper middle class' (Subramaniam 1970, 197l). A recent study on social 
mobility based on data derived from a cross-sectional election survey in 1967 
regrouped all occupations into five non-agricultural and three agricultural 
'classes' (Nijhavan 1969).
If one is primarily interested in inter-generational mobility of a 
changing society one can assess the movement from agricultural to non-agricultural 
occupations. But this will not be of much help when we are dealing with urban 
populations like those in Bhilai and Raipur and when our primary interest is in 
intra-generational mobility. Our problem in Bhilai however, is considerably 
simplified by the administrative hierarchy in which the respondents were placed. 
But here again there were some inconsistencies. For example, lower civil 
servants occupy higher positions in the administrative hierarchy but draw 
consistently lower salaries than skilled employees who work on the operational 
side. The situation was slightly different in Raipur. Here most of the 
respondents were self-employed or were employed by private firms. Employment 
hierarchical order was less clear here. I first classified occupations into 
nine groups keeping in view mainly administrative hierarchy, economic status, 
and life style of the respondent. In ranking these groups I placed high level 
administrators and decision makers at the top and manual labourers at the bottom. 
The ranking of some groups had to be, however., arbitrary. Except for some 
ambiguity regarding the ranking of skilled workers and lower civil servants this 
classification seemed to have worked well.
A quick glance at the inter-generational and intra-generational 
occupational mobility tables (TABLES A.3, A.4, A.5, A.6 and III.2) clearly 
indicates that occupational mobility over the generations and also within the 
respondent 's career was mainly from cultivation, manual labour, and semi-skilled 
work to higher level occupations. So for assessing mobility on the occupational 
scale I again divided the above nine occupational groups into two major 
occupational divisions and designated them as division A, and division B. A 
majority of those in division A (civil servants, professionals, businessmen and 
skilled workers) correspond to those who are described as middle class and a majority
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of those in division B (semi-skilled workers, cultivators, labourers and others) 
correspond to those who are described as working class in the West. I did not 
however use these terms because the concept of class does not fit well in the 
Indian situation.
When grandfathers, fathers and respondents were classified into two 
divisions A and B it was found that about three in four respondents whose 
grandfathers and fathers had division A occupations continued to be in the same 
division. And similarly, seven in ten respondents whose grandfathers and fathers 
had semi-skilled, agricultural or manual occupations continued to be in the same 
occupations (division B). In the case of about a fifth of the respondents, 
their grandfathers were mostly in division B and fathers and particularly 
themselves had division A occupations (Diagram III.4 ). In such a broad
classification it should be remembered that there was considerable mobility 
within the boundaries of each division and that those who left the lower division 
usually moved into the lower groups of the higher division. As expected most 
of the movement was from the occupation of cultivation into a whole range of 
urban occupations.
Inter-generational Variations in Educational Achievements
The educational achievements of the respondents in Bhilai were closely 
associated with the educational achievements of their gradnfathers and fathers.
Of a total of 285 respondents whose grandfathers and fathers had not been to 
school three in ten themselves were unschooled, about five in ten had some 
schooling and about two in ten had completed high school studies. On the other 
hand, out of a total of 127 respondents whose grandfathers and fathers had been 
to school, fewer than one per cent had not been to school, about a seventh had 
some schooling, and as many as eight in ten had completed high school studies 
(Diagram III.4 ). With a difference of degree the same pattern could be observed 
in Raipur.
Situation in Raipur
The inter-generational mobility patterns in Raipur differe from those in 
Bhilai in a number of ways. In Raipur only a relative majority (41$) of the 
respondents were first-generation migrants from rural areas while in Bhilai they 
were in an absolute majority (65%). Migration from rural areas to Raipur was 
gradual while to Bhilai it was to be sudden and was achieved most probably within 
the past two or three generations. Type of residence of grandfathers and fathers 
was closely associated with education, occupation, and income of respondents in 
both Raipur and Bhilai but more so in the latter than in the former.
RESPONDENTS' CAREER MOBILITY
Occupational Mobility
Considered broadly the career mobility of the respondents across division 
boundaries was only marginally different in Bhilai from that in Rairur. Of a 
total of 621 respondents in Bhilai, 247 (40%) mentioned a division A occupation 
as their first job, and of these about eight in ten (85%) remained in the same 
division and the rest (l5%) moved down into division B occupations. Of the 
374 respondents who mentioned a division B occupation as their first job about 
eight in ten (81%) remained in the same division.9 The above classification 
does not, however, take into account intra-division movement, the prestige
TABLE III.2
Present Occupation of Respondents by Their First 
Occupation (Bhilai and Raipur)
Present occupationFirst
occupation
Bhilai
1 Administrators
2 Professionals
3 Businessmen
4 Lower civil 
servants
5 Skilled 
workers
6 Semi-skilled 
workers
7 Cultivators
8 Manual 
labourers
9 Others
10 Total
Raipur
1 Administrators
2 Professionals
3 Businessmen
4 Lower civil 
servants
5 Skilled 
workers
6 Semi-skilled 
workers
7 Cultivators
8 Manual 
labourers
9 Others
10 Total
Note : Occupational categories at top (present occupation) should be
read as indicated on the left side (first occupation). All 
figures in the above table are absolute numbers.
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attached to different occupational groups in different localities, or the value 
orientations and considerations of the respondents willing to move upward or 
downward in the occupational scale. lor example, when all the respondents were 
cross-classified into nine occupational groups by their first and present 
occupations it was found that about 60 per cent of them continued to cling to 
the same groups (in diagonal cells) about 29 per cent moved up either within 
their division or across division boundaries, and about 11 per cent moved 
downward. In some occupational groups the numbers were too small to draw 
any definite conclusions. Mobility in general was the highest from among the 
lower civil servants and manual labourers.
Reasons for Moving
It should be remembered here that within each occupational group there 
was ample room for upward mobility. lor example, among engineers there were 
five to six grades with the salary varying from 450 to more than one thousand 
rupees; among lower civil servants there were several grades from lower division 
clerk to office head assistant. Promotions and salary increments within these 
limits were common in Bhilai and employees took these promotions for granted.
At the same time it was my impression in the field that there were some status 
discrepancies between occupational and income structures. lor example, the 
social prestige of the lower civil service jobs has been higher and they occupied 
higher positions in the administrative hierarchy than those of the skilled 
workers both in industrial towns and traditional cities but not their salaries, 
job security, or promotional opportunities (see Table A.10 for discrepancies 
in income). In fact in Bhilai both skilled and semi-skilled workers called 
lower civil servants 'officer log' (officer people) because lower civil servants 
prepared their pay cheques and took decisions on their travelling allowances 
and leave applications. Hence, of a total of 161 respondents who mentioned 
their first job as lower civil servant, as many as 57 (35$) moved into the 
skilled and semi-skilled occupations, with slightly lower occupational prestige 
but certainly with equal or higher salaries. So if we exclude the lower 
civil servants who technically moved down the occupational scale but actually 
opted for job security and higher salaries, the mobility of all the other 
respondents from all the other occupational groups was upward.
Interestingly, almost all the respondents who moved from lower civil 
service jobs to skilled work belonged to the intermediate castes (mostly from 
south India and West Bengal) and respondents of traditional elite castes
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showed no inclination to move down the prestige scale and opt for a higher 
salary and job security. The patterns of mobility from first jobs into the 
present occupational groups are presented in Table III.2.
Shifts in Income
The increase in income of respondents between their first and present 
jobs was considerable in Bhilai. The first monthly salary of nine in ten
in Bhilai was less than two hundred rupees a month, for about one in ten it 
ranged from two to four hundred rupees, and for two per cent it was more 
than four hundred rupees a month. As against this at the time of the survey, 
only a seventh of the respondents drew less than two hundred rupees a month, 
about two in three drew two to four hundred rupees a month, and the rest 
drew more than four hundred rupees a month. Stated briefly, the salary of 
about six in ten doubled and in quite a few cases it increased by many more 
times. A major share of these benefits had undoubtedly gone to the lowest 
income group. Bor example of those who drew one hundred rupees or less a 
month as first salary, about half were now drawing two to three hundred and 
about three in ten were now drawing more than three hundred rupees a month. 
This vast increase in income of employees at all levels indirectly indicates 
the promotional opportunities and salary revisions in a fast expanding 
industrial town.
Comparison of Bhilai and Raipur
Occupational and income mobility in Raipur compared poorly with 
those in Bhilai. Among businessmen, lower civil servants, cultivators, 
and labourers mobility was significantly lower in Raipur than in Bhilai.
While downward mobility was negligible in Bhilai it was considerable in 
most of the occupational groups in Raipur. Income mobility was low in
Raipur. Compared to the first salary drawn by them about a quarter to a 
third in each group remained where they were before.
The consequences of such wide variations in inter-generational 
and career mobilities was well shown when the question, ’Would you say 
that your life is much better now, say, than ten years earlier?’ was put 
to the respondents. About six in ten respondents in Bhilai replied that
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it was better, about three in ten thought there was no change and only 
about one in seven thought that it had become worse. Compared to this 
about four in ten in Raipur thought it was better, two in ten thought 
there was no change, and as many as four in ten thought that it had 
become worse (Diagram III.3).
Interestingly, in Bhilai it was the high-salaried respondents 
who said that though their income had gone up, their standard of living 
had gone down while in Raipur it was the poorer sections of the society 
who, unable to make ends meet, thought that life had become worse.
Job Security and Job Aspiration
The sense of job security and the definite improvement in the 
standard of living made the respondents in Bhilai aspire to higher things 
while insecurity of employment and worsening standards of living made 
respondents in Raipur pessimistic, with low aspirations. In response to 
the question 'Do you think your job is secure here?' about nine in ten 
in Bhilai thought that their job was secure while only six in ten thought 
so in Raipur (Diagram III.3). To the question 'If you had a free choice 
now, which job would you like to hold?' about seven in ten in Bhilai 
unhestitatingly stated that they would like to have one or two promotions, 
while in Raipur only a seventh asked for a promotion and about half wanted 
to continue in the same job and said that they would in fact be happy if 
their present job could be made permanent (Diagram III.3). With employ­
ment and promotional opportunities so limited, it was not uncommon for 
the respondents in Raipur to say that they would like to take up any job 
with higher pay if only it was offered to them. In Bhilai the respondents 
more often mentioned specific higher jobs in their line of promotion for 
which they were properly trained.
PROFILES OF BHILAI AND RAIPUR 
Bhilai
Bhilai is a heavy industry-based new industrial town established 
in the fifties and located in a backward region of a backward state. The 
city is well planned and provided with all modern amenities -- such as 
reticulated drinking water, electricity, underground drainage, good houses, 
good roads, modern shopping centres, sports grounds, recreation centres, 
educational institutions, and transport to the workplace. Most of the
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workers in Bhilai were engaged in skilled and engineering jobs in the 
stell plant financed and managed by the Government of India.
Bhilai was cosmopolitan. Compared to the national average 
figures, the distribution of religions in Bhilai shows considerable over­
representation of Christians and marginal under-representation of Muslims 
and Hindus. Most of the Christians in Bhilai were inter-state migrants 
from Kerala. Among the Hindus, Brahmins were over-represented just as 
they are in traditional cities. In Bhilai educational levels were quite 
high, most of the respondents were young or middle-aged, adult dependents 
were few, about half of the respondents had two or less children, about 
eight in ten were long distance and inter-state migrants, mostly from 
rural areas, more than half had lived in at least one place other than 
their native place and Bhilai, and about nine in ten had been living in 
Bhilai for more than five years. Such a high inter-state migration 
provided a fertile soil for new political ideas. Respondents in Bhilai 
in general maintained close contacts with their native places.
Inter-generational mobility patterns in Bhilai indicated a 
heavy migration from rural areas and a big switch from agricultural to 
non-agricultural occupations. Respondents with owner-cultivator parents 
were the major beneficiaries of this process. Type of parental residence, 
occupational, income, and educational status were closely related to 
each other and they all had influence on the occupations of the respond­
ents .
Respondents' career mobility in Bhilai was mostly upward and 
their incomes had considerably improved. Respondents in Bhilai had a 
feeling of job security and stated that their life was better now than 
ten years earlier; they optimistically hoped for higher things.
Raipur
On the other hand, Raipur is a traditional city which has grown 
over a period of ten centuries. In Raipur civic amenities are poor 
and most of the workers were dependent on private sector. Most of the 
respondents in Raipur were locals; traditional elite caste groups con­
stituted about half of the respondents; inter-state migration was low; 
respondents were of all age groups; occupational mobility was low and a 
good proportion of the mobility was downward. In Raipur incomes were 
low, most of the respondents felt that their jobs were insecure, and 
their aspirations were low.
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FOOTNOTES
III
1. For details of difficulties encountered when fieldwork was 
attempted in Durgapur and Burdwan in West Bengal, see the note 
on fieldwork (Appendix II).
2. According to the 1961 census the religous break-up of the Indian 
population was Hindus 83.5 per cent, Muslims 10.7 per cent, 
Christians 2.4 per cent, Sikhs 1.8 per cent, and others 2.6
per cent. The comparative figures for Durg district (in which 
Bhilai is located) were Hindus 96.0 per cent, and others less 
than one per cent each (Census of India 1961, 1967b:3-5;
Census of India 1961, 1964a:XIII, XIV).
3. A projection based on earlier censuses suggests that the present- 
day Hindu society consists of 8.7 per cent Brahmin castes, 7.4 
per cent Kshtria castes, 3.5 per cent Vaisya castes, 55.8 per 
cent Sudra or agricultural castes, 17.3 per cent of scheduled 
castes (actual as of 1961 census), and 7.3 per cent scheduled 
tribes (actual as of 1961 census). The distribution of Brahmins 
is not, however, even all over the country. The highest Brahmin 
proportion of population is found in Uttar Pradesh (about 30 per 
cent) and Bihar compared with 5 per cent in east India, about
6 per cent in west India, and about 4 per cent in south India. 
Generally the proportion of Brahmin population in any region 
seems to be in inverse ratio to its distance from the Gangetic 
plains. These figures, however, do not take into consideration 
the differential rates of territorial movement of caste groups.
4. According to the 1961 census Raipur had a total population of 
139,792 of whom three in ten were classified as workers. The 
data presented in the Union Primary Census Abstract reveals 
that of a total of fifty thousand workers in Raipur a fifth 
were dependent on manufacturing industries, slightly more than 
a fifth were dependent on trade and commerce, a third were 
dependent on service occupations, and one in eight were dependent 
on transport and communication activities. In contrast to this 
the total population in Bhilai was 86,116, of which a half were 
classified as workers. Among a total of about 49,000 workers 
more than half were engaged in manufacturing industries, a fifth 
in construction and a fifth in transport and communications and 
other services. Here it should be remembered that the Bhilai 
Steel Project was still in the stage of construction at the
time of 1961 census. Since then many temporary employees who 
were engaged in construction jobs had left the Plant (Census 
of India 1961, 1963c:383-387).
5. According to the 1961 census there were 96,298 inter-district 
or inter-state migrants in the urban areas of Durg district.
Among these only about one in ten came from within the state of 
Madhya Pradesh. Separate statistics are not available for the 
industrial town of Bhilai. But it may be safely assumed that 
most of the inter-state migrants enumerated in Durg district 
were in Bhilai. These data also reveal that of a total of 
88,400 inter-state migrants in the urban areas of Durg district,
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about a fifth came from Maharastra, about a sixth each came 
from Andhra Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh, about one in twelve 
each came from Bihar, Orissa, Kerala, and Punjab (Census of 
India 1961, 1964a:143). These figures are not, however, 
comparable with our survey data because our sample was drawn 
only from adult males and that too nearly ten years after the 
1961 census.
6. Nijhavan in his article did not analyse the volume and direction 
of occupational mobility. But recomputations of figures pres­
ented in his tables give us a fair picture of occupational 
mobility patterns.
7. Studies of socio-economic background of legislators, adminis­
trators, managers and businessmen in general suggest that 
parental residence, educational and income statuses, and occu­
pation have a definite influence on the occupational and pro­
fessional placement of their sons. We already took note of 
the socio-economic background studies of local elected rep­
resentatives and of state and central legislators. For studies 
on other elite groups see V. Subramaniam, Social Background of 
India's Administrators. Delhi: The Manager of Publications
1971; The Managerial Class of India. New Delhi: All India
Management Association 1970; Stanley A. Kochanek, Interest 
Groups and Interest Aggregation: Changing Patterns of
Oligarchy in FICCI. Economic and Political Weekly V, 1970.
8. The term cultivator was very vaguely defined by the 1961 census. 
’For purposes of the census a person is working as a cultivator 
if he or she is engaged either as an employer, single worker
or family worker in (a) cultivation of land owned or held from 
government, and (b) cultivation of land or supervision or 
direction of cultivation of land held from private persons or 
institutions for payment in money, kind or share' (Census of 
India 1961, 1963a:35).
9. The division of occupational groups into 'working' and 'middle' 
was difficult in the situation of Bhilai. It is common in 
western societies to include skilled workers in the working 
class. But in Bhilai most of these skilled workers came from 
rich and middle peasant families that enjoy 'middle class status' 
in the rural areas. A majority of the skilled workers themselves 
had supervisory jobs, drew high salaries and considered them­
selves as 'middle class'. In this analysis I preferred to 
include skilled workers, lower civil servants, businessmen, 
professionals and administrators in the 'middle class' and 
manual labourers, cultivators, and semi-skilled workers in the 
'working class'. I did not, however, stress this division or 
investigate inter-class mobility because the direction of 
mobility was regarded as more relevant for our investigation.
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IMPACT OF INDEPENDENT VARIABLES ON PARTY SUPPORT
The aggregate analysis in the second chapter showed that residents 
of industrial towns voted differently from those in traditional cities, 
and that some socio-economic groups were more likely to vote for particular 
parties than for others. On that basis I developed some hypotheses. The 
analysis of survey data in the third chapter revealed the differences in 
the socio-economic occupational characteristics and employment opportunities 
of Bhilai and Raipur and that these differences were associated with 
mobility patterns. In this chapter I first outline the voting patterns in 
Madhya Pradesh in general and Bhilai and Raipur in particular since the 
first general election and then examine the impact of the socio-economic 
variables on the voting differentials.
ELECTORAL HISTORY OF THE REGION 
Political History
The region of Chattisgarh1 in which Bhilai and Raipur2 are
located is the southernmost part of the Hindi-speaking north, with the
Oria-speaking Orissa on the eastern borders and the Marathi-speaking
Maharastra on the west. Both Chattisgarh and the surrounding hilly and
forest regions contain much tribal population and for that reason about
one-third of the state legislative assembly seats are allocated to candi-
3dates of the scheduled tribes and castes. The history of the region is 
not well researched and politically the area was unintegrated until it 
came under the direct control of the British. Local historians usually 
refer to the period of the Gupta dynasty as the golden age of the region 
then known as Dakshina Kosala (south Kosala). Later it was successively 
under the control of the Haihayas, the Muslims and the Marathas. The 
Marathas destroyed and plundered the region hand in glove with the Pindarics 
(highway robbers). The Marathas claimed that they liberated the area from 
the Muslims but the local people detested them as plunderers and welcomed 
the rule of the British, who enforced law and order and introduced land 
ownership rights (Census of India 1961, 1964a:xliii-xliv). The people 
are of mixed origin and the distribution of the local elite castes in the 
population suggests that a majority of them probably moved down from the 
north in the distant past (Baker 1969:4). During the British era the region 
of Chattisgarh was a part of the bi-lingual old Central Province and Berar.
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The research investigation carried out by Baker on the bi-lingual 
politics of Central Province and Berar threw some light on the politics of 
the region of Chattisgarh. Baker argues that by 1919 both economic and 
political activity in the Hindi region in general and in the region of 
Chattisgarh in particular had fallen to a low level. Towns in the region 
were few and those that existed served merely as administrative centres.
There was no secondary industry whatsoever to generate urban employment 
(Baker 1969:7). The region did not have a single daily vernacular news­
paper or a college, and in fact the district of Durg (in which Bhilai is 
located) did not have even a high school. The urban doctors, lawyers, 
traders, and resident landlords formed the social and political elites, 
and they were usually disinclined to participate in politics (Baker 1969:11). 
In fact they loyally supported the state government for having conferred 
land ownership rights. The politics of the region between 1919 and 1938 
centred on a struggle between the Responsivists who cooperated with and 
participated in the government, and those who launched the Gandhian non­
cooperation movements. From about 1928 the leaders of the Chattisgarh 
region acquired commanding positions in the province but the region con­
tinued to be economically and industrially backward. The first sign of 
industrialization in the state was the establishment of the steel plant 
at Bhilai in the late 'fifties.
Voting Shifts in Madhya Pradesh
The present state of Madhya Pradesh of which Chattisgarh is a
region was created in 1956, and included part of old Central Province and
Berar, the states of Vindhya Pradesh, Bhopal, and parts of Madhya Bharat 
4and Rajastan. An analysis of the election results in the above areas since 
1952 reveals some singificant changes in the party choices that should be 
kept in mind while interpreting our secondary and survey data on Raipur 
and Bhilai.
In terms of both votes and seats the strength of the Congress 
in Madhya Pradesh steadily declined from about 50 per cent of votes and 
79 per cent of seats in 1952 to about 41 per cent of votes and 56 per cent 
of seats in 1967.^ During the same period the strength of the Socialist 
parties (the SSP and the PSP) registered' a steeper decline than that of 
the Congress. The voting strength of the Communists was always negligible in 
Madhya Pradesh. From 1952 to 1967 it remained more or less static, below 
2 per cent.
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The Ramarajya Parishad, and the Hindumaha Sabha -- both Hindu 
religious parties -- which secured about 10 per cent of votes in 1952 had 
all but disappeared from the state electoral scene by 1967. The Jana Sangh 
which appeared on the Indian and Madhya Pradesh political scene just on the 
eve of the first general election was the major beneficiary of the electoral 
reverses suffered by all other political parties. It secured about 6 per 
cent of votes and one per cent of seats in 1952, but it steadily improved 
its electoral performance thereafter, and secured about a quarter of the 
votes and seats in 1967. Studies of elections in Madhya Pradesh indicated 
that the Jana Sangh had considerably benefited from its close association 
with the feudal elements (Chandidas 1967; Purohit 1967-1968). Any vari­
ations in the voting trends in Bhilai or. Raipur from these general patterns 
have to be explained in terms of the local situational variables.
Past Elections in Bhilai
Until 1957 there was no assembly constituency named after Bhilai 
and even in 1957 it was part of a two-member constituency. Eventually when 
the two-member constituency was split into two single member constituencies 
in 1962 the constituency of Bhilai was reserved for the scheduled tribes 
candidates. The Ramarajya Parished and the PSP were the most prominent 
non-Congress parties in the area. The Ramarajya Parished completely dis­
appeared from the local electoral scene. The PSP which was very popular 
and had earlier given a stiff fight to the Congress in the area, secured 
about one in every four votes in Bhilai in 1962, but five years later was 
reduced to less than one in twelve (TABLE IV.1). On the other hand, the 
Jana Sangh and the Communists who entered the electoral scene in Bhilai only 
in 1962, secured about 8 per cent and 11 per cent respectively and improved 
their position to 18 per cent and 22 per cent respectively in 1967. Out 
of a total of 9 contestants in the election of 1967, three were independent 
candidates. Ideological rifts among the leftist parties were obvious from 
secondary data. The Communist Party of India put up a single candidate in
1962, but after its split into the CPI and the CPIM in 1965, the two£
wings put up separate candidates in 1967 in Bhilai. The vote secured by 
the Congress declined considerably from 1962 (547o) to 1967 (467c) .
Past Elections in Raipur
Since 1952 the population of Raipur has been large enough for it 
to constitute an independent assembly constituency. Since that time the 
electorate in Raipur expanded by 36 per cent and the voter turnout increased
TABLE IV.1
Party Choice in 1952, 1957, 1962 and 1967 
in Raipur and Bhilai Assembly Constituencies
Raipur Bhilai
1952
7o
1952*
%
1957
7o
1962
7o
1967
7o
1962
%
1967
7o
Congress 23 41 53 49 71 54 46
PSP 51 50 36 27 7 27 8
JS 4 - - 2 6 13 8 18
Communists 1 9 6 13 - - 11 22
Others 21 -- 3 5 9 -- 6
Total % 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Note : This table is based on the constituency data
published by the Chief Election Officer, Madhya 
Pradesh (Chief Electoral Officer, Madhya Pradesh 
1969:40,41, 48, 49).
* By-election
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by 50 per cent (see Appendix Table A.11). The analysis of election 
results brings out some interesting features (TABLE IV.1). The fortunes 
of the Congress in Raipur were highly dependent on the whims of person­
alities rather than on the vitality of the party organization. The 
Congress secured about a fifth of the votes and came out as a poor second 
in 1952. But since then, under the leadership of S.C. Tiwari, an enter­
prising and skilful community leader, the voting support of the Congress 
steadily increased from about 41 per cent in the by-election of 1952 to 
about 71 per cent of the votes secured by both the factions of the Congress 
in 1967.
The strength of the PSP declined from a maximum of 51 per cent 
in 1952 to a minimum of 7 per cent of the votes in 1967.
The percentage of votes secured by the Jana Sangh steadily 
increased by about three times between 1952 and 1967. Still the Jana Sangh 
vote was much lower in Raipur (13%) then in the state as a whole (28%,).
Local community leaders played a decisive role in the election 
contests of Raipur. Inter-party defections of party leaders were common. 
Bulakilal Pujari, a wealthy local lawyer, contested the 1952 election on 
the Socialist ticket and the 1967 election on the Congress ticket. Until 
after independence, S.C. Tiwari was not a member of the Congress. In the 
by-election of 1952 he stood on the Congress ticket and improved the 
Congress vote though he was defeated. In 1957 and 1962 he again stood on 
the Congress ticket and won with big leads over his nearest opponents. In 
1967 he broke away from the Congress, contested the election on the Jana 
Congress (a short-lived splinter Congress group in Madhya Pradesh) ticket 
but rejoined the Congress within two years.
The dependence of the Communist Party on a single leader was un-
mistakeable. Sudhir Mukerji, a lower middle class lawyer, contested
four successive elections from 1952 to 1962 and improved his vote from
4about one per cent in 1952 to about 13 per cent in 1962. The Communist 
Party in Raipur is popularly known as Sudhir Mukerji's Party. The Jana 
Sangh was the only one which did not depend on personalized power structures 
at the time of elections. At every election the Jana Sangh put up a new 
candidate and still raised the level of its vote.
After 1957, an increasing number of non-party candidates contested 
the elections in Raipur. Their number increased from one candidate in 
1957 to 5 in 1962 and 9 in 1967. The chances of electoral victory of a 
large number of these candidates were remote. They probably wanted to
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exploit the opportunity presented by the election to integrate their 
respective occupational or social sections and make them aware of their spe 
special interests. I will return to a detailed analysis of this aspect 
again in the seventh chapter.
It is obvious even from the last names of the candidates that 
traditional elite castes continued to play a dominant role in the electoral 
politics of Raipur. The nominees of the Congress, the Communist Party, 
and the Jana Sangh were always Brahmins.
SURVEY ANALYSIS 
Limitations of Survey
The survey was carried out in the middle of 1969 about two 
years after the most recent election to the state assembly. It is reason­
able to assume that in the interval there must have been considerable 
out-flow of electors who were thus beyond the range of the survey. This 
out-flow was probably much larger from Raipur than from Bhilai, where pro­
motion opportunities and living conditions were far better. So the 
survey data are not wholly comparable with the constituency data.
The CPI and the CPIM each nominated its own candidate in Bhilai 
in the general election of 1967. The respondents, particularly those who 
opposed the Communists did not recognize any difference between the two 
parties. Those who supported the Communists considered the CPI as moderate 
and pro-Soviet and the CPIM as extremist and pro-Chinese. A few of those 
who voted Communist in 1967 could not precisely recall which of the two 
Communist candidates they had voted for. Hence, I decided to treat the 
Communist vote as a single block for the analysis. S.C. Tiwari contested 
and won the Raipur constituency in 1967 on the Jana Congress ticket but 
later joined the Congress. Those who voted for Tiwari, and also those who 
voted for the official Congress candidate (Bulakilal Pujari) considered 
that they voted Congress. So I decided to treat those who voted for 
Tiwari and also those who voted for Pujari as a single block for the analysis.
The 1967 general election being the closest to the time of the 
survey was more appropriate for voting analysis. I will, however, utilize 
the 1957 and 1962 voting data for what they are worth. Only 34 out of a 
total of 621 respondents reported voting in Bhilai in 1957; the rest voted 
elsewhere, did not vote, or were too young to vote (TABLE IV.2). So in 
the case of Bhilai changes in the voting patterns would be limited to an
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examination of the 1962 and 1967 voting data.
In relation to political preferences, the survey provided in­
formation on the parties supported and opposed by the respondents and 
the party choices of those who voted in 1957, 1962 and 1967 (TABLE IV.3).
The information on support and opposition for political parties was elicited 
indirectly. After the questions 'What do you think are the most important 
local problems that concern people like you?' and 'What do you yourself 
think should be done to solve these problems?' each respondent was asked 
to name the party that 'is most likely to improve conditions of employees 
like you' and the party that 'is least likely to improve conditions of 
employees like you'. Interpreted into colloquial Hindi, these questions 
sound like 'Which party do you think is best (or worst) from your point of 
view?' The party named by a respondent as the most likely one to improve 
his conditions is interpreted as the party supported by him and the party 
named by him as 'the least likely' one to improve his conditions is inter­
preted as the party opposed by him.
Respondents found these questions relevant and easy to answer. 
Responses varied from an 'unqualified' admiration of some parties to 
outright condemnation of others. A few respondents equated and condemned 
all political parties and emphasized the need for a military dictatorship 
to save the country from political chaos and economic troubles. The 
principal complaint against every party and particularly against the leader­
ship was that they served personal and sectional demands rather than 
community and national interests. In general, the supporters of each 
political party were loyal to it at the time of elections. It may be 
observed in Table IV.4 that more than eight in ten voted for the parties 
that they supported. Every party suffered some defections but also gained 
some voters from other parties.
The influence of socio-economic and occupational characteristics 
of respondents on their political attitudes can be examined in three 
different ways. We can use voting choice or party supported or a combin­
ation of both these items as a dependent political variable in the analysis. 
In combining voting choice and party supported as a single variable we can 
divide the respondents into four meaningful categories, according to their 
degree of partisanship. Those who supported and voted for the same party 
are 'strong partisans'. Those who supported a particular party but did 
not go to the poll for one reason or other are 'weak partisans'. Those 
who supported a particular party but voted some other party are 'defectors',
TABLE IV.4
Party Choice in 1967 by Party Supported by Respondents
Party choice in 1967
Party supported Total
(N) Congress JS Com. Others Total% % % % %
Bhilai ■
Congress 335 82 7 5 6 100
Jana Sangh 89 11 80 3 6 100
Communists 116 9 5 83 3 100
Others 29 -- -- -- -- --
Total (467) 51 19 21 9 100
Raipur
Congress 329 84 7 -- 9 100
Jana Sangh 82 16 81 -- 3 100
Communists 47 31 -- -- 69 100
Others 44 -- -- -- -- --
Total (398) 63 18 -- 19 ' 100
Note : Respondents who did not report the party that they supported
and those who reported the party that they supported but did 
not go to the pollis in 1967 are eliminated from the above 
table. Figures in parenthesis are total voters.
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and those who did not support any political party and did not vote for any 
party are ?non-partisans'. I have not in fact used such a classification 
in this analysis.
I preferred to use the party supported as the most appropriate 
dependent political variable for the following reasons. While about nine 
in ten respondents named the party that they supported only about six to 
seven in ten actually voted in 1967. So if voting choice was taken as 
a dependent variable a considerable proportion of respondents whose party 
identifications are known would be eliminated from the analysis and valuable 
information would be lost. Further, respondents whose parties did not con- 
test elections had no opportunity of going to the polls and voting for the 
parties of their choice. For example, the Communists did not contest the 
election in Raipur in 1967. Finally, we are more interested in investigating 
the sources of social support of different political parties rather than 
the general strength of partisanship. I have however utilized voting data 
where it can be put to better use than the data on party support.
Questions Asked
In what follows, we shall use our analysis of party supporters 
to answer two important questions. Firstly, from which socio-economic and 
demographic strata do different political parties draw their supporters? 
Secondly, is the support structure of a political party differentiated and 
heterogeneous or is it more concentrated in certain segments of the elector­
ate? These questions are particularly relevant in relation to the immediate 
and future electoral prospects of political parties and inter-party electoral 
shifts in a country like India where the demographic and occupational struc­
tures are undergoing vast changes.
A party with its support structure concentrated in certain seg­
ments of the society or geographical regions is likely to alienate other 
sections of the society and other geographical regions. It is already noted 
that the Jana Sangh for example draws its support primarily from north 
India and it is suggested that its strength is mostly derived from tradi­
tional elite castes, feudal elements and people in urban areas. If this 
is true and if this results in the alienation of religious minorities, low 
caste Hindus and people from other regions, the electoral prospects of Jana 
Sangh will be bleak because the social sections supporting it are only a 
small portion of the Hindu society in a particular region.
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Further, in a country with increasing industrialization, urban­
ization, and rural to urban migration, a political party, if its support 
is limited primarily to rural areas and the agricultural community, is 
likely to decline gradually in strength and relevance The future prospects 
of the Australian Country Party provide an excellent example of this.
With decreasing demand for wool and wheat, declining marginal returns from 
small and medium agricultural farms and increasing migration of farmers to 
urban areas, the electoral support of the Country Party is likely to shrink. 
Unless the government insists on electoral boundaries on the basis of ter­
ritory rather than population, the Country Party's share of the seats will 
inevitably go down. The only other way the party can save itself is by 
reorganization as an urban party.
Further, a party which is unable to communicate its ideology to 
the younger generation, or a party that is unable to readjust successfully 
to the occupational changes, new group interests and rising issues of the 
electorate will lose its political relevance. Parties like the Justice
g
Party of Madras, and more than a dozen of the present-day Socialist parties 
in India, are excellent examples. On the other hand a party with hetero­
geneous social support and an ability to adapt itself to new situations 
will continue to enjoy electoral support.
Existing Literature
Examined in the light of the above discussion, findings of 
studies in Indian elections become meaningful. It is already noted that 
immediately before and after independence, western educated urban middle 
class and traditional elite castes played active roles in Indian politics 
With the introduction of adult franchise, party politics and electoral com­
petition, the leadership of every political party was forced to widen ter­
ritorially (from urban to rural areas) and deepen socially (from higher to 
lower castes and tribes) its support structure. Parties found it easier 
to achieve this aim by appealing to the existing primordial group loyalties 
and personalized power structures. As time passed, hitherto socially 
under-privileged and politically non-participant groups were drawn into 
party politics, and were given an increasing share of power in party organ­
izations, legislatures, and ministries. In this process traditional social 
cleavages were increasingly politicized and political parties provided 
associational bases for nation-wide identifications. By 1967, it was sug­
gested that traditional channels of vote mobilization like caste influence
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and p e r s o n a l i z e d  power s t r u c t u r e s  had g i v e n  p l a c e  to  m o d e r n i z i n g  i n f l u e n c e s  
such  as  y o u t h ,  l i t e r a c y ,  u r b a n i z a t i o n ,  e x p o s u re  to  ca m pa ign ing ,  i s s u e  
p o s i t i o n s ,  and p e r c e p t i o n s  o f  o n e ' s  own economic and s o c i a l  w e l l b e i n g .
A f t e r  t h e i r  ' Baroda  E a s t '  e l e c t i o n  s tu d y  i n  1962, K o t h a r i  and h i s
9
a s s o c i a t e s  r e p e a t e d l y  s t r e s s e d  t h e  above p o i n t .  And t h e i r  e l e c t i o n  s u rv e y s  
i n  1967 and 1969 f u r t h e r  c o n f i r m e d  t h e i r  e a r l i e r  g e n e r a l i z a t i o n s .  On the  
o t h e r  hand,  t h e r e  was a l a r g e  body o f  o p i n i o n  t h a t  p a r t y  c h o i c e  was s t i l l  
h i g h l y  d e pe nden t  on c o n s i d e r a t i o n s  such as  r e l i g i o n ,  c a s t e ,  r e g i o n ,  l anguage  
and f e u d a l  i n f l u e n c e s .
The n a t i o n a l  e l e c t i o n  s u r v e y s ^  c a r r i e d  ou t  so f a r  have made 
two t h i n g s  amply c l e a r .  Only the  Congress  has  been a b l e  to  p e n e t r a t e  i n t o  
a l l  s e c t i o n s  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y  and draw s u p p o r t  f rom h e t e r o g e n e o u s  s o c i o ­
economic and o c c u p a t i o n a l  groups  w h i l e  t h e  s u p p o r t  o f  a lm o s t  a l l  t h e  o t h e r  
p a r t i e s  has  r em a ined  c o n c e n t r a t e d  i n  c e r t a i n  s o c io - e c o n o m ic  g roups  or  
r e g i o n s  ( E l d e r s v e l d  1970;  Madsen 1970) .  P o l i t i c a l  a c t i v i s t s  such  as  t h o s e  
who had t a k e n  s p e c i f i c  i s s u e  p o s i t i o n s ,  and t h o s e  who p e r c e i v e d  t h a t  t h e i r  
s o c i a l  o r  economic s t a n d i n g  was w o r s e n i n g ,  were  c r i t i c a l  o f  the  government  
and opposed  t h e  C ongress  more t h a n  o t h e r s .  But t h e  C ongress  was a b l e  to  
make up t h e s e  l o s s e s  by g a i n i n g  new v o t e r s  and w inn ing  o v e r  d e f e c t o r s  from 
o t h e r  p a r t i e s  ( E l d e r s v e l d  1970;  K o t h a r i  1 9 7 1 a ) .  Our s u r v e y  i n  g e n e r a l  
c o n f i r m s  t h e s e  f i n d i n g s  and  p r o v i d e s  a d d i t i o n a l  i n f o r m a t i o n  from i n t e r v i e w s  
w i t h  p o l i t i c a l  l e a d e r s  and r e s p o n d e n t s '  p e r c e p t i o n  o f  t h e  s o u r c e s  o f  s o c i a l  
s u p p o r t  o f  d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s .
V o t e r  Tu rnou t
R e s p o n d e n t ' s  a g e ,  p l a c e  o f  o r i g i n ,  r e l i g i o n ,  c a s t e ,  income,  o c c u ­
p a t i o n ,  l i t e r a c y ,  and p a r t i c i p a t i o n  i n  v o l u n t a r y  a s s o c i a t i o n s  have a l l  
p roduced  c o n s i s t e n t  p a t t e r n s  o f  v o t e r  t u r n o u t  and p a r t y  s u p p o r t .  Only a few 
s y s t e m a t i c  s t u d i e s  have a t t e m p t e d  to  r e l a t e  v o t e r  t u r n o u t  to  p a r t y  c h o ic e  
a t  e l e c t i o n s  ( E l d e r s v e l d  1970 ) .  I t  i s ,  however ,  n o t e d  t h a t  v o t e r  t u r n o u t  
i n  I n d i a  went  up from a b o u t  45 p e r  c e n t  i n  1952 to  a bou t  60 p e r  c e n t  i n  
1967. During  t h e  same p e r i o d  t h e  v o t e  s e c u r e d  by th e  Congress  d e c r e a s e d  
m a r g i n a l l y  and t h e  v o t e  o f  t h e  non -C ongres s  p a r t i e s  i n c r e a s e d  a c c o r d i n g l y .
But which s o c i a l  s e c t i o n s  p a r t i c i p a t e  i n  h i g h e r  p r o p o r t i o n s  t h a n  o t h e r s  i n  
e l e c t i o n s ?  Three  m a jo r  e l e c t i o n  s u r v e y s  have i n d i c a t e d  t h a t  i n  g e n e r a l  v o t e r  
t u r n o u t  was h i g h e r  i n  u r b a n  t h a n  i n  r u r a l  a r e a s .  V o t e r  t u r n o u t  was a l s o  h i g h e r
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among males, literate, professional, high caste, high income, and religious 
minority groups than among their alternatives (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 
1969:62,63; Kothari 1971a).
An examination of the tables presented in the above studies 
indicates that in general the Congress fared poorly among social and 
economic sections which had a high voter turnout. Earlier the aggregate 
analyses carried out by Morris-Jones and Gupta, and Gopal Krishna also 
concluded that the Congress vote was in general lower in districts with 
higher voter turnout than among others (Morris-Jones and Gupta 1969;
Gopal Krishna 1966).
Contrary to the findings of earlier studies, in Bhilai high 
caste, high income, high literacy, and high occupational groups showed a 
lower turnout than their counterparts.
Further, voter turnout was higher among trade union members 
than among the members of cultural associations, In Raipur, however, the 
patterns of voter turnout were generally in accordance with the findings 
of the earlier election studies in India (see Tables A.13 and A.14 in 
Appendix).
The voter turnout patterns are not surprising when we investigate 
the degree of interest taken in and the amount of participation of different 
social and economic sections in politics in Bhilai.
It has already been pointed out in the third chapter that there 
was a high degree of association in Bhilai between type of residence, 
caste, literacy, occupation, and income. So naturally the pattern caused 
by one variable was consistently repeated in relation to most of the other 
variables. As everywhere else in India the managment in Bhilai required 
that employees in officer cadres should not join trade unions. On the 
other hand lower civil servants demonstrated more enthusiasm in language 
and regional cultural associations than in trade unions, which were 
joined mostly by industrial workers. All these tendencies created a gap 
between the blue collar and white collar employees. Soon after the first 
round of interviews it was obvious to me that high income officers more 
than low income respondents were indifferent to politics, and to elections 
in particular. Their line of argument usually was that politics was the 
pre-occupation of trade unions, and trade unions were the domain of labour­
ers and low grade employees. Some of the top level officers were critical 
of trade unions and union leaders and said that workers were most undisci-
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plined and that no labourer could be punished because of the protection 
offered by the unions. It was because of this apathy that groups of 
high socio-economic status did not turn up at the polls. On the other 
hand, trade unions inducted most of the labourers, skilled workers and 
some clerical staff into their fold, emphasized the importance of voting 
in protecting the rights of workers and promoting the cause of the trade 
unions, and worked hard to rally their followers to the polling booths.
In Raipur on the other hand the interest and reference groups 
were highly involved in politics, had the will to participate, and encour­
aged others to participate in elections.
Expansion of the Electorate
The generalizations that young voters of the post-independence 
generation were less likely to appreciate the role played by the Congress 
in the independence movement, that they were more likely to be guided by 
current economic and political problems, and that they were less likely 
to vote Congress than the older electors, appear to be true in the case 
of our survey also. About half of the respondents in Bhilai were already 
on the electoral roll by 1957, about four in ten came of voting age and 
were enrolled by 1962 and only 4 respondents (less than 17o) reported that 
they were too young to vote even in 1967.
The impact of this sudden enrolment of the young respondents 
as electors was disadvantageous to the Congress and beneficial to the other 
parties and particularly to the Jana Sangh. Of those who reported that 
they voted in 1957 in Bhilai or elsewhere about eight in ten voted Congress, 
while one in ten each voted for the Communist and other parties. By 1967, 
when 99 per cent of the respondents were on the electoral roll and voted 
mostly in Bhilai, the Congress vote was reduced to 50 per cent, the vote 
of the Jana Sangh increased ten-fold and that of the Communists increased 
two-fold (TABLE IV.3).
There could be two reasons for the above trends. A majority 
of the young respondents might have already been politicized and developed 
certain political sympathies according to which they voted after they 
arrived in Bhilai. Or the employment conditions and the social circum­
stances in Bhilai might have provided ideal opportunities for the establish­
ment and expansion of the extreme religious rightist and leftist parties.
A detailed analysis suggests that both of the above factors operated sim-
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ultaneously, in varying degrees.
In Raipur the inflow of migrants and the expansion of the 
electorate were all gradual. The rates of decline of the Congress vote 
and of the expansion of the Jana Sangh vote were much lower in Raipur 
than in Bhilai.
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES AND PARTY SUPPORT 
Age and Party Support
The earlier inference that the Congress was more popular with 
older respondents than with the younger respondents proved to be correct 
both in Bhilai and Raipur. The higher the age of respondents, the 
higher the proportion of support offered for the Congress. The pattern 
is not difficult to explain. Older people obviously were familiar with 
the freedom movement launched and conducted in the Gandhian days. In 
fact, a few of the older respondents, though now associated with the non- 
Congress parties, replied with pride that they themselves or their parents 
responded to Gandhi's call and joined the freedom movement by giving up 
studies and participating in the satyagraha or non-cooperation movement. 
The impact of age on the support for the Communists and the Jana Sangh was 
less clear. For no obvious reasons, a higher percentage of middle aged 
than younger and older groups supported the Jana Sangh, and in the case 
of the Communists middle aged group gave less support than other groups.
In Raipur, the lower the age of the respondents, the higher the support 
of the Jana Sangh and other parties. While opposition of the younger 
generation to the party in power is just as much a nation-wide phenomenon 
in India as in many other countries, the ideological commitments of the 
yDung are no similar in Bhilai and Raipur.
Religion, Caste and Party Support
It may be observed in Table IV.5 that in relation to religion 
and caste, the patterns of party support were similar and consistent in 
Bhilai and Raipur, the differences being only of degree. In both Bhilai 
and Raipur the lower the status of caste the higher the support for the 
Congress and the Communists, and the lower the support for the Jana Sangh. 
The support for the Jana Sangh was nil among the Muslims, and the support 
for it among Brahmins and Vaisyas was about four times higher than among 
scheduled castes. Among the respondents of 'other religions the support
for the Jana Sangh appeared to come mainly from Jains whose status is more 
or less equal to that of Vaisyas.
The predicament into which the Jana Sangh launched itself on 
the religious front was highly beneficial to the Congress and the Communists. 
To the question, 'Which political party is least likely to improve condi­
tions of employees like you?' 53 per cent of the Muslims mentioned the 
Jana Sangh. Or to put it in a different way, more than 95 per cent of 
those who supported the Jana Sangh were the Hindus (mostly high or inter­
mediate caste Hindus) while the corresponding figure for the Congress 
and the Communists was about 77 per cent.
The call of the Jana Sangh for the revival of Bharatiya Sanskriti 
or the Vedic way of life appealed more to elite castes, less to caste- 
Hindus, and least to the scheduled castes because it is essentially the 
Sanskritic culture and Brahminic way of life. Within the elite castes 
again the southern Brahmin regards the Northern Brahminic way of life as 
half Islamised (Subramaniam 1969). Consequently, the appeal of the Jana 
Sangh is only to some sections of the Hindus in some regions. Further, 
the Muslims are very much aware that they are a minority and that in 
north and west India their bona fides are suspect, and that the Jana Sangh 
is the most anti-Muslim party. They regard religious solidarity as essen­
tial for their survival. They are aware that the Congress which has 
been in power since independence has been trying to protect their interests 
as far as it could. So their support is mostly for the Congress or for 
the Communists or for the democratic leftist parties. The Muslim respon­
dents were vocal in their support for the Congress but a few of them were 
hesitant to name the Jana Sangh as the party they opposed.
The Christians just like the Muslims support the Congress and 
fear the Jana Sangh as a threat to the survival of minorities. But they 
regard the atheistic Communists as worse than the Jana Sangh. In Bhilai, 
however, a few of the Christian respondents I interviewed argued that 
the Christian religion and Communism were not incompatible.
Consequently, in a country with adult franchise, and a first 
past the post election system, the Jana Sangh restricted for itself the 
area of social manoeuvre and in fact forced the religious and caste minor­
ities to seek protection mostly in the ruling Congress.
The data presented in Table IV.5 have another implication. In 
the second chapter I hypothesized that religious and caste considerations 
are less likely to play an important role in industrial towns than in
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the traditional towns. But a marginally higher percentage of the Brahmin 
and Vaisya respondents in Bhilai (277>) than in Raipur (26%) supported the 
Jana Sangh, thus indicating an equal if not higher influence of caste 
considerations in voting. Loyalty to religious parties and commitment 
to traditional values need not necessarily be the result of low education, 
low income and low occupation. In Bhilai it was the high literacy and 
high income elite castes rather than the lower ones that extended stronger 
support to the Jana Sangh. The prevailing social cleavages then are more 
important than the mere caste and religious distributions. In Bhilai the 
differences between high and low occupations appeared to have encouraged 
the elite castes to support the Jana Sangh.
Income and Party Support
In relation to the variable of income, in Bhilai the higher 
the income the lower the support for the Congress. Support for the 
Communists was higher among the middle income respondents. On the other 
hand, the vote of the Jana Sangh was higher among the low and high income 
groups and marginally lower among the middle income group. The patterns 
in Raipur were slightly different. Here respondents in the lowest 
income group supported the Congress most strongly (687>) and the higher 
the income the higher the support for the Jana Sangh.
The variations in the above patterns of party support can be 
explained. The respondents in the highest income group in Bhilai are 
high level officers. Though a majority of them have always supported the 
Congress, they are not in any way involved in the power structure of the 
Congress. They have no interests that need to be protected through the 
Congress organization and few favours that they can seek from the local 
Congress party. On the other hand, in Raipur respondents in the high 
income group are mostly big businessmen: they have day to day favours 
to seek from the government through the party in power and are closely 
involved in the affairs of the party. During the survey I found that a 
majority of these high income respondents in Raipur knew S.C. Tiwari on 
personal terms, and made generous financial contributions to his election 
campaign. The pattern of political preferences of this section were made 
clear when a grain merchant in Raipur said bluntly, 'Jana Sangh is a good 
party, but what is the use? It is not in power. I know Tiwari personally 
and he gets things done for us. So we have got to support him.' In Bhilai
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on the other hand I came across only one high level officer (manager of 
the picture halls owned by the steel plant) who stated that he was 
on quite friendly terms with Dharmapal Gupta the local Congress Member 
of the State Legislative Assembly. Other high level officers did not 
even mention the name of Dharmapal Gupta.
Occupation and Party Support
It may be observed in Table IV.6 that the percentage of support 
secured by the Congress was the highest (687,) among the manual labourers 
and next highest (597,) among the professionals. On the other hand, the 
support for the Jana Sangh was higher among the high civil servants and 
the professionals than among skilled workers and manual labourers. The 
Communists fared comparatively better among the skilled workers and lower 
civil servants than among manual labourers and professionals.
In Raipur there was not a single higher civil servant or culti­
vator who supported the Jana Sangh. Yet the support for the Jana Sangh 
was fairly high among businessmen and lower civil servants and strikingly 
low among skilled workers and manual labourers. The situation with the 
Communists was just the reverse. While the explanations given for the 
variations in party support in relation to income hold good here also 
there are differences to be noted between Bhilai and Raipur.
To begin with, the monthly income of each occupational group, 
businessmen aside, was far higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. Moreover, 
the higher civil servants in Raipur were directly involved in day to day 
administration and were in close contact with the people. Not only were 
their actions closely watched by political leaders, particularly by the 
leaders of the party in power, but also they were forced to work in accord­
ance with the local leaders. So it was natural that a majority of them 
supported the Congress. In Bhilai the higher civil servants were not 
subjected to the pressures of local politics and they supported the parties 
that they pleased without any risk. Further, in Bhilai even those officers 
who supported the Congress did so despite their criticism of it for the 
lack of any better alternative.
Literacy and Party Support
Of all the independent variables, the level of education pro­
duced the most consistent patterns in relation to the support for different
90
political parties. In Bhilai, the higher the educational level the lower 
the support for the Congress, and the higher the support for the Jana Sangh. 
The Communists fared marginally better among those who did not attend school 
and those who had completed their high school studies. The trends in 
Raipur were similar. In both Bhilai and Raipur the support for the Congress 
among those who completed high school studies was much lower (53% in 
Bhilai, 56% in Raipur) than the average percentage of support for it in the 
respective towns. Further, in Bhilai the percentage of support for the 
Jana Sangh among those who completed high school studies was twice as high 
as the percentage of support for it among those who had not been to school. 
In Raipur it was four times as high.
Associational Membership and Party Support
It has been noted that most of the poorly educated and low 
income employees were inducted into the trade unions. In Bhilai, the 
Indian National Trade Union Congress, the labour wing of the Congress, 
was the recognized trade union, and most of the labourers belonged to it, 
to the disadvantage of the Communist and Jana Sangh trade unions. The 
Communists and the Jana Sangh on the other hand successfully exploited the 
regional cultural associations and the religious organizations for building 
support bases for themselves. A detailed analysis of this aspect will 
follow in the chapter on voluntary associations. It may be noted that 
the support extended to the Congress was highest among the respondents 
who were not members of any association, and among the members of trade 
unions, while the support extended to the Communists was considerably higher 
among the members of cultural associations and trade unions than among 
others (TABLE IV.6). In the case of Raipur the Jana Sangh secured its 
highest support from among the trade union members.
There was however a difference between the trade unions in Bhilai 
and Raipur. In Bhilai, trade union membership was drawn mostly from skilled 
workers and manual labourers among whom membership was almost universal. 
Every trade union set up an office and cultivated the workers actively, and 
the management looked favourably on the INTUC.
In Raipur skilled workers and manual laboures were employed mostly 
by private enterprise and that too only in small numbers. Consequently, 
there was virtually no trade union activity among them. In fact, the only 
trade unions of skilled workers of which I heard during the survey in Raipur
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were the Madhya Pradesh Electricity Employees* Union and the Madhya Pradesh 
Road Transport Workers’ Union. These unions were small and inactive and 
the members, though not much disciplined, were highly discontented. As 
already seen, the Jana Sangh drew a high percentage of support from lower 
civil servants. So it was no surprise Jana Sangh fared particularly well 
among the trade union members in Raipur. The cultural associations reported 
in Raipur belonged mostly to minority religious groups such as Parsees, 
Sindhis, Sikhs and the Christians. An overwhelming majority of them (77%) 
supported the Congress. The amount of opposition to the Jana Sangh 
expressed by the respondents from minority groups in the course of or 
after interviews can hardly be over-emphasized. It is clear that because 
of occupational and income differences the patterns of political support 
of trade union members in industrial towns and traditional towns were 
different.
Irrespective of socio-economic and occupational statuses the 
relative betterment of life of the respondents over the past ten years 
gained political support for the Congress. On the other hand the support 
for the Jana Sangh and the Communists was better among those who thought 
that there was no change in their standard of living or that it had declined 
over the decade.
This suggests that upward occupational and income mobility had 
the consequence of increased support for the Congress and downward mobility 
had the consequence of increased support for the Jana Sangh and Communists.
Profiles of Party Support
Now we can draw together all the findings in this section and 
give a total picture of the profiles of party support in Bhilai and Raipur.
About six in ten respondents in Bhilai supported the Congress.
The support for the Congress came from heterogeneous socio-economic groups 
and it was fairly evenly spread. More than half of the respondents in every 
socio-economic and occupational group supported the Congress. However, 
support for the Congress was marginally higher among old, non-Hindu, low 
caste, low income, low income, low occupation, and low literacy groups than 
among others. It was also higher among those who had no associational 
membership than among members of trade unions and cultural associations.
On the other hand only a fifth of the respondents in Bhilai 
supported the Communists. Support for the Communists was fairly evenly
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spread, but was somewhat higher among religious groups other than Hindus 
and Muslims, scheduled castes, skilled workers, and members of cultural 
associations than among others.
The support for the Jana Sangh was low. Only about one in six 
respondents in Bhilai supported the Jana Sangh, and this support was 
fairly concentrated in certain socio-economic and occupational groups, 
namely urban natives, Hindus, Jains, traditional elite castes, high income 
groups, professionals and those who had completed high school studies. 
Support for the Jana Sangh among Muslims and Christians was nil; among 
scheduled castes, the older generation and manual labourers it was very 
low.
SOURCES OF SOCIAL SUPPORT OF POLITICAL PARTIES 
AS INTERPRETED BY PARTISANS
Respondents in Bhilai had a fairly good idea as to which social 
groups supported different political parties. There were subtle but 
meaningful differences in the idioms used by the supporters and opponents 
of each political party to describe the socio-economic and occupational 
groups that supported it.
The sympathizers of each party used the most respectable terms 
possible to describe the socio-economic and occupational groups that 
supported their party. The sympathizers of each party made a definite 
attempt to attribute these sources of social support to the noble aims 
and objectives of that particular party, and did not hesitate to use a 
derogatory or insinuating vocabulary to describe the supporters of other 
parties. Further, the opinions of a majority of the respondents were 
unmistakably influenced by the images they had of different political 
parties in the places of their origin. Finally, respondents in general 
were less critical in describing the sources of social support of the 
Congress than of any other party.
Supporters of the Jana Sangh
For example, the sympathizers of the Jana Sangh preferred to 
describe its Hindu supporters as those who believe in the 'Hindu way of 
life', 'the preservation and propagation of Vedic dharma', and 'the unity 
and integration of Bharatiya culture'. But Communist sympathizers preferred 
to describe them as 'Hindu religious fanatics', 'Hindu religious reaction­
aries', 'tradition-minded Hindus' and 'Hindus suspicious of minorities'.
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Here again the impressions carried by the migrants from the 
regions of their origin were obvious. In the region of Punjab and 
Haryana the Jana Sangh has been strongly supported by the Arya Samajists. 
So a migrant from that region more often mentioned the Arya Samajists as 
the first group of supporters of the Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh and 
the RSS have been strongly supported by the Brahmins in Maharastra. So a 
migrant from Maharastra, particularly a Maratha respondent more often 
mentioned 'Maharastrian Brahmins’ as the first group of supporters of the 
Jana Sangh. The south Indians often used terms such as 'Brahmins and 
Banias', 'north Indians', and 'Hindi speakers' to describe the supporters 
of the Jana Sangh.
Supporters of the Communists
In the same way, the supporters of the Communists preferred to 
describe the social groups supporting their Party as 'those who have faith 
in revolution', 'those who believe in economic equality', and those 'who 
want a change in the society'. On the other hand the sympathizers of 
the Jana Sangh would freely use terms such as 'goondas', 'hoodlums', 
'traitors inspired by foreign powers', and those 'who believe in violence'. 
Here again one could easily detect the impressions carried by the respon­
dents from the places of their origin. A migrant from UP coming from an 
area where the Communists have been strongly supported by the Muslims would 
more often mention Muslims as the first group of supporters of that Party.
A migrant coming from Kerala or Andhra Pradesh where Communists have 
been strongly supported by the agricultural labourers or poor and middle 
size peasants was more likely to mention these groups as the supporters 
of the Communists.
These impressions carried by the respondents from their places 
of origin were supplemented by their perception of the situation in 
Bhilai. The identification of inter-state and linguistic migrants such 
as Bengalis, south Indians, north Indians as separate and homogeneous 
groups was the result of such a perception, though an inaccurate one.
For example, migrants from north India would call all the migrants from 
south India 'Madrasis' or 'south Indians'. But migrants coming from 
the south would clearly distinguish between different southern language 
groups (Keralites, Tamils, Telugus, Kannadigas).
The use of a derogatory vocabulary and value-loaded idiom to 
describe the supporters of the parties that respondents disliked was,
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however, subject to three conditions. Firstly, the use of such subtle 
language was limited to respondents with average and above average political 
consciousness and particularly to those who were strongly committed to the 
extreme rightist and leftist parties. Secondly, respondents with low 
education, occupation, and income were mostly uncritical of the parties 
that they did not sympathize with. Thirdly, the sympathizers of both the 
rightist and leftist parties subjected the supporters of the Congress to 
much less criticism.
Tables IV.7, 8 and 9 show what the supporters of each political 
party thought were the sources of social support of their party and what 
the supporters of other parties thought were the sources of social support 
of that particular party. Every respondent was asked to mention the kinds 
of people that support each political party. In case the respondent did not 
understand the meaning of 'kinds of people', the interviewer was instructed 
to describe some social, economic and occupational groups as examples. In 
relation to each party three responses were recorded. A quick glance at 
these tables makes it obvious that there were variations in the frequency of 
social support groups mentioned by the sympathizers of a particular party 
and the sympathizers of other parties.
Supporters of the Congress
The sympathizers of the Congress agreed that their party was 
supported by rich people and big businessmen, but in the same breath 
stated that it was supported by both rich and poor, or by 'all sections 
of the society'. But the sympathizers of the Communists and the Jana 
Sangh emphasized that the Congress was primarily a party supported by 
the rich or the big businessmen. In Raipur a relative majority of the 
Congress sympathizers thought that the Congress was supported by all sections 
of the society. Further, groups such as cultivators, poor people, and the 
middle income group were predominently mentioned as supporters of the 
Congress in Raipur.
The above pattern of responses is also evident in relation to 
the social groups interpreted to be supporting the Communists and the 
Jana Sangh. Respondents in general agreed that labourers and poor people 
were the principal supporters of the Communist Party. But in Bhilai a 
higher proportion of the supporters of the Congress and the Jana Sangh 
than of the Communist Party cited south Indians and Bengalis as supporters 
of the Communists. On the other hand, a larger percentage (10%) of the
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s u p p o r te r s  o f  th e  Communist th a n  o f  th e  C ongress and th e  Jan a  Sangh m entioned  
th e  m iddle c l a s s  a s  s u p p o r te r s  o f  th e  Communists.
In  R aipu r o p in io n s  re g a rd in g  th e  socio -econom ic groups th a t  su p p o rte d  
d i f f e r e n t  p o l i t i c a l  p a r t i e s  were c lo s e ly  r e l a t e d  to  lo c a l  r e a l i t i e s .  H ere, 
f o r  exam ple, th e  Communist P a r ty  was p o p u la r  m o stly  among sw eepers and among 
i r r e g u l a r l y  h i r e d  w o rk e rs . C onseq u en tly , v e ry  few Communist, s u p p o r te r s  i n  
R aipur m entioned  th e  m iddle income group a s  su p p o r te rs  o f th e  Communists. 
F u r th e r ,  in  R aipu r on ly  a  few communist s u p p o r te r s  th o u g h t t h a t  t h e i r  p a r ty  
was su p p o rted  by so u th  In d ia n s  and B e n g a l is .  On th e  o th e r  hand , i t  was 
common knowledge in  R aipu r t h a t  th e  Jan a  Sangh d e riv e d  m ost o f  i t s  f i n a n c i a l  
su p p o r t and human re s o u rc e s  f o r  the  e l e c t i o n  cam paign (d is p la y  o f  f l a g s ,  
d i s t r i b u t i o n  o f  e l e c t i o n  l i t e r a t u r e ,  e t c . )  from  sm a ll businessm en such  as 
r e t a i l  c lo th  m e rc h an ts , owners o f  g r o c e r ie s  and 'pan  s h o p s ’ . So th e  
sy m p a th ize rs  o f  th e  Jan a  Sangh a s  w e ll  as o f  o th e r  p a r t i e s  m entioned  sm a ll 
businessm en  as  th e  m ost p rom inen t group  th a t  su p p o rted  th e  Ja n a  Sangh.
A much la r g e r  p ro p o r t io n  o f  th e  s u p p o r te r s  o f th e  C ongress and th e  
Communists th a n  o f th e  J a n a  Sangh th o u g h t t h a t  th e  J a n a  Sangh was su p p o rted  
by Hindu f a n a t i c s ,  sm a ll businessm en  and th e  m ig ra n ts  who came from  n o r th  I n d ia .  
The s u p p o r te r s  o f  th e  Jan a  Sangh conceded th a t  t h e i r  p a r ty  was su p p o rted  by 
H indus and sm a ll businessm en  b u t th e y  used  a  d i f f e r e n t  id iom  to  d e s c r ib e  them 
and a l s o  em phasized th e  su p p o r t th e y  drew from  th e  m iddle income g ro u p .
The sy m p a th ize rs  o f  ev e ry  p a r ty  t r i e d  to  d e s c r ib e  th e  su p p o r t s t r u c t u r e  
o f  t h e i r  p a r ty  a s  be ing  a s  b ro ad -b ased  s o c i a l l y  as  p o s s ib le ,  w h ile  t h e i r  
opponents a tte m p te d  to  p a in t  i t  a s  a  s e c t i o n a l  p a r ty .  This t r u t h  was w e ll 
b ro u g h t o u t by a  h ig h  l e v e l  e n g in e e r , an ex-RSS a c t i v i s t  and a  s tro n g  Jan a  
Sangh s u p p o r te r ,  who u n h e s i t a t i n g ly  s t a t e d :  'O urs i s  a  m iddle c l a s s  H indu
P a r ty ;  f o r  propaganda p u rp o ses  we do say  th a t  our p a r ty  i s  non-communal and 
em phasize t h a t  we do have M uslims in  ou r p a r t y ' .
MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
When a rra n g e d  in  two-way t a b le s  s e v e r a l  socio -econom ic c a te g o r ie s  had 
produced some c o n s is te n t  p a t te r n s  i n  p a r ty  s u p p o r t,  and I  sough t to  e x p la in  
th e se  p a t te r n s  by k eep in g  i n  mind the  socio -econom ic and p o l i t i c a l  s i t u a t i o n  i n  
u rb an  I n d ia .  But w hich o f  th e se  soc io -econom ic  c a te g o r ie s  had s ig n i f i c a n t  
e f f e c t s  on p a r ty  su p p o rt and what was th e  p ro p o r tio n  o f  t o t a l  v a r i a t i o n  i n  th e  
su p p o rt o f  each  p a r ty  acco u n ted  f o r  by th e se  v a r ia b le s ?  The m u l t ip le  r e g r e s s io n  
a n a ly s i s  a tte m p te d  h e re  i s  in te n d e d  to  answ er th e se  q u e s t io n s .
The method o f  a n a ly s i s  fo llo w ed  was s im p le . F i r s t ,  each  o f  th e  
v a r ia b le s  o f  ag e , e d u c a tio n , type o f  p la c e  o f  o r ig i n ,  r e l i g i o n ,  c a s te ,  
o c c u p a tio n , m onthly  incom e, and membership i n  a s s o c ia t io n s  was d iv id e d  
in to  two o r  th re e  dummy v a r i a b l e s .  N orm ally
TABLE I V . 10
R e g r e s s i o n  Model:
Dependent  V a r i a b l e :  S uppor t  f o r  t h e  Congress  ( B h i l a i )
Number o f  c a s e s  569
C o n s t a n t  t e rm + 0 .528  ^
C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  (R ) .048
Dummy v a r i a b l e s R e g r e s s i o n
c o e f f i c i e n t
F-Value
No membership i n  a s s o c i a t i o n s 0 .146 12.318
Middle  income* - 0 .1 2 2 5 .904
Muslims 0 .210 7.379
Manual l a b o u r e r s 0 .096 3 .2 29
Businessmen - 0 . 2 3 3
* Rs 3-4  hundred  s a l a r y  a month
TABLE I V . 11 
R e g r e s s i o n  Model:
Dependent  V a r i a b l e :  Sup p o r t  f o r  t h e  Congress  (R a ip u r )
Number o f  c a s e s  502
C o n s t a n t  t e rm  + O . 6 4 I 2
C o e f f i c i e n t  o f  d e t e r m i n a t i o n  (R ) .068
Dummy v a r i a b l e s  R e g r e s s i o n  F -Value
c o e f f i c i e n t
Youth
No membership i n  a s s o c i a t i o n s
- 0 .2 1 5  
0. 137
24.768
9 .982
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income could be treated as an independent and real variable and it is reasonable 
to assume linear correlation between level of income and party support. But 
our two-way tables based on income and party support clearly indicated that 
the relationship between income and the party support of the Jana Sangh and 
that of the Communists was curvilinear. It will be explained a little later 
how both high and low income groups voted relatively higher than the middle 
income group for the Jana Sangh. So I decided that income categories as 
dummy variables would measure the amount of association between income and 
party support more accurately than income as a real variable. Bor computat­
ional purposes one dummy variable was excluded from each class and the rest 
were included in the model as independent variables. The party supported 
by the respondent was the dependent variable. Bor example, if support for 
the Congress was considered as a dependent variable each respondent who 
supported Congress was given a score of one and all others zero. In the 
first stage of the analysis the effect of all the dummy variables (after 
excluding one from each class) was examined. Later all the dummy variables 
whose B statistic was below 10 per cent significance level were excluded 
from the model and the proportion of total variation in party support accounted 
for by all the dummy variables which remained was estimated. The results 
are presented in Tables IV.10 to IV.15.
Though many of the variables included in these regression models? 
produced B statistics above the ten per cent level of significance the R s 
obtained in some of these regression models are small. There could be two 
principal reasons for such small R s . Our analysis here is primarily 
concerned with socio-economic status and occupational and territorial mobility 
variables. firstly, it is possible that political attitudinal variables 
play an equally important role in predicting party support. Bor example, a 
regression analysis based on the 1967 cross sectional election survey in 
India found that the proportion of total variation in Congress support 
accounted for by socio-economic variables was only 4.7 per cent. On the 
other hand the proportion of total variation accounted for by the variables 
of ’comparative imagery on Congress’ was as high as 16.5 per cent (Madsen 
1970). Secondly, it is possible that some of these variables cover only 
a fraction of our sample and that though they are significantly related to 
the support of a particular party the proportion of total variation in 
that party’s support accounted for by them could be only small. Bor 
example, of a total of ten businessmen in Bhilai seven supported the Jana 
Snagh but they constituted less than eight per cent of all those who 
supported the Jana Sangh in Bhilai (7 out of 89).
Congress
In relation to the support for the Congress the dummy variables 'Non- 
membership in associations’, ’Muslims', and ’Manual labourers' had positive and 
significant effects and the dummy variable 'Middle-income group’ had a negative 
and significant effect. The effect of the dummy variable 'Businessmen1 
was nearly significant and hence was retained in the model. The
proportion of total variation accounted for by all these variables was 
only 4.8 per cent.H Nevertheless, these patterns confirm
TABLE IV.12
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Jana Sangh (Bhilai)
Number of cases 569
Constant term + 0.13?2
Coefficient of determination (R ) .081
Dummy variable Regression
coefficient
F-Value
Businessmen 0.501 19.950
Brahmin Bania castes 0.119 10.853
Muslims - 0.126 4.950
Middle aged 0.054 3.283
Low income* - 0.056 3.315
Skilled workers 0.066 2.650
* Rs2-3 hundred salary a month
TABLE IV.13 
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Jana Sangh (Raipur)
Number of cases 502
Constant term + 0.100^
Coefficient of determination (R ) .060
Dummy variable Regression
coefficient
F-Value
Brahmin Bania castes 0.123 12.443
Businessmen 0.097 6.282
High income* 0.130 3.680
Muslims - 0.100 3.643
* Rs4-5 hundred salary a month
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our earlier generalizations. lor example the conditional probability of a 
Muslim supporting the Congress in Bhilai was as high as .738 and the 
conditional probability of businessmen supporting the Congress was as low 
as .295 (TABLE IV.10).
In Raipur on the other hand, the only dummy variables above the 10 
per cent significance level were 'Non-membership in associations' and 'Youth' 
—  the former in the positive and the latter in the negative direction.
■Lana Sangh
In relation to the support for the Jana Sangh in Bhilai, the dummy 
variables 'Businessmen', 'Brahmin-Bania castes', and 'Middle aged' had 
positive and significant effects. On the other hand the effects of the 
dummy variables 'Muslims', 'Low income group', and 'Skilled workers' were 
negative and significant. The proportion of total variation in the support 
for the Jana Sangh accounted for by all these dummy variables was 8.1 per 
cent. The conditional probability of support of the Jana Sangh by 
businessmen was as high as .637, by Brahmin-Bania castes .257, and by 
Muslims it was as low as .011 (TABLE IV.12).
In general, those in Raipur who support the Jana Sangh appear to 
come from Brahmin-Bania castes, business occupations and high income groups. 
The conditional probability of a Muslim supporting the Jana Sangh in Raipur 
was nil (TABLE IV.13). These figures certainly confirm our earlier 
conclusions that support for the Jana Sangh was concentrated in certain socio­
economic groups. It was more so in Bhilai than in Raipur because —  one 
may imagine —  those who respected traditional values supported the Jana 
Sangh as a protective measure.
Communists
In relation to support for the Communists, the dummy variables 
'Members of culture associations', and 'Members of trade unions ', had 
positive and significant effect. The effect of the dummy variable 'Skilled 
workers' was nearly significant and hence retained in the model (TABLE IV.14). 
But the proportion of total variation in the support for the Communists 
accounted for by all these dummy variables was only 1.6 per cent.
On the other hand in Raipur skilled workers, migrants from rural 
areas and persons of other than middle-age group appeared to have supported 
the Communists. The effects of membership in cultural associations and 
trade unions was significantly related to Communist support in Bhilai while 
the were not at all significant in Raipur. Further, religion and caste 
had no impact on Communist support either in Bhilai or Raipur.
In general, both in Bhilai and Raipur the variables of loyalty 
to religion, caste, and traditionalism had significant effects only on the 
support for the Jana Sangh and the proportion of total variation in party 
support accounted by these variables was the highest in relation to the 
Jana Sangh (7.2/6). It was almost negligible in relation to the Congress,
TABLE IV.14
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Communists (Bhilai)
Number of cases 569
Constant term + 0.159
Coefficient of determination (R2) .016
Dummy variable Regression
coefficient
F-Value
Cultural association member 0.110 6.918
Trade union member 0.097 5.878
Middle aged -0.057 2.795
Skilled workers 0.071 2.394
TABLE IV.15
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Support for the Communists (Raipur)
Number of cases 502
Constant term + 0.072 ^
Coefficient of determination (R ) .051
Dummy variable Regression
coefficient
F-Value
Skilled workers 0.206 15.655
Rural native 0.089 10.353
Middle aged - 0.054 4.062
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and it was nil in relation to the Communists. The inclusion of the dummy 
variable 'Muslims' into the model accounted for only 1.2 per cent of vari­
ation in the support for the Congress. On the other hand variables of 
membership in cultural associations, membership in trade unions, and type 
of place of origin, all of which may rightly be regarded as indicators of 
modernization and territorial movement, had significant effects on the 
support for the Communists. However, only a small proportion of the 
variation in support for the Communists was accounted for by these vari­
ables .
HYPOTHESES TESTED
A comparison of the findings in this chapter with some of the 
hypotheses suggested in the earlier chapters justify the following con­
clusions .
The hypothesis -- that the electoral success of a political 
party in an industrial town is likely to be dependent on the amount of 
trade union work that the party puts in -- is proved. The popularity of 
the Congress in Bhilai is traced mostly to the trade union work it had 
put in.
The hypothesis that in traditional cities the support for a 
political party is more likely to be dependent on successfully inducting 
into the party fold community leaders who control vote banks, is proved.
The electoral success of the Congress in Raipur was attributable clearly 
to the induction of a leader like S.C. Tiwari into the party.
The hypothesis that workers in industrial towns on the whole 
might see the Congress rule as more beneficial than detrimental to peoples' 
welfare is proved. A majority of the respondents in Bhilai (59%) mentioned 
the Congress as 'the most likely party to improve conditions'.
The hypothesis that the Communists secured their highest support 
in industrial towns from the working class is only partly confirmed. In 
Bhilai about 58 per cent of Communist supporters were either semi-skilled 
or un-skilled workers. On the other hand, this was true of only about 30 
per cent of Communist supporters in Raipur. It may be also noted that 
members of trade unions, members of cultural associations and skilled 
workers all showed a greater tendency to support the Communists than did 
the manual labourers (TABLE V.6).
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The hypothesis that the sources of support of religious parties 
are the same social groups in both industrial towns and traditional cities 
is proved. A higher proportion of high caste Hindu groups, Jains, high 
salareid people and migrants from urban areas than of other categories 
supported the Jana Sangh in Bhilai. The social solidarity of the higher 
caste and income groups was higher in Bhilai than in Raipur. Consequently, 
the Jana Sangh could make headway in gathering electoral support.
The hypothesis is proved that in a plural society with conflicting 
group interests, if a political party associates itself very closely with 
particular social or cultural groups it is likely to be most difficult 
for it to penetrate the rest of the society. In Bhilai the Jana Sangh was 
highly associated with Hindu religion, high castes and hostility to 
religious minorities.
The hypothesis that the rightist vote in industrial towns is 
essentially a religious vote is only partly confirmed. In Bhilai the Jana 
Sangh was the only rightist party which fielded a candidate. But the Jana 
Sangh combined in itself both religious traditionalism and support of a 
free enterprise economy.
lüu
FOOTNOTES
IV
1. The term Chattisgarh in Hindi means 36 forts. The region in 
the middle ages was said to have been ruled from 36 fortified 
places of which the present Raipur was one. Presently the 
districts of Bastar, Raipur, Durg, and Bilaspur comprise the 
region of Chattisgarh.
2. The known history of Raipur city can be traced back to the 
10th century A.D.
3. According to the Delimitation of Parliamentary and Assembly 
Constituencies Order issued in 1966, 26 out of a total of 65 
assembly constituencies in the region of Chattisgarh were reserved 
scheduled castes (9) and scheduled tribes (16) candidates 
(Election Commission India 1967a:152-156).
4. For details of areas included in the present state of Madhya
Pradesh see Census of India 1961 Madhya Pradesh General 
Population Tables Vol. Ill, Part II-A. Delhi: The Manager of
Publications.
5. The information for this section was obtained from the Handbook
on the General Elections in Madhya Pradesh: Election Results
from 1952 to 1967 issued by the Chief Electoral Officer, Madhya 
Pradesh (1967:40,41).
6. In 1964 the Communist Party of India (CPI) broke into two almost 
equal divisions. The rightist faction, officially recognized
by the Election Commission as the CPI has since then been loyal 
to the Soviet Union, unequivocally committed to parliamentary 
democracy, and actively cooperated with Indira Gandhi's Congress 
Party. It is popularly known as the pro-Moscow group. The 
leftist faction, officially recognized by the Election Commission 
as the Communist Party of India (Marxist) is alleged to be pro- 
Peking and has openly declared its faith in extra-parliamentary 
methods of gaining power. But the New China News Agency has 
disowned the CPIM and subjected its leadership to sharp ideo­
logical attacks. In this study unless I refer to CPI or CPIM, 
the term ’Communist' refers to both these parties. For further 
divisions among the Communists of India see Marcus Franda,
India's Third Communist Party. Asian Survey 9, 1969. Also see 
Harry Gleman, The Communist Party of India: Sino-Soviet Battle­
ground. In A, Doak Barnett, (ed) Communist Strategies in South­
east Asia. New York: Frederick A, Prager 1963.
7. Sudhir Mukherji in the meanwhile organized the pro-Communist 
trade union in Bhilai and stood on the CPI ticket in Bhilai in 
1967. Now he is more popular in Bhilai than in Raipur.
8. The Justice Party of Madras was a south Indian parochial party.
It drew its support primarily from non-Brahmin landed gentry 
and was aimed against Brahmin supremacy. See Eugene Irshik, 
Political and Social Conflict in South India: The Non-Brahmin
Movement, Tamil Separatism 1916-1929. Berkeley and Los Angeles* 
University of California Press 1969.
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9. Here I am referring to Rajni Kothari, Gopal Krishna, Dirubhai 
Sheth, Rameshray Roy, Bashiruddin Ahmed, and Ashish Nandy who 
are working at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies.
For details of the model advanced by these scholars see particu­
larly the articles of Kothari and Rameshray Roy (Kothari and 
Sheth 1965; Kothari and Shah 1965; Kothari 1967b, 1970c;
Rameshray Roy 1966a, 1968).
10. Until now three national election surveys have been carried out 
all around 1967 in India. Two of these surveys were carried out 
by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies in cooperation 
with S.J. Eldersveld, University of Michigan, and D. Marvick of the 
University of California. For several articles based on these 
surveys see the annual numbers for 1970 and 1971 of Economic and 
Political Weekly and the November issue of Asian Survey 1970. 
Another study -- a three-wave survey with the sample drawn from 
west, north, and east India -- was sponsored by the Research 
Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission in 1967. The 
all-India report of this study prepared by N. Srinivasan and V. 
Subramaniam was submitted to the Planning Commission in 1969 and
is not yet published.
11. In a regression model based on survey data in India in 1967, the
dummy variables based on type of native place, age, literacy, 
income, and caste accounted for less than 5 per cent variation 
in Congress voting. See Douglas Madsen, Solid Congress Support 
in 1967: A Statistical Inquiry. Asian Survey X, 1970.
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V
MOBILITY AND PARTY SUPPORT 
MOBILITY AND VOTING
In the fourth chapter we sought to explain differences in the 
voting of people in similar socio-economic categories as between Bhilai 
and Raipur. In this chapter we turn our attention to the influence of 
fathers' political loyalty, social, geographical and occupational mobility 
on the changing patterns of party support in India and especially in our 
study areas.
Loss of Congress Voting Support
We have already seen that from 1952 to 1967 the Congress steadily 
lost voting support. In 1967 it also lost its majority in several state 
assemblies when challenged by strong non-Congress alliances, although 
its net loss of votes exceeded 5 per cent only in a few north Indian 
states. The main challenging groups, the Communists, the Jana Sangh, the 
Swatantra Party, and the regional parties such as the Dravida Munnetra 
Kajhagam, retained their own voting support in the states where they were 
respectively the strongest, and were able to mobilize it in the interests 
of the electoral alliances they formed.
This change was the subject of both impressionistic and aggregate 
statisitcal analyses around the time of the 1967 election. The explan­
ations offered mentioned many factors such as caste, religion, feudal 
influences, high prices, and language tensions.^ However, none of these 
studies attempted quantitative estimates of the proportions of the varia­
tion in Congress votes that could be attributed to these factors, either 
individually or as a whole. Moreover, they neglected altogether the 
influence of social mobility on the shifts in party support.
Social Mobility in Western Society
European and American studies of social mobility suggest that 
its primary significance for political behaviour lies in the consciousness 
of status discrepancy. Every society comprises a number of separate 
hierarchies (social, economic, educational, occupational, ethnic and so on) 
each of which has its own status structure and its own conditions for the
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attainment of a position of prestige. There may be discrepancies between 
the different positions a person occupies in the different hierarchies at 
a given time. Mobility up or down within only one or some of these hier­
archies widens the status discrepancy between them and the others (Lipset 
and Bendix 1964:64,65), The perception of the discrepancies leads to 
attempts to redress the balance, especially by trying to improve one's 
status in those hierarchies where it is relatively low. This may be 
tried directly or through political affiliations that promise such improve­
ments, or by seeking alternative status satisfactions in some new hierarchy 
such as that of a political party.
A number of factors have been found to influence the political
orientation of upwardly mobile persons, in comparison with those in a
static situation. According to comparisons of political preferences as
between the United States on the one hand, and northern European countries
on the other, two of the most important are the openness of the occupational
structure and the need to adjust to the life-style of the class into which
one moves or among whom one lives. Taking occupational mobility as the
independent variable, a number of studies indicate that where this is
relatively easy, and adjustment to the life-style of the higher class is
correspondingly easy, the upwardly mobile trend to become more conservative
than they were -- indeed more conservative then most established members of
the class into which they move. On the other hand, compared with their
counterparts in the United States, Britain and Australia, those who have
moved up into skilled manual occupations in northern Europe have had a
greater struggle both to move and to be received into their new milieu,
and this is thought to explain the fact that they become politically more
2radical than semi-skilled and unskilled.
Social Mobility in India
But the two western models of inherited party loyalties and the 
reformulation of political sympathies in conformity with the general party 
choices of the class into which one moved will be inadequate to explain 
the inter- or intra-generational shifts in the party choices of the Indian 
electorate. Parties in the Western countries developed along the dimensions 
of class and religion and more or less the same parties have been in exist­
ence for at least half a century (Lipset and Rokkan 1967:50,51). So it is 
easy to compare inter- or intra-generational mobility patterns and shifts 
in party choice.
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The party system in India, however, did not develop on class lines.
Though the initial leadership of all political parties has come from 
western-educated middle-class elites, popular support has come from diverse 
socio-economic and occupational groups. It is therefore difficult to 
characterize any particular party as labour or middle class.
Although the Congress Party has been on the Indian political scene for 
more than eighty years, it was less a political party than a freedom movement 
before Independence, while most of the other parties were formed after 
Independence —  many of them over the past decade. So the party choices were 
not available for the electorate over the generations or even throughout a 
single generation. Further, about eight in ten adults had no vote before 
Independence.
Another difficulty is that although the Congress is organized nationally 
and contested both parliamentary and state legislative elections of the 
other parties are confined in each case to a limited number of states. Hence 
geographical movement of respondents —  in which we are particularly interests 
—  faces the mobile voter in a different state with a new range of party 
choices, and the options available are not comparable across the state 
boundaries.
INTER-PARTY SHIFTS 
Party Choice
Party choice was examined by using the recall of three successive 
elections (1957, 1962, and 1967). Most of the respondents replied to these 
questions without much difficulty and the information appeared to be reliable. 
We have already noted that some respondents found it difficult to recall for 
which of the two Communist candidates (in Bhilai) and for which of the two 
Congress candidates (in Raipur) they had voted in 1967. This problem was 
solved by treating the Congress and the Communist votes as single blocks.
For the purpose of this analysis I divided the voters into three major 
categories.
All those who voted for a particular party in at least two most recent 
elections (1962 and 1967) I defined as regular voters of that particular 
party. Regular voters of a party, one can argue, are politically involved.
They are committed to a political party on a long term basis and to a broad 
spectrum of the party's leadership, ideology, and policies. They are not 
usually swayed by temporary issues and usually stand by the party in times 
of political crisis.
All those who voted for a particular party at one or two elections and 
later shifted their choice to another party in the later elections I defined 
as swingers. Those who voted for a particular party in 1957, shifted to some 
other party in 1962 but returned in 1967 to the fold of the party for which
TABLE V.l
Voting History of Those Who Voted Congress, 
Jana Sangh and Communist in 1967
Town
Party
choice
in
1967
Total
(N)
Voting history
Regulars*
%
Swingers**
%
New
voters***
%
Total
%'
Congress 236 60 16 24 100
co
r—1 Jana Sangh 91 12 55 33 100
si
PQ Communist 97 32 41 27 100
Congress 250 56 27 17 100
3a
• H
Jana Sangh 73 29 36 35 100
CO
OS Others 75 18 61 21 100
=  80.496
=  52.985
* All those who voted for a particular party in at least two most 
recent elections.
** All those who voted for a particular party at one or two elections 
and later shifted their choice to another party, and also those 
who voted for a particular party in 1957, shifted to some other party 
in 1962 but returned in 1967 to the fold of the party for which they 
voted in 1957.
*** All those who voted for the first time in 1967.
105
they voted in 1957 were also defined as swingers. Election literature in
the West suggest that swinging voters are usually politically the least 
informed and the least interested in politics. Their knowledge of political 
parties, of candidates who contest elections, and of sitting legislative 
members is low (Butler and Stokes 1969; Macarrus 1971; Converse 1967). The 
preliminary analysis of the Australian election survey carried out by Aitkin 
and Kahan confirms these generalizations.
Survey researchers in India however, had concluded differently. In a 
study of the recall data of three elections based on two election surveys 
in 1967 and 1969 Sheth concluded that the shifters, /like the partisan voters, 
are politically involved voters who vote regularly and are aware of their 
preferences ... Often they are guided by more discriminating political 
considerations which prevent them from tagging themselves blindly and 
indefinitely to one party' (Sheth 1970). Sheth gave two arguments in support 
of such a conclusion. Firstly, seven in ten shifters in his sample offered 
specific reasons for withdrawing their support from a particular party and 
secondly six in ten of the shifters in his sample expressed the intention to 
stick to the same party in the next election. So Sheth interpreted this as 
a pattern of permanent shift in party allegiance of voters rather than a 
lack of political identification among them. Our survey, however, did not 
provide any conclusive material in this regard. But it will be explained a 
little later how some respondents changed their voting preferences after 
having had some experience in Bhilai (see page 110).
Finally, all those who voted for the first time in 1967 were defined as 
new voters of the party for which they had voted. This category again included 
all those whose names were included on the roll for the first time in 1967 
and also those whose names were already on the roll but did not cast their 
votes in the past for one reason or another. The 1967 study just referred 
to found that about seven in ten new voters were under thirty years of age. 
Owing to their short political experience, it is suggested that new voters 
are more likely to be swayed by temporary issues than to be guided by strong 
political loyalties (Sheth 1970). This is said to be especially true of new 
voters in India because political identification in India begins to form 
during early adulthood and particularly in the course of electoral parti­
cipation (Roy 1971). Let us now examine the inter-party shifts in Bhilai. 
Inter-Party Shifts in Bhilai
We can begin by considering three different voting histories: those 
who voted in all three elections (1957, 1962 and 1967), those who voted for 
different parties in 1967, and those who voted for Congress in 1957 and 1962. 
Those who voted for non-Congress parties in 1957 and 1962 were few and we 
might as well ignore them. Tables V.l and V.2 show that long-term party 
loyalty was characteristic of the Congress voters. The Jana Sangh and the 
Communists expanded their voting base by recruiting inter-party defectors 
(mostly from Congress) and new voters.
Of a total of 106 who voted in all three elections in Bhilai two in 
three regularly voted for the same party and of these partisans nine in ten 
voted Congress.
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The Congress did not have the same lead among those who had 
gone to the polls in and after 1962 (TABLE V.l). Of a total of 236 
who voted Congress in Bhilai in 1967 some six in ten were its regular 
voters and about two in ten each were new and swinging voters. Of 16 per 
cent swinging voters, 13 per cent were attracted from across party lines 
and 3 per cent voted Congress in 1957 and 1967 but for some other party 
in 1962.
On the other hand, of those who voted for the Jana Sangh and 
the Communists in 1967 about four to five in ten were swinging voters 
(mostly from the Congress) and about three in ten were new voters. Further, 
about a third of the Communist voters and a tenth of the Jana Sangh voters 
were regulars.
Finally, of those who voted Congress in 1957 and 1962 about one 
in ten did not turn up at the polls in 1967, and about a quarter voted 
for non-Congress parties in 1967 (TABLE V.2).
The above findings make it clear that although the net losses 
suffered by the Congress in India as a whole from 1952 to 1967 were less 
than 5 per cent, there may have been considerable movement of voters into 
and out of the Congress, if Bhilai and Raipur are a guide.
The Congress party made up the losses it suffered from defections, 
partly by attracting voters from other parties and partly by attracting 
new voters. But among the new voters, the vote for the Congress was mar­
ginally lower than its average vote in Bhilai, and for the Jana Sangh and 
the Communists it was marginally higher than their average figures.
These inter-party shifts are not surprising. Because Congress 
is the oldest political organization, long term party loyalty was essen­
tially a characteristic of Congress voters. Most of the non-Congress 
parties were in essence breakaways from Congress and appealed first to 
discontented Congress supporters.
Implications
The above inter-party shifts have two major implications. The 
voting support of the Congress has been on the decline. This decline 
is higher among the new voters than among those who have been on the roll 
for a long time. Secondly, the Jana Sangh and the Communists are develop­
ing into stable parties with expanding electoral bases. Whether the Jana 
Sangh or the Communists can expand their electoral bases sufficiently to
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defeat the Congress candidate in Bhilai will depend on the spread of its 
voting support over different social sections.
Workers in Bhilai have very high rates of inter- and intra- 
generational occupational and income mobility. It is of considerable 
electoral importance whether a party's voting support is concentrated 
in narrowing or expanding social and cultural bases. For example, how 
different are the respondents who voted regularly for a particular party 
compared with swinging and new voters drawn to it? What made some respon­
dents vote regularly for a particular party and others to change their 
choice of party from election to election? Are these voting shifts 
related in any way to the territorial relocation of the respondents or 
status discrepancies caused by upward or downward mobility?
CHOICE OF A DEPENDENT VARIABLE
The influence of indicators of mobility on political attitudes 
of respondents can be assessed in several different ways. We already 
noted in Chapter IV that respondents' choice of party in different elections 
or party supported by the respondents at the time of survey or a combination 
of both these factors can be used as a dependent variable. Of these three 
options, respondents' choice of party in elections will be the most appro­
priate and logical to be used as a dependent variable. The voters can be 
divided into partisans, swinging voters, and new voters and the impact 
of indicators of mobility can be examined by two-way and three-way tables 
and multiple regression analysis. But I did not pursue such a method of 
investigation for the following reasons.
Such a method will automatically exclude a large number of res­
pondents from our analysis. Most of the respondents in Bhilai were either 
too young to vote or were fresh migrants and had no vote in Bhilai in 1957 
and 1962. Only a fifth voted in 1957, only a third voted in 1962 and only 
a sixth voted in all three elections. In 1967 swinging voters were few -- 
only 37 of those who voted Congress, 50 of thos who voted Jana Sangh and 
40 of those who voted for the Communists were swinging voters. Combining 
all the swingers into a single category would be meaningless because the 
shifts were in different ideological directions. Hence, in this chapter 
again I preferred to use party support as the dependent variable.
I will first examine the impact of different mobility variables 
such as father's political loyalty, political complexion of state of origin, 
occupational mobility, perception of one's own living over the past ten
P
ar
ty
 
P
op
u
la
ri
ty
 
by
 
P
ar
en
ta
l 
P
ar
ty
 
L
oy
al
ty
 
in
 
B
h
il
a
i 
an
d 
R
ai
pu
r
1
3
g
CO
O ' CM < r cD
d CO r-4 X X
o X II ! » 1
> , o d
x
54
03 X
CL 4-1 <0 oo 00 CM CM
•H d d 6-S |X X X
4-1 54 CO »3 1 + 1 1
O CO X COrH —
X 3
0) a CO
X o 1 CO 00 X CM
C CL d CU •<r X >3-
M c 54 + 1 + +
CJ ac
CO
54
CU CM ON ON
X on X
4-1
o
4-)
c 1
05 3 CO
XI g X CM CM X o
c B CO 5 ^ X X X Xo O ■H
cl u d
CO
CU
>4
X
CO 60 cD >3- CD CD
X I d d * 8 r-4 CM CM CM
cO 3
X X co
0)
COo CO
CL 1 CO X CM
CL d CU 6 ^ iX CM X Xo o 54
CJ 60
>N
4-1
(-4 >N
CO H ON r - 00 rH
(X o CL g-0 »X CM CNJ
2 01
54
CO
54
CU
X 5 ^ X ON X cD
X Xo
1
3 CO
g X S'« X O X
g CO X X 1—< rHo •r-4
c j d
X
X X
01 4-1 CO CxO
4-1 d d d CM CM < f
54 0) CO 3 X X X rHo X X co
CL c
CL o
3 CL
CO CO CO
<u I CO
>> 54 d CU X CM vD cD
X o >4 X X X X
54 CJ 60
CO
P4
rH
o CL S '? 00 < f oiz; 0)
54
rH rH
rH
0 X rH o 00
4-1 X o CM 00
D 'w ' X X X
H X
CO
CO
05
rH r\ 54 CO
H 0 co X 00 d
CO J X co 6 d d  co 3
4-1 X 54 CU o 05 O 05 CO
d  ■J O 54 X d O  X X rH
CU X CL 6 0 CU 0) 1 X X 3
54 X CL d 05 > d  54 d 54 X
CO D 3 o 54 o O 3 o 3 o
fH X CO CJ X d I S  CL CL EH
00
d
X
54 X
3 CJ
CL 3 X
■H 54 3
3 X X X
as CO -Q X
X 3
TO X CO 60
d X d
3 05 x
X X X
•H 54
3 X X O
X 05 3 a
•H X Cl
jd 54 X 3
CQ O 05 CO
a >
X C L X CO
o 3 54 X
CO 54 d
CO 3 05
X O X
d CO d
0) 3 o
-a !5 CL
d co COo 0) 0)
CL X X 54
CO X X VO
05 54 54 X X"
54 3 3 O o
a rH •
0) 3 05 a v
.d CO CL 60 o
X CO O 3 T—
05 CL X
X 54 d It
0) 00 05
CO d X CJ CM
CL o >4 54
3 CJ 3 05
rH 1 CL CL
rH do o X 0)
a d O X
X
w X X
0) 05 B
£ X X Oo 54 d 54
X O X X
CL
CO CL 05 >>
3 3 X X
S CO EH 543
CO o CL
0) X •
X £ CO 3
X 05
54 CO X O
3 X X X
CL d 54
05 3 X
CO 54 CL 05
CO 3 CO
0) CL CO o T"*
54 3 C L
00 x O CL ON
d o X O •o X 00 o -
a X CO
i X rH X T"~
d o 0) do 54 05 li
d X X
3 X d CM .
54 o 05 o Wo X CL
X 54 CO
. O 05
X 05 CL 54
54 X c l
O D 3 X
C L 3 CO O
CL X
3 X 05
CO 05 co 60
rH 3
X 00 X X
3 d d d
X X 3 0)
d CO CJ
<u CO 54
54 3 05 05 •3 X CL >N
CL O X X
X 54 0) 54
CO d 3 X 3
< X CL X CL
a>
•U
O
55
108
years, and aspirations of life on party support. In carrying forward the 
analysis I shall employ the technique of multiple regression which will 
enable us to find out the proportion of total variation in party support 
accounted for by all the variables included in the model.
FATHERS' PARTY LOYALTY AND RESPONDENT’S' PARTY SUPPORT 
Limitations
We noted that when the fathers of most of our respondents
reached adulthood many non-Congress parties did not exist or were relatively
unknown. Further, some respondents considered their fathers to be Congress
sympathizers even though they had different ideological persuasions --
because they had worked within the Congress for a long time. Consequently
when respondents were asked: 'During this period -- when you were 14 or
315 -- which party did your family think worth supporting?' many replied, 
'During those days everybody participated in the freedom movement', or 
'During those days everybody supported the Congress'. It was understandable 
that about two in three who gave information on this aspect mentioned the 
Congress as the party supported by their fathers. There were in addition 
good reasons why some respondents had no parental loyalties to inherit: 
those whose fathers were in government service and did not profess any 
overt political sympathies, and those whose fathers died while respondents 
were young children, and those whose fathers lived in rural areas where 
there was no political activity. Wherever I refer to fathers' political 
support, it is only meant to be the party supported by the fathers when our 
respondents were 14 or 15 years old. It is not meant to be the fathers' 
political loyalty at the time of the survey.
Our data support the general finding that sons are likely to 
sympathize with the parties supported by their parents. An absolute 
majority of those who claimed to know their parental political loyalties 
supported the same parties themselves. Parental support for non-Congress 
parties was low. Only 101 respondents (in Bhilai and Raipur) reported 
that their fathers supported leftist or rightist parties. Hence I 
collapsed respondents whose parents supported non-Congress parties into a 
single category and respondents in Bhilai and Raipur into a single table 
(TABLE V.3).
Fathers' support for the leftist parties in Bhilai was essentially 
for the Communists and in Raipur it was mostly for the Praja Socialist 
Party. In both Bhilai and Raipur the Hindu Mahasabha, the Arya Samaj, and 
the Rashtria Swayamsevak Sangh were mentioned prominently as the organ-
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izations supported by the parents. It was for this reason that respondents 
whose fathers supported non-Congress parties, themselves supported Jana 
Sangh, Communist and other parties in equal proportions. Just about an 
average percentage of respondents with non-partisan fathers and about six 
in ten respondents with Congress-supporting parents themselves supported 
Congress.
Patterns of Shifts
The patterns of inter-generational shifts in party support can 
be described better by utilizing leadership interviews and the material 
provided by some respondents who spoke at length after the interviews than 
by limiting ourselves to the statistical relationships brought out by the 
tables. On the basis of the shifts in party support we can divide the 
respondents into six categories.
Some respondents, just like their parents, continued to support 
the Congress. This was not simply a sentimental attachment passed on from 
fathers to sons. Quite a few of these were certain that under the existing 
circumstances no other party could rival the Congress in maintaining 
reasonable standards of administration. These respondents rationalized 
their support for Congress by citing the miserable performance of several 
different united front governments that were formed and defeated in the 
states of Haryana, Madhya Pradesh, West Bengal, and Kerala soon after the 
1967 election.
Some respondents whose parents were supporters of the Congress,
came under the influence of the Communist and other leftist parties when
they were young, and started voting for those parties when they came of
voting age. 'My father supported the Congress, you know; during those
days all freedom fighters were in the Congress. But I was a member of
4the Students' Federation' was a typical answer of this kind of respondent. 
But a few of these changed their opinions after coming to Bhilai. I will 
explain a little later how the variable of region operated in relation to 
this type of respondent.
Some respondents whose fathers were supporters of religious 
parties, themselves actively participated in the activities of the Rashtria 
Swayamsevak Sangh and now extended strong support to the Jana Sangh. The 
intellectual and organizational content of the Jana Sangh in Bhilai were 
provided by this type of respondent. The variable of region is important 
in understanding the party support of this type of respondent also.
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Respondents whose parents were non-partisan could be divided 
into two sub-types. The first contained respondents whose parents were 
agricultural labourers or poor peasants or belonged to the scheduled 
castes, tribes and artisan castes in rural areas or were manual labourers 
in urban areas. In most cases they did not participate in any kind of 
political activity, and had no sentimental or ideological attachments to 
any party. The educational achievements and occupational status of this 
kind of respondent were low. Their aspirations were limited and their 
appreciation for all that was done by the Congress was high. These res­
pondents measured the benefits secured by voting in innocent and practical 
terms: 'Over the past two elections I voted for the Communist candidate.
He did not do anything for us. This time the Congress candidate promised 
to arrange the supply of drinking water. In fact, it was done on the eve 
of the election. So I voted Congress'; or 'Previously we voted Congress, 
but when a dispute arose between us [sweepers] and the hospital adminis­
tration the Congress did not come to our rescue. On the other hand, the 
leader of the Jana Sangh went on fast and fought for our interests, so 
we all voted for him', were two typical explanations from these respondents. 
The second sub-type were the respondents whose parents were government 
servants and hence remained non-partisan; these respondents developed 
sympathies for the Congress or the Jana Sangh.
Finally, some respondents were highly politically conscious 
though not necessarily inspired by parents or influenced by the situations 
in their regions. Their political horizons were much wider and their 
ideological convictions were deep, and they usually hailed from educated 
middle-income families (both rural and urban). They assessed and reassessed 
the ideological and issue positions of political parties. In Bhilai at 
any rate this type of respondent provided the initial organizational support 
and voting base for the ideology-based splinter parties. They supported 
the SSP, the Forward Bloc, and the CPIM.
Support for the Congress in an industrial town -- if Bhilai is 
any guide -- is a reward for its stable administration and its industrial 
development plans. This was more so among low paid manual labourers and 
industrial workers than among high paid engineers and officers. The organ­
izational support for opposition parties such as the Jana Sangh and the 
Communists is provided by political activists who developed sympathies 
for these parties during their youth. Later these parties expanded their 
support structure by penetrating into politically conscious and socially
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and economically discontented sections among whom the Congress was popular 
in the past. To put it briefly inter-generational shifts in party support 
in Bhilai were based on differential rates of efficacy of different 
political parties in securing the interests of workers.
THE POLITICS OF GEOGRAPHICAL MOBILITY 
Existing Literature
The effects of status discrepancy take somewhat different forms 
among migrant voters. In the second chapter we cited studies indicating 
that inter-state migrants tended to work as power cliques and pressure 
groups within the trade unions and political parties they joined in their 
new homes, and to vote for a candidate from their own region or language 
group if an effective one was available. Migrant workers from states with 
strong Communist movements usually joined Communist or other leftist trade 
unions and supported their candidates at parliamentary elections (Harrison 
1960; Palmer 1963) .  It has been shown that in Calcutta the Congress vote 
was consistently low in areas with large concentrations of residents of 
local origin and of refugees from Pakistan, and relatively higher where 
there were few refugees but a larger number of migrants from within India. 
These differences were attributed to the lower educational achievements 
and expectations, and the past Congress contacts, of internal migrants, 
compared with the frustrations and higher aspirations of local residents 
and refugees from Pakistan (Weiner 1967:360- 367) .
The above findings appear to be equally applicable elsewhere with 
some limitations. The political effects of migration are limited by the 
choice of parties available and the numerical strength of migrants support­
ing a particular party. If there are no political parties of migrants' 
choice or the migrants supporting a particular party are few in numbers 
in their new homes there will be hardly any political consequences of 
migration.
In a place like Bhilai such a political party or trade union, if 
newly formed, should have a national and non-parochial outlook to appeal 
to a cosmopolitan population. For example, even when the number of 
supporters of regional parties (such as the Dravida Munnetra Kajhagam of 
Tamil Nadu, and the Bangla Congress of West Bengal) are sufficiently large 
in number in a place like Bhilai to form branches of their own parties 
their growth will be limited and politically they will be ineffective.
TABLE V.4
Party Support by State of Origin (Bhilai)
Political complexion 
of the state of 
origin
Total
(N)
Party supported by respondent
Total
70
Congress
%
Jana
Sangh
7o
Communist
7o
Other
parties
7o
Strong Communist 210 46 9 37 8 100
Strong Jana Sangh 285 68 19 10 3 100
Other States 74 58 23 14 5 100
Total 569 59 16 20 5 100
Note : Respondents who did not report the party they supported are
excluded from the above table. As the number of migrants from 
'strong-Communist' and 'other' states to Raipur was small, the 
data of Raipur are not presented in the above table.
TABLE V.5
Supporters of Political Parties by Political 
Complexion of State of Origin (Bhilai)
Party supported 
by respondents
Political
of
complexion of state 
origin
(N) Strong Strong Other Total
Communist Jana Sangh S tates
7o 7, 7o 7o
Congress 355 29 58 13 100
Jana Sangh 89 21 60 19 100
Communist 116 67 24 9 100
Total 621 36 50 14 100
Note : Respondents who did not report the party they supported and
those who supported 'other' parties are excluded from the 
above table. As the number of migrants from 'strong Communist' 
and 'other' states to Raipur was low, the data of Raipur are not 
presented in the above table.
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Further, such parochial parties, because they are formed by inter-state 
migrants, might alienate other sections and create tensions on language 
and state lines.
Large scale inter-state migration can minimize the number and 
importance of small regional parties and may in fact promote the growth 
of national parties in yet another way. The migrants who supported small 
political parties of their native states are likely to be few in a place 
like Bhilai. And such migrants may have no other choice except supporting 
one of the existing parties in their new homes. For example for a migrant 
from Kerala the choice of parties such as the Muslim League, the Kerala 
Congress, and the Revolutionary Socialist Party which is available back 
at home is not available in a place like Bhilai. Under such circumstances 
a migrant may feel inclined to support the political party closest to his 
ideological persuasions or a party which in his opinion can secure his 
professional interests.
Considered from this point of view, in Bhilai there were suffi­
ciently large numbers of migrants from different language groups and 
states of strong Jana Sangh and Communist influence. The Praja Socialist 
Party and the Hindu Mahasabha, the two prominant non-Congress parties in 
the region, gradually declined in strength after the steel plant was 
erected in Bhilai. In their place the Communists and the Jana Sangh rose 
to prominence. So one may hypothesize that the strength of the Jana Sangh 
and the Communists was secured mostly from migrants who had already identi­
fied themselves with these parties.
Classification of States
The classification of states in this analysis into 'strong- 
Communist' or 'strong-Jana Sangh' is only relative. In all of these states 
Congress always maintained its pluralities of votes and often won majorities 
of seats in the legislatures. I use these terms only to distinguish those 
states in which the Communists and the Jana Sangh were conspicuously succes­
sful. All the states not included in these two categories I have classified 
as 'Others'.'5 The information for this variable was derived from the 
replies to the questions: 'What is your native place? In which state is
it?'
Of a total of 621 respondents in Bhilai about a third migrated 
from 'strong-Communist' states, about half from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states
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and the rest from, ’other' states. 
Impact of State of Origin
The political complexion of state of origin had definite political 
consequences especially in Bhilai. We already noted that the support for 
the Communists and the Jana Sangh was in general lower than that for the 
Congress. In general the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states were more 
likely to support the Communists and oppose the Jana Sangh than were 
migrants from elsewhere. And migrants from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states were 
more likely to support the Jana Sangh and oppose the Communists than were 
migrants from elsewhere. Migrants from 'other' states were few and we 
cannot make any generalizations in relation to them.
Of those who replied to the question on party support, an absolute 
majority from the 'strong-Jana Sangh' and 'other' states and less than half 
from the 'strong-Communist' states supported the Congress. On the other 
hand, about four in ten from 'strong-Communist' states and one in ten from 
all other states supported the Communists (TABLE V.4). Or to put it in a 
different way, about seven in ten Communist supporters came from 'strong- 
Communist' states, about six in ten Congress and Jana Sangh supporters 
came from 'strong Jana Sangh' states (TABLE V.5).
The opposition to each party was in reverse order to the above 
patterns. When measured in terms of a simple party-popularity index con­
structed by subtracting the percentage of respondents opposing a particular 
party from the percentage of respondents supporting it, the Congress obtained 
a plus popularity score in all the three types of states, but it was the 
lowest among migrants from 'strong-Communist' states (+ 19) (TABLE V.6).
On the other hand, the Communists secured a plus score (+ 20) only among 
the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states. The Jana Sangh secured a 
negative score in all the three types of states but did worst of all among 
the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states (-27). In Raipur the number of 
migrants from 'strong-Communist' and 'other' states was small but here also 
the direction of general association was similar to that in Bhilai.
Party Support in States and Bhilai
A comparison of voting in states in 1967 and party support patterns 
in Bhilai as brought out by our analysis raises some important questions.
TABLE V .6
Party Popularity Score by Political Complexion 
of State of Origin (Bhilai)
Political complexion 
of state of origin Total
(N)
Party popularity score
Congress Jana
Sangh
Communists Other
parties
'Strong-Communist' 
states 227 +19 -27 +20 -4
'Strong-Jana Sangh' 
s tates 308 +55 - 3 -32 -9
Other states 86 +36 - 4 -29 -7
Total sample 621 +39 -11 -12 -7
Note : Party popularity score is a simple index constructed by
subtracting the percentage of respondents opposing a 
particular party from the percentage of respondents 
supporting that particular party. The number of migrants 
from 'strong-Communist' and 'other' states was small in 
Raipur and these are not represented in the above table.
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Only a fifth of the votes in the 'strong-Communist' states went 
to the Communists in 1967, while about four in ten migrants from 'strong- 
Communist' states supported the Communists in Bhilai. So the question 
arises, were the Communist sympathizers more likely than others to migrate 
from these states to industrial towns? Or were the migrants from 'strong- 
Communist' states more likely than others to develop Communist sympathies 
after arriving in Bhilai?
Similarly, of a total of 33 million votes cast in the 'strong- 
Communist' states in 1967, less than 2 per cent had voted for the Jana 
Sangh, whereas about a tenth of the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states 
supported the Jana Sangh in Bhilai. The same questions asked in relation 
to the Communists are equally applicable in relation to the Jana Sangh.
Of a total of 68 million votes cast in the 'strong-Jana Sangh' 
states in 1967 only five per cent went to the Communists, whereas a tenth 
of the migrants from these states to Bhilai supported the Communists. Is 
it an indication that the Communists in Bhilai were more efficient in 
attracting supporters from these than from other states?
Only four in ten in the 'strong-Jana Sangh' states voted for the 
Congress in 1967 whereas seven in ten migrants from these states to Bhilai 
supported the Congress. How did the Congress attract such a large proportion 
of supporters? Did the Congress achieve this support by impressing the 
migrants with its industrial development plans?
Finally, among the migrants from 'strong-Communist' states 
support for the Jana Sangh was low and opposition was quite high. Then 
how was it that the Jana Sangh attracted a large number of defectors from 
among the migrants from these states? Did the Jana Sangh adopt any specific 
strategy to penetrate into social sections which did not come under its 
influence in the past?
Explanation
A study of the interview schedules of the migrants from 'strong- 
Communist' states reveals that several factors operating simultaneously 
helped the Communists and the Jana Sangh to improve their position in Bhilai. 
The differential rates of migration of the people of various regions and 
social sections, the activities of the trade unions among these migrants, 
and the disappearance of small regional parties might be mentioned as the 
most important factors.
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a) Areas of party influence
Within the 'strong-Communist' states it was from the areas of the 
highest Communist, influence that most of these migrants came. For example, 
the Communists had been traditionally strong in the coastal districts of 
Andhra Pradesh, central and north Kerala and in the industrial centres 
in the West Bengal. An overwhelming majority of the migrants from the 'pro- 
Communist' states came from these areas. The proportions of migrants from 
the Telangana and Rayalasima regions regions of Andhra Pradesh and the 
northern region of West Bengal -- areas where Communist influence was weak -- 
were negligible.
b) Migration of certain social groups
From within these regions certain social groups among whom the 
Communist Party was popular, moved in larger numbers than other communities. 
A majority of the migrants from Andhra Pradesh came from Kamma, Naidu, 
Agnikula Kshtriya (fishermen), Setti Balija and Harijan communities. Only 
a few of the migrants belonged to the Reddy community -- numerically the 
largest caste in Andhra Pradesh and one with whom the Communists were not 
particularly popular. A majority of the migrants from Kerala came from the 
Nair or Eizhava communities from whom the Communists drew a high proportion 
of their strength. The rest of the migrants from Kerala were Christians. 
Muslims constituted about one third of the population in north Kerala and 
mostly supported the Muslim League, but only a negligible number of Muslims 
from that area migrated to Bhilai. A majority of the migrants from West 
Bengal came from the communities of Kayasta, Baidya and Namsudra. Excepting 
the Kayastas and Baidyas from West Bengal and the Brahmins in general, all 
the other respondents from these states were mostly the sons of middle and 
low income agriculturists, or agricultural labourers, the occupational 
groups that strongly supported the Communists.
c) Trade union activity
The relatively better performance of the Jana Sangh among the 
migrants in Bhilai than in the states of their origin can be attributed 
primarily to two factors. The Jana Sangh was actively involved in trade 
union work among the manual labourers from 'strong-Communist' states. These 
labourers belonged to the low income group (less than Rs200 per month) and 
came from untouchable or service castes, and previously had no connections 
whatsoever with the Jana Sangh; indeed some of them had been Communist 
sympathizers. On the eve of the 1967 election when there was a dispute
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between the hospital management and tr.ht.se labourers, Sadhu, the Jana Sangh 
trade union leader, who contested the election on the Jana Sangh ticket, 
began a fast in protest and won their support. Most of the defectors from 
the Communists to the Jana Sangh from among the migrants from 'strong- 
Communist' states came from this section. It is, however, interesting to 
note that whereas the basis for supporting the Jana Sangh was essentially 
the attachment to traditional values in the case of high caste or high 
income groups, in the case of low income and low caste labourers it was a 
reward for the leader who offered to protect their employment rights.
d) Past political contacts
Among the respondents from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states, those 
with the RSS or the Hindu Mahasabha background from Maharastra and the 
Arya Samajists from Haryana invariably supported Jana Sangh and actively 
participated in the local RSS and Jana Sangh activities.
On the other hand regional and social group considerations 
did not operate in relation to the support extended to the Communists.
The Communist support among these respondents came essentially from two 
sources. Firstly, there were a few educated people who developed faith 
in the ideology of Communism. For example, a couple of technical teachers 
who visited Russia on a training programme were so impressed with the 
industrial development in that country that they recommended a kind of 
'Stalinist' regime for India. Secondly, there were a few skilled and 
semi-skilled workers who were previously employed in the steel factories 
or mining industries in Bihar or West Bengal. These had been members of 
the Communist trade unions there and continued to be so in Bhilai; they 
regularly voted for the Communists and extended strong support to them in 
Bhilai. With regard to the Congress it will be explained a little later 
how relative improvements in the standard of living led to increased 
support for the Congress among the migrants from 'strong-Jana Sangh' states.
OCCUPATIONAL MOBILITY AND PARTY SUPPORT 
Existing Literature
We have seen in chapter one how the castes of peasant proprietors 
have been inheriting the power of the upper castes who were the dominant 
local political influence in pre-independence India. The ability of the 
peasant proprietors to control and mobilize the rural electorate, the 
political power they acquired in the panchayat raj, cooperative institutions
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and state politics, and the increasing pressure they extended on the 
federal centre, all combined to force the political parties to use these 
men as their main medium of contact and communication with the masses of 
the population. Further, their control over local politics has secured 
to them most of the gains from the abolition of the zamindari system, from 
new tenancy laws, from irrigation and drainage schemes, from rising prices 
for agricultural products, and from the green revolution and rural economic 
development generally. These factors have cumulatively enhanced the wealth, 
power and prestige of the peasant proprietors. By contrast, the conditions 
of life for the vast majority of the share croppers and agricultural lab­
ourers have failed to improve or even worsen, and the same has applied to 
the displaced traditional elites, and to the under-employed intelligentsia 
in the towns.
Many social scientists (Rudra 1969, 1971; Ladejinsky 1969;
Kothari 1971b; Joshi 1971) have seen in this the fuel for an explosive 
political situation, of which the first signs lay in the polarization of 
support for the political parties, with the peasant proprietors bolstering 
the Congress or other ruling parties and the disaffected groups being 
increasingly organized by the opposition parties. The sociologists 
(Srinivas 1962; Beteille 1970) tended to view it as a caste struggle and 
the political scientists such as Kothari as a class conflict but having a 
similar effect.
The elections of 1962 and 1967 provided some evidence to confirm 
these expectations. Between 1962 and 1967 many voters changed parties.
Only about a quarter of the electorate voted for Congress in both elections; 
it won few supporters from other parties while about one third of those who 
voted for non-Congress parties in 1967 were defectors from the Congress.
On the surface these voting patterns seemed to reflect current election 
issues and party images. However, Kothari noted that Congress had retained 
the allegiance of a higher proportion of the prosperous voters and those 
who were satisfied with their well-being than of those whose economic con­
dition had deteriorated; a greater proportion of the latter had trans­
ferred their support to the other parties. From this Kothari inferred that 
the Indian party system was likely to be further fragmented into pockets 
of right reaction and left militancy, each drawing some support from a 
growing lower middle class suffering from a sense of economic insecurity 
and general discontent (Kothari 1970b).
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A study carried out in 1967 found that occupational mobility 
was significantly positively associated with factors such as urban 
residence, caste, literacy, income, and lack of cultivable land. Further, 
a higher proportion of mobile than non-mobile respondents took interest in 
politics and public affairs, themselves were engaged in election campaign 
activity, and were aware of the importance of elections and political 
parties as crucial instruments for influencing the government. Also a 
higher proportion of mobile than non-mobile respondents were members in 
voluntary associations and favoured greater government control (Nijhawan 
1971).
So one can argue that because of differential access to economic 
and educational resources and ascriptive status certain social segments 
experience greater occupational mobility than others. Consequently, the 
initial stages of economic development are usually characterized by unequal 
distribution of economic benefits, in many cases, leading to greater 
economic inequalities and feelings of relative deprivation. In developing 
agricultural societies like India economic inequalities may grow both in 
rural and urban areas simultaneously because of modernization of agri­
culture and an expanding industrial sector. The middle classes play an 
important role in channelling occupational frustrations into political 
discontent. In this process opposition parties (particularly radical 
leftist parties) become increasingly popular with those whose economic 
welfare has deteriorated, while those who are happy with their general 
welfare are likely to support centre or right of centre parties. The 
cleavage in such a situation can be broadly described as that between those 
who want change and those who are happy with the status quo.
While the above findings and generalizations appear to be rational 
and may be true in some geographical regions and economic sectors, they 
are not true in the case of Bhilai. In fact if the situation in Bhilai is 
any guide for other industrial towns in India, economic and industrial 
development in these areas are accompanied by very high rates of occupational 
and income mobility and low income disparities.
Mobility Patterns in Bhilai
We have seen in the third chapter that for most of the migrants 
from rural areas their jobs in Bhilai represented an inter-generational 
mobility from agriculture or agriculture-allied to urban occupations. In 
most cases these migrants occupied manual, skilled, and lower civil service
TABLE V.7
Party Support by Occupational Mobility 
(Bhilai, Raipur)
Occupational 
mobility pattern 
of
respondents
Total
(N)
Party supported by respondent
Total
7o
Congress
%
Jana
Sangh
7o
Communis ts
%
Others
7o
Bhilai
Moved up 165 58 20 18 4 100
Stable 342 61 14 20 5 100
Moved down 62 52 11 29 8 100
Raipur
Moved up 88 64 14 11 11 100
Stable 356 66 18 8 8 100
Moved down 58 66 12 14_ 8 100
Note : Respondents who did not report the party they supported 
are excluded from the above table.
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jobs. Even those who moved from rural to urban manual occupations had 
jobs in Bhilai with higher job security and regular increments and 
promotions. The salary difference between the highest and lowest 
categories of employees was only seven to eight times in Bhilai, while it 
was 60 to 70 times in Raipur.
The mobility considered here is intra-generational mobility —  
the movement, if any, between the first and present jobs of the respondents. 
But within each occupational category, particularly in Bhilai, there was 
considerable scope for both occupational and income mobility. Promotions 
from a lower to an immediately higher grade were offered as a matter of course 
and double and triple promotions were not unheard of (see pages 121, 122, 123) 
So the category of stable respondents in Bhilai represents relatively lower 
rates of mobility rather than occupational or income immobility. In the 
absence of any comparable data on intra-generational mobility it is 
difficult to compare the situation inBBhilai with the situation in India 
in general.
However, during interviewing it was my clear impression that the 
respondents in Bhilai were aware that in Bhilai compared with many towns, 
especially traditional towns, the opportunity structure was open and 
promotional possibilities were great.
For the above-mentioned reasons it is reasonable to assume that 
occupational mobility patterns in Bhilai will result in a lower degree 
of social frustrations than in places of very high economic disparities 
and limited employment opportunities. On the other hand, it is equally 
possible that social sections which enjoyed high ascribed status and 
privileges in the past but are now disaffected by the urban pattern of 
life may seek new associational forms through which they can re-establish 
the social distance between themselves and the old under-privileged 
social sections. The political expression of this aspect could be that the 
disaffected sections will support political parties that have respect 
for the status quo or political parties through which they can still 
retain their leadership roles. On the other hand, social sections who have 
already experienced some change and some improvement in their economic 
condition will ask for more and rapid change and support the parties that 
promise it.
For these reasons it is reasonable to assume that occupational mobil­
ity patterns will cause a lower degree of differential in political support 
and whatever relationships are found will have to be treated with caution.
Also as occupational mobility in Bhilai concealed a great amount of income
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mobility and high aspirations I propose to utilize information on the 
type of action suggested by respondents to solve their local problems, 
to find out the patterns of political support.
Mobility and Party Support in Bhilai
Our data on Bhilai did not suggest any definite relationship 
between occupational mobility and party support. It may be observed in 
Table V.7 that the application of the Chi Square test did not confirm our 
hypothesis that occupational mobility patterns and party support patterns 
were likely to be interdependent. The data however, brought out some 
interesting suggestive patterns. Though the Congress was supported 
by more than 50 per cent in each category support for it was relatively 
higher among those who were stable (61%) and among those who moved up 
(58%) than among those who moved down (52%). On the other hand the 
proportion of support for the Jana Sangh was the highest (20%) among 
those who moved up, next highest among those who were stable (14%) and 
lowest among those who moved down (11%). The support pattern in 
relation to the Communists was just the reverse.
An examination of the basic data also reveals that among those 
who moved up the Jana Sangh vote increased from 7 per cent in 1962 to 
25 per cent in 1967, and the Congress vote steeply declined from 70 per 
cent in 1962 to 49 per cent in 1967. The major gains of the Communists 
came from among those who moved down (from 17 to 33%). We have however to 
treat these patterns with great caution because our occupational mobility 
data were based on a comparison between the first and the present jobs of 
the respondents and the shifts in party choice were between 1962 and 1967. 
We do not precisely know the occupational mobility patterns of respondents 
between 1962 and 1967. In addition not all respondents voted in 1962 
and 1967.
One's Own Welfare and Party Support
The above patterns of party support were further confirmed in 
relation to solutions suggested by respondents to solve local problems.
In general both in Bhilai and Raipur those who were contented, those who 
thought that there was nothing that they could do to solve the local 
problems were more likely than others to support the Congress 
(TABLE V.8). On the other hand, those who were discontented and
TABLE V.(9
Party Supported by Solutions Suggested to Local Problems
Solution suggested 
by respondent to 
local problems
Total
(N)
Party supported by respondent
Total
7o
Congress
7o
Jana
Sangh
7o
Communis ts
%
Other
parties
7o
Bhilai
Resignation, no
problem 350 67 15 13 5 100
Mass action 219 46 17 32 5 100
Total 569 59 16 20 5 100
Raipur
Resignation, no
problem 322 70 16 6 8 100
Mass action 180 55 18 16 11 100
Total 502 66 16 9 9 100
Note : Respondents who did not report the party they 
supported are excluded from the above table.
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advocated mass action to solve local problems and to protect workers' 
interests were more likely than others to support the Communists. In other 
words those who wanted to pressure the government for rapid socio-economic 
changes tended to support the Communists. The variations in support for 
Jana Sangh in relation to the above variables were only marginal.
Explanation for Variations in Party Support
The patterns of party support appear to have been based on two 
considerations. The first was the actual mobility achieved by the respon­
dents in their careers and their perception whether their welfare had been 
improving, getting worse or was the same over the past decade. This 
perception and the consequent feeling of deprivation or fulfilment in 
their turn were dependent on the frame of reference and level of expecta­
tions of respondents. Secondly, the image of a particular party as an 
agent of change or ensurer of status quo or as a middle party was directly 
related to the patterns of party support.
a) Expectations of the middle class
The expectations of the middle class occupational groups were 
high. Quite a few of them believed that the opportunities for upward 
mobility were low or that their rightful share (promotion, increment, etc.) 
was denied because of favouritism and nepotism. They were highly critical 
of the government administration and blamed the working class for low pro­
ductivity .
'Both politicians and administrators are faction-oriented on
6the basis of language, region and caste. There are no uniform rules and 
regulations. Tell me the name of the officer then 1 will state the rules 
and regulations applicable in practice. For example, my juniors who were 
less qualified were promoted over my head. Nobody works sincerely. I 
honestly feel that our country needs a dictator who can impose some sort 
of discipline, organization and devotion to work* (Manager of Safety 
Engineering Department).
'We discuss other countries also. We always hear about people 
going abroad to Canada and the USA. We hear the opportunities available 
there and how much salary they get there. Among the engineers, 'going 
abroad' is a common topic of discussion' (A Senior Design Engineer).
'The government should thoroughly reorganize the administration
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of the. public undertakings to give each man a fair deal. I know that this 
is the worry of many people. When a person feels secure with regard to 
his job and line of promotion, he can put his mind to work' (General 
Foreman in Charge, Roll Turning and Repairs Shop).
The three respondents who made the above comments started their 
employment career in Bhilai with a salary of about 250 rupees a month about 
10 to 12 years ago. All three of them secured a minimum of four promotions 
and were drawing about 1400 to 1800 rupees a month at the time of the survey 
Their criticism of the government was typical of the high level officials. 
Being high level officials they had first hand knowledge of corruption, 
favouritism and nepotism. And they unhesitatingly attributed the ineffic­
iency to the party in power. But at the same time they were critical of 
the Communists who advocated radical economic and administrative changes.
Some of these officers who had experience in the private sector 
also made objective comparisons between the two. 'I am not much informed 
about the political developments in the country. I can only narrate my 
experiences in the workshop. The plant is overstaffed and under-worked... 
having worked in a private sector factory I was taught to be a disciplin­
arian. I insist on extracting full work from employees. I attend my 
workshop punctually and insist that all my subordinates should do the same. 
They do not like this. Everybody wants me to sign overtime which they 
had not done. Workers do not do their duties and management cannot impose 
discipline. How can we achieve targets?' said a foreman in the mechanical 
maintenance section.
This state of affairs was nicely summed up by the Deputy Chief 
Engineer when he said during the interview: 'People are dissatisfied here
because they have never seen the outside world in this country. They 
earned promotions which they did not deserve. I recruited engineers before 
they passed out of their colleges. They earned four promotions within 
ten years. This is the highest rate of mobility in this country. They 
should be grateful for what they have got. Their rate of promotion made 
them over-estimate themselves. Now the pace of promotion is slow because 
all the posts are already filled up. Hence they are disgruntled'. Irres­
pective of the value judgments involved in the above assessment, the 
ground for anti-government and anti-Congress attitudes is obvious enough.
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b) Expectations of working class
The situation was altogether different with regard to the occu­
pational groups in the working class. The expectations of the labourers 
were low. Their main demands were food, shelter, clothing, and children's 
education at reasonable prices. Their frame of reference was highly 
related to the local opportunity structure. 'Those who joined along with 
me were given advance increments I was not given', 'the management should 
allot me better accommodation', 'we should have more drinking water facil­
ities' , 'we should have an elementary school for our children in our mother 
tongue' were the typical responses of this category of respondents. The 
labourers, in fact, were more appreciative of their improved position.
A majority of these were previously irregularly employed hired labourers 
living in dilapidated thatched huts, with no reticulated water and elec­
tricity facilities. I can recall dozens of respondents whom I interviewed 
personally and who were proud of their regular pay packet, single room 
flat, reticulated drinking water and electricity facilities compared to 
the miserable standard of living they had back at home. In terms of social 
service done and votes secured the input and output ratio was quite high 
for the Congress among these sections.
Those who were stable within their groups in the middle class 
occupations or those who moved upward supported the Jana Sangh equally, 
not because the party was highly regarded as an agent of change but as a 
measure to protect the religious and traditional values while those who 
moved downwards voted for the Communist party which preached radical 
socio-economic changes.
Support for the. Jana Sangh in Raipur
In Raipur the support secured by the Jana Sangh among those 
stable, within the middle class occupational groups was high for slightly 
different reasons. Here the middle class stable respondents were mostly 
businessmen. They opted for the Jana Sangh both for religious and secular 
reasons. The Jana Sangh, apart from appealing to the Hindu sentiments 
strongly pleaded for protection of the interests of small businessmen.
But the image of the party was not the same in all social sections. In the 
business community it was recognized as the party with high regard for 
traditional values.
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Among the labourers who supported the Congress or the Communists 
the Jana Sangh earned the reputation of being a party of businessmen. 
Further, in the minds of labourers, businessmen were invariably associated 
with black marketing, high prices, and big profits. This image of the 
Jana Sangh was well described when a rickshaw puller I interviewed said,
'It is a party of businessmen. They were the people who hoisted'Jana Sangh 
flags at every election. They never sold us things at fair prices'.
On the other hand, in the intermediate social groups and lower 
civil servants, the Jana Sangh was also recognized as an agent of change. 
The selfless and disciplined workers and the well-knit organization of the 
Jana Sangh appealed particularly to these sections who saw the party as 
an effective challenger to the Congress, which in their opinion misruled 
the country.
The conclusions can be summarized as follows. In both Bhilai and 
Raipur occupationally stable respondents gave higher than average support 
to the Congress. Here again stable middle class respondents gave less 
than average support and stable working class respondents gave more than 
average support to the Congress. Upwardly mobile respondents gave con­
siderably more than average support to the Jana Sangh and the Congress 
and those who moved down tended to support the Communists. But what was 
the proportion of total variation in the support of different parties 
accounted for by the variables of mobility?
REGRESSION ANALYSIS 
Regression Analysis -- Bhilai
The proportion of total variation in party support accounted for
by the variables of territorial movement and occupational mobility was
the highest in relation to the support for the Communists and the lowest
in relation to the support for the Jana Sangh. Of the three classes of
independent dummy variables based on political complexion of the state
of origin, perception of whether one's own life was getting better or worse7over the past ten years, and occupational mobility, the first class of 
dummy variables emerged as the most effective one. The effects of percep­
tion of one's own life and occupational mobility were nearly significant 
but the proportion of total variation in party support accounted for by 
them was little. The findings of the regression analysis were consistent 
with the observations made earlier from two-way and three-way tables.
TABLE V.9
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for
the Congress (Bhilai)
Number of cases = 569
Constant term = + O.SSl^
Coefficient of determination (R ) = ,042
Variables
'Strong-Communist' state 
'Strong-Jana Sangh' state
Regression F Value
coefficient
- 0.119 3.339
0.103 2.683
TABLE V . 10
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for
the Jana Sangh (Bhilai)
Number of cases = 569
Constant term = + 0.177
Coefficient of determination (R^) = .023
Variables Regression F Value
coefficient
'Strong-Communist' state - 0.103 10.812
0.058 3.039Occupationally upward mobile
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a) Congress
In relation to the support for the Congress the dummy variables of 
'strong-Communist' and 'strong-Jana Sangh' states of origin produced F 
values above the ten per cent significance level. The direction of 
association of the former was negative and of the latter positive. The 
proportion of total variation accounted for by these two dummy variables 
was only 4.2 per cent. Yet the conditional probability of a migrant 
from a ’strong-Jana Sangh' state supporting the Congress was as high as 
.684, while that from a 'strong-Communist' state was as low as .462 
(TABLE V.9). In a separate model the dummy variables of occupational 
stability and upward occupational mobility had only marginal positive 
effects on the support for the Congress. The F values of both these dummy 
variables were not statistically significant. The proportion of total 
variation accounted for by these dummy variables was less than one per 
cent. The same pattern was also observed in relation to the class 
of dummy variables based on perception of one's own life.
b) Jana Sangh
In relation to the support for the Jana Sangh the dummy variables 
of 'strong-Communist' state of origin and upward occupational mobility 
produced F values above the 10 per cent significance level. Of the above 
two dummy variables, the direction of association of the former was 
negative and that of the latter was positive. The proportion of total 
variation accounted for by these two dummy variables was only 2.3 per cent. 
But it is interesting that the conditional probability of a migrant 
from 'strong-Communist' states supporting the Jana Sangh was as low 
as .074, while that of those who moved occupationally upward was .235 and 
of those who migrated from 'strong-Communist' states and also moved 
occupationally upward was .132 (TABLE V.10). Other variables did not 
show any significant effect on the support for the Jana Sangh.
c) Communists
In relation to the party support for the Communists, the dummy 
variable of 'strong-Communist' state of origin emerged as the most 
effective and statistically significant independent variable and the 
proportion of total variation accounted for by it alone was 10.1 per 
cent (TABLE V.ll). One would imagine that the dummy variable of 'strong- 
Jana Sangh' state of origin would show significant negative effect on the 
support for the Communists. But when this dummy variable was included
TABLE V.ll
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for 
the Communists (Bhilai)
Number of cases = 569
Constant term = +0.106
Coefficient of
determination (R ) = .101
Variables Regression coefficient F Value
’Strong Communist’ state 0.266 63.837
TABLE V.12
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support for 
the Communists (Raipur)
Number of cases = 502
Constant term = 0.097
Coefficient of  ^
determination(R ) = .080
Variables Regression coefficient F Value
’ Strong-Communist’- state 
state 0.420 34.946
Life no change 0.937 8.123
Occupationally stable -0.047 2.894
in the regression model it showed only marginal negative effect. The 
conditional probability of a migrant from a 'strong Communist' state of 
origin supporting Communists in Bhilai was as high as .372 while that of 
a migrant from a 'strong Jana Sangh' state was as low as .099.
In other words the variable of state of origin was significantly 
related to the support of all political parties in Bhilai (TABLES V.9 
V.10 and V.ll) while the variable of occupational mobility was significantly 
related only to the support for the Jana Sangh and that too only in Raipur.
Regression Analysis -- Raipur
In relation to support for the Congress only the dummy variable of 
those who said there was no change in their life over the past ten 
years produced an F value above the 10 per cent significance level and 
the proportion of total variation in the support for the Congress accounted 
for by it was less than one per cent.
In relation to the support of the Jana Sangh the dummy variable 
of 'strong-Jana Sangh' state of origin produced an F value above the 
level of 10 per cent significance but the proportion of variation in 
Jana Sangh support accounted for by it was only about one per cent.
In relation to the support for the Communists, the dummy variables 
of 'strong-Communist' state of origin, the dummy variable of those who 
stated that there was no change in their life over the past ten years, 
and the dummy variable of occupational stability all produced an F value 
above the 10 per cent level of significance. Also the proportion of 
total variation accounted for by the above three dummy variables was eight 
per cent (TABLE V.12)
Joint Analysis of Socio-Economic and Mobility Variables
The inclusion of socio-economic and mobility variables in a single
regression model had considerably improved the amount of total variation
accounted for in each party's support in each town. The coefficient
2of determination (R ) varied from 6.7 per cent for the Congress in Bhilai 
to 11.7 per cent for the Communists in Raipur. The results of this 
regression analysis are presented in Tables V.13 to V.18.
In relation to the support for the Congress in Bhilai, and in 
relation to the support for the Communists in Bhilai and Raipur, 'strong 
Communist' state of origin emerged as the most significant predictor 
of party support. In relation to the support for the Jana Sangh in 
Bhilai 'strong Communist' state of origin was significantly negatively 
associated, and in Raipur 'strong Jana Sangh' state of origin was
significantly positively associated.
TABLE V.13
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support 
for the Congress (Bhilai). Independent 
Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility 
Dummy Variables
Number of cases 569
Constant term +0.602
Coefficient of  ^
determination (R ) .067
Variable Regression coefficient F-Value
'Strong Communist' state -0.178 17.997
Non-membership in associations 0.133 10.423
Medium income -0.108 4.794
Businessmen -0.289 3.589
Muslims 0.154 3.964
Labourers 0.093 3.123
TABLE V.14 
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support 
for the Congress (Raipur). Independent 
Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility 
Variables
Number of cases 502
Constant term +0.644
Coefficient of  ^
determination (R ) .068
Variable Regression coefficient F-Value
Youth
No membership in associations
-0.214
0.137
24.769
9.982
TABLE V.15
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support 
for the Jana Sangh (Bhilai). Independent 
Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility 
Variables
Number of cases 569
Constant term +0.141
Coefficient of ^
determination (R ) .088
Variable Regression coefficient
Businessmen 0.503 
Brahmin-Bania 0.111 
’Strong Communist' state -0.092 
Muslims -0.159 
Middle age 0.052
TABLE V .16 
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support 
for the Jana Sangh (Raipur). Independent 
Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility 
Variables
Number of cases 502
Constant term -0.030
Coefficient of ^
determination (R ) .065
Variable Regression coefficient
Brahmin-Bania 0.128 
’Strong Jana Sangh’ state 0.149 
Businessmen 0.093 
Muslims -0.101
F-Value
20.450
9.702
8.723
7.610
3.175
F-Value
13.537
6.173
5.808
3.715
TABLE V. 17
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support 
for the Communists (Bhilai). Independent 
Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility 
Variables
Number of cases 569
Constant term +0.141
Coefficient of ^
determination (R ) .107
Variable Regression coefficient
’Strong Communist' state 0.261 
Member in cultural association 0.081 
Trade union member 0.077
TABLE V.18 
Regression Model:
Dependent Variable: Proportion of Support 
for the Communists (Raipur). Independent 
Variables: Socio-economic and Mobility 
Variables
Number of cases 502
Constant term +0.060
Coefficient of ~
determination (R ) .117
Variable Regression coefficient
'Strong Communist' state 
Highly skilled 
Rural native 
No Change in life 
Middle age
0.397
0.199
0.075
0.084
-0.046
F-Value
61.604
4.200
4.194
F-Value
32.131
15.589
8.010
6.736
3.058
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In such a joint analysis the F statistic of the dummy variables 
based on occupational mobility was found to be less than ten per cent level 
of significance in relation to the support of all parties. Hence the 
dummy variables based on occupational mobility were deleted from these 
regression models. (TABLES V.13 to V.18).
In Bhilai membership in cultural associations and trade unions 
turned out to be significant predictors of support for the Communists 
while non-membership in such associations emerged as the second most 
significant variable in relation to the support for the Congress (TABLES 
V.13 and V.15)
The socio-economic groups from whom the Jana Sangh derived its 
support appeared to be same in both Bhilai and Raipur. Brahmin-Bania 
businessmen extended significant support to the Jana Sangh while Muslims 
turned away from it in both Bhilai and Raipur (TABLES V.15 and V.16).
CONCLUSIONS
The information contained in this chapter is relevant to the 
following hypotheses.
Firstly, it lends weight to the theory that shifts in party support 
in industrial towns were primarily related to issues and problems. The 
ability of a party to help secure workers' interests was assessed before 
supporting a party. The demands made on political parties varied from one 
social section to another.
Secondly, despite the defections that occurred among those 
respondents whose parents supported the Congress, a majority of the 
respondents continued to support and to vote for the parties that were 
supported by their parents.
Thirdly, it is proved that a migrant from a 'strong Communist' 
state was more likely to support Communists than a migrant from other 
states, and a migrant from a 'strong Jana Sangh' state was more likely 
to support Jana Sangh than a migrant from a 'strong Communist' state.
Fourthly, Congress and the Jana Sangh derived relatively higher 
support from occupationally stable and upwardly mobile respondents than 
from others. Our analysis also suggested that both in Bhilai and Raipur the 
Communists derived relatively higher support from respondents who moved 
down than from respondents who were occupationally stable or those who were 
upwardly mobile.
Fifthly, a comparison of the findings in Bhilai in the present and 
previous chapters reveals that the effect of the dummy variables based 
on socio-economic attributes and the dummy variables based on respondents' 
state of origin, and occupational mobility, was not similar on all
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political parties.
The support for the Communists in Bhilai accounted for by the 
dummy variables based on territorial movement was much higher (10.1%) 
than the variation in Communist support accounted for (1.6%) by the 
dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes and involvement with 
voluntary associations. When the socio-economic and mobility variables 
were included in a single regression model, 'strong Communist' state of 
origin emerged as the most significant variable in accounting for the 
variation in Communist support.
The proportion of total variation in the support for the Jana 
Sangh in Bhilai accounted for by the dummy variables based on socio­
economic attributes was far higher (8.1%) than the proportion of the 
total variation accounted for by the dummy variables based on territorial 
movement and occupational mobility (2.3%). When socio-economic and 
mobility variables were included in a single regression model, the 
occupational and social variables of businessmen, and Brahmin-Banias in 
Bhilai and Brahmin-Banias in Raipur emerged as the most significant 
variables in accounting for the variation in Jana Sangh Support.
On the other hand, in relation to the Congress in Bhilai, the 
proportion of total variation accounted for by the dummy variables 
based on socio-economic attributes and the dummy variables based on 
respondents' state of origin, was more or less the same (about 4%).
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V
MOBILITY AND PARTY SUPPORT
1. For articles which highlighted these points see the special 
number on the Fourth General Elections in India, Political 
Science Review 6, 1967-1968; Election Outcome, Seminar 94,
1967; Power Patterns, Seminar 95, 1967.
2. For an excellent summary of the studies of political conse­
quences of social mobility done in America and Europe, see S.M. 
Lipset and Reinhard Bendix, Social Mobility in Industrial Society. 
Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press 1964.
See especially the second chapter.
3. Though this question was asked in general terms about the 
political loyalty of the family, the respondents invariably 
took it to mean the political loyalty of their fathers. So 
'parental political loyalty’ and 'father's political loyalty' 
were used in the same sense in this chapter.
4. The Students' Federation was a pro-Communist students' organiza­
tion which was very active in the early fifties; its influence 
is only nominal now. For an account of the student movement in 
India see Myron Weiner, The Politics of Scarcity. Bombay: Asia
Publishing House 1963. See especially his seventh chapter, on
s tudents.
5. As per this classification, I included the states of Kerala,
Andhra Pradesh, and West Bengal in the category of 'strong- 
Communist' states; the states of MP, UP, Maharastra,
Rajastan, Bihar and the union territory of Delhi in the category 
of 'strong Jana Sangh' states, and all other states in the cate­
gory of 'other states'. The inclusion of the state of Punjab
in one of these groups posed a problem. The state of Punjab was 
divided into Punjab and Haryana only in 1966. The respondents 
who were born in these areas did not mention their state of origin 
clearly. The Jana Sangh is very strong in the state of Haryana 
and the Akalidal is very strong in the new Punjab state. So I 
included the states of both Punjab and Haryana in the category 
of other states. But it appears from the basic data that large 
numbers of the respondents from both these states supported the 
Jana Sangh. We can only infer on this basis that most of the 
migrants from the areas of old Punjab state came from urban areas 
in which the Jana Sangh and the Arya Samaj were strong.
6. These allegations were heard only from respondents engaged in 
high occupational grades. Semi-skilled and manual labourers did 
not mention any difficulties of this kind.
7. The dummy variables based on the political complexion of the state 
of origin were 'strong-Communists', 'strong-Jana Sangh', and 'other 
states'. The dummy variables based on the perception of one's 
own life whether it was getting better or worse over the past
ten years were, 'life better', 'life no change', and 'life now 
worse'. The dummy variables based on occupational mobility were 
'occupationally moved upward', 'occupationally stable' and 
'occupationally moved downward'. In the regression models one
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dummy variable from each class was excluded from the model. In 
relation to each party I first ascertained the effect of all 
the variables but later excluded the dummy variables whose F 
value was below the 10 per cent level of significance.
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VI
STATE CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS AND TRADE UNIONS
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN THE WEST
A voluntary association may be defined as a formally organized 
group of people with a certain interest in common, who agree to meet and 
to act together in order to try to satisfy that interest or achieve that 
purpose. As social structures, voluntary associations have distinct 
features such as formal leadership, specific aims and objectives, rules 
and electoral procedures for operating, place and time of meeting (Rose 
1968:390, 391). Some voluntary associations such as recreational and 
sports associations, the social and hobby clubs and the professional 
societies act only to express or satisfy the interests of their members. 
Hence they are called expressive groups. Other associations are directed 
outward; they wish to achieve some condition or change in some segment of 
the society and are called ’social influence' or 'instrumental' groups 
(Jacoby and Babchuk 1963).
Participation
Recent investigations in Europe and north America reveal that 
less than half of urban males do not participate in any voluntary asso­
ciation^ " whatever. Associational membership is considerably lower in the 
rural counties and in rural farm segments of metropolitan counties. 
Participation in voluntary associations varies as between central city, 
suburb, and fringe areas. In general, middle and upper status males have 
higher participation rates and they join a wider range of associations 
than lower status males. Associational membership is also closely related 
to stability of residence. Younger migrants have higher participation 
rates than older migrants. Migrants from rural areas have considerably 
lower participation rates than migrants from urban areas. Participation 
rates are closely related to educational, occupational, religious and 
racial differences and social attitudes. For example, trade union member­
ship is likely to be higher among low-income groups than among the high- 
income groups.
Leaders
Investigations in Europe and north America also reveal that 
leaders of voluntary associations tend to be better educated than the
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general population. They 
tions, feel themselves to 
and participate in larger 
tion of the population is 
portion join associations
usually hold professional and managerial posi- 
be members of the upper or upper-middle class, 
numbers of associations. Only a small propor- 
very active in associations though a large pro- 
(Rose 1962).
Functions
Voluntary associations perform diverse functions. Some like
manufacturers' and traders' associations and farmers' organizations can
act as pressure groups and lobbies and distribute power to their members.
Others, like labour unions and professional associations may keep their
members informed on matters that affect their aims and interests and take
collective action if necessary. While most voluntary associations act as
agents of social change some associations may block social change. In a
mass society where the individual feels anonymous, membership in voluntary
associations gives him a feeling of identification with some smaller group
that he can comprehend and influence. Again, membership in some exclusive
2voluntary associations such as 'Rotary' and 'Kiwanis' is a status symbol.
In the light of the above discussion, in a new town like Bhilai 
the significance of voluntary associations as agents of integration and 
sources of new identifications can hardly be overstressed. Whether 
organized on the basis of state, language, occupation, profession, or even 
religion, all these are institutions to which the migrants can transfer 
their loyalties in their new place of residence.
VOLUNTARY ASSOCIATIONS IN INDIA 
Existing Literature
It would be dangerous to apply the findings of investigations 
in Europe and north America uncritically to India. The socio-economic 
surveys sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee and others already 
referred to tell little about the frequency of and participation in volun­
tary associations. Existing studies are also silent about the role of 
voluntary associations in moulding urban community life, particularly in 
resocializing the life of migrants to urban areas.
A survey conducted by N.V. Sovani in the city of Kolhapur 
(Maharastra) revealed only 63 voluntary associations including ten western
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style clubs in a population of about a hundred thousand and their member­
ship covered less than four per cent of the population (Sovani 1951:38,39).
Sovani also observed that far fewer associations existed in Bangalore, the
3capital city of Mysore state than in Kolhapur. On the other hand a 
survey conducted by Irawati Karve and Ranadive in Phaltan (a town of about 
20,000 population in the state of Maharastra) did not mention any signi­
ficant voluntary association but reported that an unusually high percentage
of respondents (25%) were members of political parties and 20 per cent were
4members of trade unions (Karve and Ranadive 1965:95,96). Some writers 
suggest that most of the artisan castes and some religious sects are inclined 
to organize themselves into caste and religious councils with a well 
defined sphere of action and membership (Gadgil 1952). This is more notice­
able in urban than in rural areas. Irawati Karve and Ranadive in their 
study of Phaltan (Karve and Ranadive 1965:95) and N.V. Sovani in his studies 
on Kolhapur and Poona (Sovani 1952:212-243) wrote at length about the 
activity of these urban caste associations. A study by V.S. D'souza on 
Chandigarh, the newly built capital city of Punjab state, mentioned 151 
voluntary associations (D'souza 1968:384-387). It was stated that about 
11 per cent of the heads of households were members of one voluntary asso­
ciation- and slightly more than 2 per cent were members of two or more 
voluntary associations. Of those who were members of voluntary associations, 
about 26 per cent were 9aid to be active participants as office bearers. 
Membership in voluntary associations was highest in the highest occupational 
group. There was, however, no significant association between the prestige 
level of the occupational grade and the percentage of office bearers 
among members of voluntary associations (D'souza 1968*199).
State Cultural Associations
A. Bopegamage in his study of urban sociology in Delhi did not 
directly investigate voluntary associations but mentioned more than 20 
clubs and associations under the heading of 'semi-public recreational 
agencies'. Of these, ten were western style cosmopolitan clubs such as 
'Rotary' and 'Lions'. He did not specify the membership of these asso­
ciations but indicated that most of the western style clubs were popular 
among upper and upper-middle income groups. Under the heading of 'community 
clubs' he mentioned state cultural associations such as 'Maharastra Club', 
'Kerala Club', 'Bengali Club', 'South Indian Club' and 'Anglo-Indian Club'. 
These associations cut across sub-regional, religious, caste and income 
divisions. According to him the Kerala Club was one of the biggest community
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Today In Delhi
S ri R ad h a  K r ish n a  K a ly a n a  M aho-
th s a v a m .—T iru p u g a z h  B h a ja n  12>8, 
W E A , K a ro lb a g h ,  7-13 P-m.
D elhi U D iversity  V e d a n ta  S a m ltl.— 
A n n u a l d a y  c e le b ra tio n s . N ew  C o n ­
v o c a tio n  h a l l ,  ♦*-30 p.m .
In d ia n  In s t l tn te  o f  M ass C o m m u n i­
c a t i o n - L e c t u r e  on ‘C re a tiv e  T r a n s ­
la t io n ” , S e m in a r  H a ll,  D-13, S o u th  
E x te n s io n - I I ,  12 noon.
A k h ll B h a ra t iy a  S h a re e r lk  S h lk sh a  
P a r l s h a d D r  S h y a m  S u n d e r  Jo sh i
to  sp e a k  on “ B a ld n ess  and  o th e r  h a i r  
d ise a se s ; its  c au ses  a n d  c u re ” , L a j-  
p a t  B h a v a n . L a jp a t N ag a r, 6-30 p.m .
In d ia n  I n s t i tu te  o f  P e rso n n e l 
M an ag em en t.—D r  A b ad  A h m ed  to  
d iscu ss  “O rg a n iz a tio n a l D ev e lo p ­
m e n t“ , B u rm a h  S he ll a u d i to r iu m , 
C o n n a u g h t P la c e , 5 p .m .
In d ia  In te rn a t io n a l  C e n tre .—M r 
T. P  S in g h  to  o p en  U n io n  C a ta lo g u e  
o f  so c ia l sc ien ces  a n d  h u m a n itie s . 
Dr C. D. D e sh m u k h  to  p re s id e . 40. 
L odi E s ta te , 6-30 p.m .
E x h ib itio n s .—P a in t in g s  b v  E ric  
B ow en , K u n ik a  C h em o u ld  A rt 
C en tre , J a n a p a th ,  10 a.m . to  6 p .m .: 
P r in ts  by  G ro u p  8, D elh i S ilp i 
C h a k ra , F la t  No. 19, S h a n k a r  M a r­
k e t, 4 p .m . to  8 p .m .; Im p a c t  '71 by 
In d ia n  C o n te m p o ra ry  a r t is ts ,  G a l­
lery- K o n a ra k ,  E-29, S o u th  E x ten s io n  
M a rk e t- I I ,  10-30 a.m . to  7-30 p .m .; 
S econd  T r ie n n a le  o f C o n te m p o ra ry  
W orld  A rt,  L a lit  K a la  G a lle r ie s . S r i-  
d h a ra n i  G a lle r ie s  an d  N a tio n a l G a l­
le ry  o f M odern  A rt,  11 a .m . to  1 p .m . 
an d  2 to  8 p .m
March 2, 1971
Today In Delhi
S o u th  In d ia  C lu b .—K u c h ip u d i 
d anoes by  K u m a ri S o b h a  N a id u  and  
S h r l  K a m a  D ev, M a n d ir  M arg , 6-30
K in g d o m  H all o f  J e h o v a h 's  W it­
nesses.—C o n g re g a tio n  m ee tin g , s u b ­
je c t :  “T h e  w a y ” ,  A -l/6 3 , S a fd a r ju n g  
E n c lav e , 7 p .m .
S h rl B a d h a k r is h n a  K a ly a n a  M aho- 
tb sa v a m .—M usic c o n c e rt  by  S h ri-  
m a ti  V a sa n th a  S u n d a ra m  an d  p a r ty ,  
12/8. W .E .A ., K a ro lb a g h , 7-15 p.m .
D elh i M a n ag em en t A ssoc ia tion  —
B rig  S. S. A pt« to  in i t ia te  a d is c u s ­
sion  on "P E R T  . YMCA T o u ris t  H os- 
te l .  J a i  S ingh  R o3d, 3-15 p.m . M r 
B. P . T o sh n iw a l to  p resid e
A khll R h a ra tl> a  » h i r e r r lk  sh lk s h a  
P a r ls h a d .—D r S h y am  S u n d e r  Jo sh i 
to  sp eak  on "W eak n ess  o f M em ory : 
its  cau ses  and  c u re " ,  L a jp a t  B h a v a n , 
L a jp a tn a g a r ,  6-30 p.m .
In d ia  In te rn a t io n a l  C e n t r e —P ro ­
fesso r V. R a m a lin g a sw a m i to  sp e a k  
on ‘P o p u la tio n  an d  N u tr i t io n " ,  40, 
L od i E s ta te , 6-30 p .m . D r K . N. R ao
Y o u th  H ostel*  A sso c ia tio n  o f  
In d ia .—M o n th ly  g e t- to g e th e r  and  
ta lk  on  N a tio n a l H im a la y a n  t re k k in g  
p ro g ra m m e  b y  B rig  G ian  S in g h , 23, 
T h e a tre  C o m m u n ic a tio n s  B u ild in g , 
C o n n a u g h t P la c e . 6 p .m .
In d ia n  I n s t i tu t io n  o f  In d u s tr ia l  
E n g in e e r in g  a n d  In d ia n  I n s t i tu te  o f  
P u b lic  A d m in is tra tio n .—D r F ra n k  E. 
C o tto n  to  sp e a k  on  ' R o le  o f  In d u s ­
t r ia l  E n g in e e r in g  In a  d ev e lo p in g  
E co n o m y ” , C o n fe ren ce  h a l l ,  In d ia n  
In s t i tu te  o f P u b l ic  A d m in is tra tio n ,
Exhlbltlons^-All I n d ia  H a n d ic ra f ts  
B o a rd -  U .P . H a n d ic ra f ts ,  A ahoka  
H o te l A n n ex e , C h a n a k y a p u r i ,  2-30 
p .m . to  7-30 P -m .; re c e n t p r in t«  by 
G ro u p  8. D elh i S ilp i C h a k ra ,  F la t  
19, S h a n k a r  M a rk e t, 4 p .m . to  8 p .m .; 
K u n ik a -C h e m o u ld  A r t C e n tre :  p a in t ­
in g s  o f E ric  B ow en , C C IE , J a n p a th  
10 a .m . to  6 p .m .; L a l i t  K a la  A ka 
d e m t : S econd  T r ie n n a le  o f c o n tem  
p o ra ry  w o rld  a r t ,  L a lit  K a la  gal 
le r ie s , S h r id h a ra n i  G a lle r ie s  a n d  N a ­
t io n a l G a lle ry  o f M o d e rn  A rt,  11 
u a .  ! •  l p .m . an d  3 p t o  •  p .m .
Today In Delhi
E n tom ology  S oc ie ty  o f In d ia .— 
tissu e  c u l tu r e ” , E n tom ology  D iv i- 
tis su e  c u l tu r e ” . E n to m o lo g y  D iv i­
s ion . I.A .R .I.. P u sa . 4 p.m .
c au ses  a n d  c u re  . 
L a jp a tn a g a r .  6-30 p.
S ri R a d h e -K rtsh n a  K a ly a n a  
M ah o th sav am .—A sh ta n a d i B h a ja n  by 
S ri  S an aeev a  B h a g a v a th a r .  12/8, 
W .E.A .. K a ro l B ag h . 7-15 D .m .
...In d ia n  In s t i tu te  o f  M ass C o m ­
m u n ic a tio n .—M r A. V H ay d av  to  
sDeak on " G o v e rn m e n t in fo rm a tio n  
se rv ice s  in the  U .K ." . S e m in a r  H all. 
D-13. S o u th  E x ten s io n  P a r t  II . noon.
A ll In d ia  in s t i tu te  o f  M edical
S c ien ces.—Di M. B. L ip se tt to  sp eak  
on "H o rm o n e  e v e n ts  in n o rm a l and  
a b n o rm a l m e n s tru a l cy c le s” , le c tu re  
th e a tr e  4 p m
J a w a h a r la l  N eh ru  U n iv e rs ity .—
P ro fe sso r A n d re  J e a n  BourcH to 
so eak  on "T h e  F re n c h  c iv iliz a tio n  
fa c in g  th e  m o d e rn  w o rld " . School 
Dremises. 35. F ero zesh ah  R oad . 4-30
School o f C o rre sp o n d en ce  C ourses 
a n d  C o n tin u in g  E d u c a tio n .—M r R. N. 
T e w a ri to  sp eak  on J a p a n .  D elhi 
School of E cono 6-30 p.m .
S ociety  o f s  . . . . . n s  o f  G od .—D is­
co u rse  on “ L ik e ly  re s u l t  o f e le c tio n s” 
b y  D r D in sh ah  K. M eh ta , 10. Y ash - 
w a n t P la c e . S a ty a  M arg , C h a n a k y a ­
p u r i .  6-30 p.m .
E x h ib itio n s .—R ecen t p r in ts  by 
G ro u p  8, D elh i S ilp i C h a k ra ,  19. 
S h a n k a r  M a rk e t, 4 p .m . to  8 p .m .; 
A ll In d ia  H a n d ic r a f t  B o a rd : U. P . 
H a n d ic ra f ts , A sh o k a  H o te l a n n e x e , 
C h a n a k y a p u r i,  2-30 p .m . to  7-30 p .m .; 
Second  tr ie n n a le  o f  c o n te m p o ra ry  
w o rld  a r t ,  L a lit  K a la  G a lle r ie s , S h r i­
d h a ra n i  g a lle r ie s  a n d  N a tio n a l G a l­
le ry  o f  M o d em  A r t,  I I  a.m . to  1 p .m . 
and  2 p .m . to  8 p .m .;  w o rk s  by  
In d ia n  c o n te m p o ra ry  a r tis t* , G a lle ry  
K o n a ra k , E-20, S o u th  E x te n s io n  P a r t  
I I  m a rk e t .  10-30 a.m . to  T-88 p.m .
March 4, 1971
Today In Delhi
In d ia  I n te rn a t io n a l  C en tre .—F ilm  
ev en in g , A m e ric a n  m u s ic  f ro m  fo lk  
to ja zz  an d  pop , 40, L odi F .stat* . 6 .30  
p.m-
C am era  S o c ie ty  o f  In d ia .—C olour 
s lid e  show  by M r G u rc h a ra n  ^ in g h , 
22-A, A saf A li R o ad , 6 p.m-
R o ta rv  C lu b  o f D elh i.—M r P a tr ic k  
S h aw , H ig h  C o m m iss io n e r fo r  
A u s tra lia , to  a p e a k , H o te l Im p e r ia l ,  
7 p .m .
A ll- In d ia  In s t i tu te  o f  M ed ica l
S c ie n c e s— In d o -A m e rlc a n  o b s te tr ic s  
and  gy n aeco lo g y  se m in a r , '* c tu r*  
th e a tre  1, 2 p .m .
N u tr it io n  8 o c le ty  o f In d ia .—-Dr 
N. S. S c r im sh a w  to  sp e a k  o n  “ N u tr i ­
t io n a l goaLs in  a g r ic u l tu r e ” , I.A.K.I- 
a u d ito r iu m  (P u sa  In s t i tu te ) ,  ’ l-SO
J a w a h a r la l  N eh ru  U n iv e rs ity .— 
P ro fe sso r A n d re  J e a n  B o u rd e  to 
sp eak  on "T h e  F re n c h  u n iv e rs it ie s  
in  18M” , 35, F e ro zesh * h  R o ad . 4-30
A k h ll B h a ra t iy a  8 h a re e r lk  S lk sh a  
P a r l s h a d —D r S h y a m  S u n d e r  Jo sh i 
to  sp e a k  on  " E a sy w a y s  to  m a in ta in
K o n a ra k :  “ Im p a c t  1 8 7 1 , E -28, S o u th  
E x te n s io n  M a rk e t P a r t  2, 10 a.m - to  
7-30 p .m .; p r in ts  b y  G ro u p  8, D elh i 
S ilp i  C h a k ra ,  19, S h a n k a r  M arlcM , 
4 to  8 p .m .; K u n ik a -C h e m o u ld  A it  
C entra-. P a in tin g *  o f  E r ic  B ow ea* 
I d C T l ,  Jan p a th , 18 to  0 p m
Today In Delhi Today In Delhi
U n ited  L odge  o f T h eo so p h ls ts .
L e c tu re  o n  “ M a s te rs  o f W isdo i 
E-16, N D SE-1 Off R in g  R o a d , 7 p.
B h a ra tiy a  K a la  K e n d ra  —H oli fe s ­
t iv a l.  L y tto n  R oad . 6-30 p .m
W om en’s  W orld  D ay o f  P ra y e r—  
S e rv ice , F re e  C h u rc h . P a r l ia m e n t  
S tre e t,  4 p .m .
..S r i R a d h a  K r is h n a  K a ly a n a
M a h o th sa v a m .—T iru p u g a z h  B h a ja n
by  S r i  A. S. R a g h a v a n . 12/8. W E A . 
K a ro l B ag h , 7-15 p .m .
D elh i B ib le  F e llo w sh ip .-
S h o rro sh  to  s p e a k ,  YWC. 
R oad , 6 p.m .
!A, A sho
lio n  a n d  F ilm
u d ito r iu m ,  J a l
S ld d h a  Y oga D h am .—D ev o tio n a l 
so n g s a n d  d isc o u rse , " M u k ta  N iw a s ” , 
M - l l ,  G re e n  P a r k  E x te n s io n , 5 p .m . 
to  7 p .m .
C h r is tia n  C o n v en tio n  a n d  film  '
show .—YM CA, a u d i to r iu m . J a i  S in g h  S ree  V a lsh n a v a  S ld d h a n ta  S a b h a .—
Road*. 6 p m .  S ri  K u la s e k h a ra  A lw a r " T i ru n a k -
----------------  sh a tr a m "  c e le b ra tio n s ,  16/25, W .E .A .,
*• irol B a g h , 4. . p . E. N. m e e tin g — D r P. M achw e 
to  sp e a k  on “ In d ia n  L i te r a tu re  in th e  
L ast D eca d e " , C o m m itte e  o f th e  
Tndian C o u n c il o f W orld  A ffa irs , 
S a p ru  H ouse. 6 p .m .
March 6, 1971
Today In Delhi
M a ra th a  M itra  M an d a l.—M a ra th i  
d ra m a  " K o tw a la c h e  K u la n g a d e ” , 
M a h a ra s h tra  R a n g a y a n , 6-30 p .m .
L a d le s  C lub , A ll- In d ia  In s t i tu te  o f  
M ed ica l Sc iences.—F o o d  m e la  a n d  
fa n c y  d re ss . 5 p.m .
S a n s k r it  A sso c ia tio n , R am Jas  C o l­
lege .—S y m p o siu m  on  In d ia n  L og ic , 
C ollege H a ll. 3-45 p .m .
C h ris tia n  C o n v en tio n  a n d  film
show .—Y.M .C.A. a u d i to r iu m , J 'a i 
S in g h  R o ad , 6 p.m .
B h a ra t iy a  V ld y a  B hava
co u rse  on  R a m a y a n a  by  P a n d i t  
K ä p in d ra j i ,  K a s tu rb a  G a n d h i M a rg ,
n .— Dis»- 
N ew  D elh i H a rl  S a b h a .—R e lig io u s  
d isco u rse  on "S ri K r ish n a  C h a r i ta -  
m r i ta ” by S ri  L a k sh m i N a ra y a n  D as 
B ab a , N ew  D elh i K ali B a r i ,  7 p .m .
S o c ie ty  of S e rv a n ts  o f  G o d .—D is­
cou rse  on  “T ru th  in  o th e r  m a n i f e s t ­
atio n  o f y o u th "  by D r D in sh a h  K. 
M eh ta , 10, Y ash w a n t P la c e ,  S a ty a  
M arg , C h a n a k y a p u r i ,  6-30 p .m .
S ree  S h a n m u k h a n a n d a  S a n g e e th a  
S a b h a .—V ocal re c i ta l  b y  K. N a ra -  i 
y a n a sw a m y  an d  p a r ty ,  S a r d a r  P a te l  
V id y a la y a  a u d i to r iu m , L o d i E s ta te ,  t 
4-25 P-m.
S ri R ad h a  K rish n a  K a ly a n a  
M a h o tsa v a m .—R a d h a  K r is h n a  K a l-  
y a n a m , 8-30 a.m . to  12-30 p .m .,
“ D o lo tsa v a m " , 8 p .m ., 12>8, W .E .A ., 
K a ro l B agh.
Bh.
B h
S ri S a th y
l a ja n s  5 p.m . to 6 p .m . D r S. 
am  a n d  D r V. K. G o k a k
B h a v a n .—S cr
o f  film * o f G e rm a n  T V  s ta tio n s , 
K a s tu rb a  G«andhi M a rg , 6-30 p.m .
M ax  M u e lle r  
s i
p .m . I
nl
R a d h a so a m t S a tsa n g  (B eaa) D elh i. I
—D isco u rse  by M a h a ra j C h a ra n  J 
S in g h , N ew  P u n  R o a d , K a ro l B ag h , 
5 p .m .
S h a s tr ty a  S a n g e e t S a m a j.—C o n c e rt 
o f  H in d u s ta n i and  C a rn a t ic  m u s ic  
a n d  K a th a k  D ance , I n d ia  I n te r ­
n a tio n a l C e n tre , 6-30 p.m .
S hree  S h a n m u k h a n a n d a  S a n g e e th a  
S a b h a .—F lu te  re c i ta l  by  N. R a m a n i 
an d  p a r ty ,  S a rd a r  P a te l  V id y a la y a  
a u d i to r iu m , L od i E s ta te ,  6-15 p .m .
a g a w a n th o] 
to sp e a k  a b o u t B h a g a w a n  S ri  S a t  
Sai B a b a  16, G o lf L in k s.
S e rv a n t«  o f  th e  P e o p le  S o c ie ty .—
S w am i N ity a  C h a ita n y a  Y-ati to  
sp eak  on  " S p i r i tu a l  C o n sc io u sn e ss  in  i 
W este rn  C o u n tr ie s ” , L a jp a t  B h a v a n ,  | 
L a jp a tn a g a r ,  6-30 p.m .
M ax M u e lle r B h a v a n .—P rafu lL a
M o h an ti to  p re se n t “T h e  D a n c in g  
H a n d s"  an e x h ib i t io n  of p a in tin g s  
s im u lta n e o u s ly  w ith  th e  d a n c e  p e r ­
fo rm a n c e . 3, K a s tu rb a  G a n d h i M a rg , 
6-30 P-m.
Y oga P ra s a d  S a m lt l .—M r R. S. 
S u r i  to  s D e a k  on  “ Y oga te c h n iq u e s  
to  a v o id  h e a r t  s t r a in  a n d  a t t a c k ” , . . .  .  m d ir_Y oga A sh ra m  M a n d ir  L an e  
M arg , 4
k n o w  w h a t  w e w o rs h ip " ,  
S a fd a r ja n g  E n c lav e , 5-30 p.m .
N ew  D elh i H a rl S a b h a .—R elig io u s
S F f ;  S m  sS H ?  sSrSS
.. , ___  ‘Doli
EA , K a ro l B ag h , 6 p .m .
M a ltre y a  T h e o so p h lc a l C e n tre .— 
L e c tu re  o r  " th e  K ey s  to  th e  w h o le ­
n ess  o f th e  B e in g " , B h a ra t iy a  V id y a  
B h a w a n , K a s tu rb a i  G a n d h i M arg , 
5-45 p.m .
C o m m erce , D e lh i 
C. L . S e n g u p ta  to  
A sp e c ts  o f M aixage-
M. E. A. H ig h e r  S ec o n d a ry  8 c h o o l, 
M a n d ir  M arg .—A n n u a l p r iz e  d is ­
t r ib u t io n  a n d  P a r e n t  T e a c h e r  A sso ­
c ia tio n  D ay . S o u th  I n d ia  C lu b  a u d i t ­
o r iu m , 5-45 p .m . E x h ib i t io n  o f 
sc ien ce  a n d  a r ts  ite m s , no o n  to  4
Y ogoda  S a ts a n g a  S o c ie ty  o f In d ia .— 
A n n u a l c o m m e m o ra tio n  of M a h a -  
s a m a d h i day§  o f G u ru d e v ,  S r i  
P a ra m h a n s a  Y o g a n a n d a  a n d  P a r a m -  
g u ru  S w a m i Y u k te s h w a r  G ir l ,  
M ^ e m  S ch o o l, B a r a k h a m b a  R o a d , 
6-30 p .m .
E x h ib i t io n s .—" Im p a c t  1971” , G a l ­
le ry  K o n a ra k ,  E-29, S o u th  E x te n s io n  
M a rk e t, P a r t  I I ,  10 a.m . to  7-30 p .m .; 
M e ta l e n a m e l jp a in t in g s  by  B is h a m -  
b e r  K h a n n a  G a lle ry  C h a n a k y a ,  114, 
Y a sh w a n t P la c e ,  C h a n a k y a p u r i ,  10-30 
a .m . to  7-30 p .m .; S eco n d  T r ie n n a le  
o f C o n te m p o ra ry  W o rld  A r t.  L a lit  
K a la  G a lle r ie s ,  S h r id h a ra n i  G a lle r ie s  
and  N a t io n a l  G a lle ry  o f M o d e rn  A rt.  
I !  a .m . to  1 p .m . and  2 p .m . to  8 
p .m . B a l B h a r^ t i  A ir  F o rc e  S ch o o l, 
L odi P o a d :  16th a n n u a l  a r t  e x h ib i ­
t io n ,  o p e n in g  11 a .m .
E x h ib itio n s .—D e m o n s tra tio n  of
f a b r ic  p a in t in g  b y  M rs S h a sh i 
V e rm a , M -2, G re a te r  K a ila s h ,  4 p.r~ 
S eco n d  T rie n n a
,
6 p.
a ry  w o rm  A r t,  i^an 
es, S h r id h a ra n i  G a lle r ie s  
N a tio n a l G a lle ry  o f M odern  A rt,  i 
a .m . to  1 p .m . an d  2 p .m . to  8 p .m .
to  .m .; le  o f C o n ­
te m p o r W ld L li t  K a la  
G a lle r ie a n d
Source: The Statesman, 1 March to 7 March 1971.
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clubs in the city. It had a large number of active members. Its main 
object was to promote social intercourse among its members and to under­
take all such activities as might be necessary for the promotion of Kerala 
culture and the interests of the Kerala community. It provided facilities 
for different types of indoor and outdoor games and organized variety 
entertainments on special occasions. Its members belonged to high and 
low income groups and the membership fee was fixed by reference to each 
member's monthly income (Bopegamage 1957:153). However, there is evidence 
to indicate that active voluntary associations are far more numerous in 
Delhi than is suggested by Bopegamage. An analysis of the 'days' engage­
ments' published over a period of one week in The Statesman from New 
Delhi indicated that more than 50 different voluntary associations arranged 
cultural programmes, discussions or discourses open to the public. In 
addition, several exhibitions were arranged by other associations (CHART 
VI.1).J
Political Role of State Associations
But what is the precise role played by the regional associations 
in the social and political fields? Literature on Indian urban communities 
does not throw much light on this aspect. A study carried out by Meillassoux 
in an African urban community made some generalizations which seem to be 
equally applicable to the Indian situation (Meillassoux 1968). After 
investigating 30 regional associations in the town of Bamako in Mali, 
constituted by migrants from a particular town, circle or canton, Meillassoux 
concluded that regional associations cut across tribal and occupational 
boundaries. Most of the migrants belonged to one association or another.
The aims and objectives of these associations were simple, the most 
important being regional solidarity to face the difficulties of the new 
urban environment, financial help and mutual assistance on occasions of 
baptism, circumcision, marriage, illness, death, and sometimes merely mis­
fortune, and occasional entertainment and cultural programmes. Of the 30 
regional associations only two had political and educational objectives.
Of a total of 245 officials of these 30 regional associations, as many as 
225 were from middle class occupations and only 20 were described as trad­
itional or skilled workers (Meillassoux 1968:61-63). As a majority of 
the migrants in Bhilai were interstate migrants and about two-thirds of 
all the respondents moved across their language and cultural boundaries, 
we could expect a high degree of participation in state cultural associ­
ations .
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Trade Unions
The birth of the organized trade union movement in India can be 
traced to the 1920s. Since then the movement has expanded enormously.
The total number of registered unions increased from 29 in 1927-28 to 
13,023 in 1965 (Shamlal 1969:120). During the same period the total member­
ship returned by the registered unions increased from 0.1 to about 4.5 
millions. One scholar estimated that from 1952 to 1961 the labour force 
that could be potentially unionized increased by 4.7 millions while the 
trade union membership increased only by 2.2 millions (Johri 1967:32).
The growth, however, was not even as between different sectors, geographical 
regions, trade union federations, or unions of different size.
The degree of unionization (proportion of union members to 
total eligible employees) was high in industries such as leather products 
(967o), mining and quarrying (52%), basic metals and textiles (497o) , while 
it was low in such industries as gins and presses (2%) and was negligible 
in the primary sector (quoted in Johri 1967: 42 ,43).
Because the trade union movement was limited to large scale 
mining and manufacturing industry there was a close association between 
the degree of industrialization and the degree of unionization of the 
labour force in a particular state. For example in 1968 the states of 
West Bengal, Kerala, Maharastra, Madras, and Uttar Pradesh contained about 
half of the registeres trade unions and more than half of the trade union 
members in the country. On the other hand, the number of trade unions was 
low in the states of Rajasthan, Assam, and Orissa where industrialization 
has barely begun (Shamlal 1969:120).
Trade unions in India are organized under four officially 
recognized national federations of different ideological persuasions.
These are the Indian National Trade Union Congress (INTUC: pro-Congress),
the All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC: pro-Communist), the Hind
Mazdoor Sabha (HMS: pro-Socialist), and the United Trade Union Congress
(UTUC: pro-Revolutionary Socialist Party). Of these trade union feder­
ations, the first was formed in 1920 and the others in 1947-48. But despite 
the preferential treatment given by the government to the INTUC in the 
matters of recognition and consultation, it has grown more slowly than 
other federations. For example, from 1952 to 1968 the total membership of 
the INTUC increased by 111 per cent, that of the HMS increased by 100 per 
cent and that of the UTUC increased by 54 per cent. During the same period 
the total membership of the AITUC increased by 650 per cent. During the
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same period the proportion of INTUC membership in the total union member­
ship in the country considerably declined while that of the AITUC nearly 
tripled and those of the HMS and UTUC both steeply declined. That is 
to say, the proportion of pro-Communist trade union membership greatly 
increased at the expense of the Congress and non-Communist leftist unions.^
Many trade unions in India are very small. Some scholars rightly 
argue that such a fragmentation of unions, caused by inter-union rivalry 
in the same bargaining territory and the creation of independent plant 
unions, has weakened the trade union movement in the country (Johri 1967:
60, 61).
As unionization is very high in the heavy industrial sector and 
public sector undertakings one can infer that unionization is higher in 
manufacturing towns than in trade and commercial towns, Surveys in new 
industrial towns clearly indicate that a considerable proportion of factory 
labourers are members of registered unions (Mohsin 1964).
All trade unions in India are organized primarily on a class 
basis to fight for workers' interests but they differ among themselves 
over the means by which to carry out the fight. Exploitation of sectional 
loyalties is negligible in organizing the unions. But workers' immediate 
interests are subordinated to ultimate trade union goals, and in their turn 
the ultimate unions goals are subordinated to the objectives of different 
political parties (Subramanian 1967:195-196). Consequently, unions are 
forced to remain largely non-sectional.
Trade union leadership in India has been dominated throughout by 
middle class political leaders outside the working class, a finding by 
two restricted surveys on the socio-economic and political background of
g
trade union leadership. A majority of the leaders were outsiders (7270) 
or ex-employees (167>) . By occupation they were lawyers, teachers, priests 
or ex-government employees. There was considerable overlap between the 
membership of a trade union and that of the political party that promoted 
it, between the power structure of the union and the power structure of the 
party. Also a majority of the trade union leaders retained their power 
over a long period of time (Subramanian 1967:194; Mathur and Mathur 1957: 
250-255; Punekar and Madhuri 1965).
Hypotheses
On the basis of the existing literature one can suggest the 
following hypotheses. The number of voluntary associations and the level
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of popular participation in them are proportionately lower in India than 
in western countries. Trade union activity in India is mostly limited to 
urban areas and manufacturing industry. Within urban areas participation 
in trade unions is likely to be higher in industrial towns based on heavy 
industries than in traditional cities based on service occupations.
State cultural associations are likely to be more developed in 
big cities and industrial towns than in small towns. The reasons are 
simple. In big cities and industrial towns migrants from across the 
language and state boundaries are likely to be found in sufficiently large 
numbers to form such associations, while in small towns and traditional 
cities like Raipur most of the migrants are likely to come from nearby 
areas. Inter-state-migrants and those from different language areas are 
more likely to form associations than migrants from nearby areas. Such 
migrants usually belong to different castes, religions, occupations, and 
income groups. Only wider loyalties which are common to all members can 
bring them together and create new identities. Such common bonds are 
language, culture, regional customs, and traditions. Once a sufficiently 
large number of migrants from a state is present in a town the formation 
of a cultural group is a natural consequence. On the other hand, local 
residents are familiar to one another in the locality. Hence they are 
more likely to develop community and locality loyalties than uprooted 
migrants.
Occupationally, membership of trade unions is likely to be 
highest among the industrial workers and membership of state cultural 
associations is likely to be highest among the middle and upper middle 
income groups. The leaders of both trade unions and state cultural asso­
ciations are likely to be highly educated and belong to middle class occu­
pations including the professions.
One can also infer than initially, the activities of all volun­
tary associations will be aimed at social integration by cutting across 
the boundaries of primordial groups. For example, outside the circle of 
their family and friends the trade union as an interest group is likely 
to unite the industrial labourers, while state cultural associations are 
likely to unite those in middle class occupations as a cultural or ethnic 
group. Depending on their aims and objectives voluntary associations will 
function as integrative agents up to some level and thereafter some may 
function as divisive (though not on purpose) and others may continue as 
integrative forces. As most of the trade unions in India have developed
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sympathies towards particular political parties, the participation of 
respondents in trade unions has direct political consequences. On the 
other hand, state associations may not always have direct political or 
voting consequences. If one wants to classify the associations on the 
basis of their involvement in politics and elections, there are the 
political parties and the trade unions at one end of the spectrum and non­
political religious or cultural associations at the other end.
One can, however, also hypothesize that the extent to which a 
particular association is exploited for political ends depends on the 
value dispositions of its members and the ability of a particular political 
party to penetrate the membership of that particular association. For 
example, the RSS is a voluntary cultural association which was established 
long before the Jana Sangh came into being. But now there is considerable 
ideological affinity and overlap of membership between the two and they 
work hand in glove at the time of election, yet continue as separate bodies.
In the context of the present study in Bhilai, therefore, I 
would expect the existence of rival trade unions (the INTUC playing a major 
role), several state cultural associations and at least some religious and 
caste bodies. I also hypothesize that both religious and secular associa­
tions function as integrative forces up to the level of secondary group 
relations on the basis of common occupational interest or common language, 
culture, place of birth, caste or religion. Such activity is likely to 
be higher in Bhilai than in Raipur.
Associations in Bhilai
At the time of the survey, excluding the agricultural and consumer
cooperative societies and cooperative farming societies, there were 27 trade
9union, cultural and religious organizations in Bhilai. These can be 
meaningfully dichotomized on several criteria such as religious or secular, 
national or parochial, expressive or action-oriented, interest or culture- 
based, and active or passive. The dividing lines were of course thin and 
there was considerable overlapping of functions, aims, objectives, and 
membership of different associations. Yet all these associations could be 
legitimately classified as voluntary associations for the following reasons. 
All were formally organized and many registered. They had a core of active 
participants, many fund contributors, an eager audience, and they held 
regular meetings.^  Some of them were also affiliated to their counter­
part regional and national organizations.
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In what follows, I analyse the survey data and the interviews 
with the leaders of different associations and trade unions (for details 
of leadership interviews see Appendix III and IV), to determine the 
characterisitcs and the social and political roles of these associations.
I deal with them under three different headings, viz. cultural, trade 
union and religious organizations.
STATE CULTURAL ASSOCIATIONS IN BHILAI 
Characteristics
Of the 13 state cultural associations in Bhilai the (seven) 
non-Hindi state cultural bodies of Tamil Nadu, Kerala (two), Andhra,
Mysore, Maharastra and West Bengal were the most active and they shared 
some characteristics.
Firstly, each had about a dozen office-bearers. A majority of 
the office-bearers of these (president, vice-president, secretary, 
treasurer, etc.) had university education and came from high occupational 
groups and their present salary was three to ten times higher than their 
first salary.
Secondly, each of the associations had regularly subscribing 
members (300 in Andhra Sahitya Samithi, 100 in Maharastra Mandal, 400 in 
Malayala Grandha Sala, 200 in Kerala Kala Kendram and 350 in Bangiya Krishti 
Parishad). Most of the members came from middle class occupational and 
income groups but they were distributed among all sub-regions, religions 
and castes. Non-natives of the state concerned also made generous financial 
contributions on special occasions and attended the cultural functions.
Aims and Objectives
The principal objectives of each of these associations were the 
retention of regional identity, the propagation of the region's culture, 
and the service of those community interests that were otherwise uncared 
for by the government or plant administration. A library with books in 
the regional language, educational facilities for children in the regional 
language, the construction of a common meeting hall, the erection of a 
temple for the regional deity, and the arrangement of occasional cultural 
programmes were some of the stated aims and objectives.^  In other words, 
outside the circle of family and friends the state association provided a 
reference group with which the respondent could feel culturally at home
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and on which he call fall back in times of difficulty. For example, the
Andhra Sahitya Samithi (Andhra literary council) was planning for a
marriage hall at the time of the survey. The Gujarathi Samaj (Gujarat
state society) had a regular fund to help friends in times of difficulties
12or to arrange funerals for the less fortunate.
The organizational and cultural activities of these associations
were cautious. They worked in a spirit of mutual cooperation rather than
competition. They tried to be as acceptable as possible to the society at
large, and to minimize their parochial focus their membership was open to
anybody who wanted to join, irrespective of region, religion, caste or
class (Bhilai Tamil Manram 1965:6). Of all the state cultural associations,
only the Maharastra Mandal (Maharastrian council) restricted its member-
13ship -- to Marathi speakers. Migrants to Bhilai contributed to and 
attended the cultural and even religious functions of other language groups.
Common Bonds and Religious Symbols
Each association sought and successfully exploited some commonly 
accepted regional, religious and even political symbols to rally the local 
community under a single social banner. Thus the Maharastra Mandal 
observed Ganesh chaturdhi, Dassarah and Sankranthi -- all popular Hindu 
festivals in Maharastra state. It celebrated Shivaji Jayanti -- the 
birthday of the mediaeval Maharastrian hero, and Tilak Jayanti -- the 
birthday of a popular Maharastrian political leader of national prominence 
early in this century. It got up drama performances and concerts -- both 
arts which were very well developed in the state of Maharastra. For all 
these functions steel plant officials usually of other language groups 
were invited as chief guests.
The Bangiya Krishti Parishad (Bengal cultural council) celebrated 
Durga punja (worship of the goddess Durga) with full fanfare and was 
supported and financed by all Bengalis irrespective of their political 
affiliations. It also celebrated the birthdays of Ramakrishna Paramahamsa 
and Vivekananda, both Bengali-born Hindu religious saints of national 
importance; of Netaji Subash Chandra Bose, the founder of the Indian 
National Army during the second world war; and also that of Ravindranath 
Tagore -- Nobel prize winner and author of India's national anthem.
The Kerala Kala Kendrum (Kerala cultural centre) was more active
14and enterprising. It celebrated 'Onam' festival and Kerala-Day, and
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organized music concerts, drama performances and sports events for children. 
It also conducted Malayalam language classes for all those who were prepared 
to learn.
The Andhra Sahitya Samithi, the Bhilai Tamil Manram (Bhilai 
Tamil club) and the Bhilai Kannada Sangha (Bhilai Kannada society) were 
run more or less on the same lines but the latter two were far more syste­
matically organized and financially sound than the first.
Securing a plot of land from the project authorities, building 
a temple, a library and a common purpose hall were among the most ambitious 
aims of every one of these organizations. All the associations had run 
elaborate fund-collecting campaigns for these purposes. For example, the 
Bhilai Tamil Manram had already built a temporary Vinayaka temple on the 
site allotted to it and set a collection target of half a million rupees 
to construct a permanent temple-library complex. The Andhra Sahitya Samithi 
aimed at collecting 200,000 rupees for a similar purpose though on a much 
more moderate scale.
Why did the cultural associations that sharply cut across all 
other primordial loyalties emphasize religion so much? This was at first 
puzzling because there were already several temples in the town presided 
over by different Hindu deities. The question was quite convincingly 
answered by K.C. Pillay, President of Kerala Kala Kendram. When I asked 
him why the people of each state wanted to have their own temple he said:
’I do not think any of the organizers of these associations are so deeply 
god-minded. For constructing temples there are two reasons. Firstly, BSP 
(Bhilai Steel Project) is allotting us land only on a temporary basis and 
that too on lease. Legally it can take the land back whenever it wants.
But if we construct a temple on the site the area becomes a religious 
property and the BSP cannot take it back. Secondly, almost all these asso­
ciations have plans for expensive construction projects. Our primary aims 
are a school, a library and a cultural centre. We add a temple to this 
complex only to induce the people to make generous financial contributions.
I think this is true of all other associations'. Later this interpretation 
was corroborated by the leaders of most other associations. So the construc­
tion of a temple was a device to gain permanent ownership rights over the 
piece of land allotted by the plant, and also a symbol to integrate the 
people of that particular state and to raise funds for secular ends. The 
leaders of all state associations were highly educated, their main aims were 
secular but they were aware that people would contribute more willingly if a 
religious cause was also included in their aims.
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Religious Minorities
It was, however, surprising that none of these state associations 
showed any inclination to exploit Muslim or Christian religious symbols to 
encourage the participation of their adherents in the social life of the 
community,, None of the state associations attempted even to celebrate 
Christmas or Easter, Id or Ramjan. Yet the Muslims and the Christians, 
particularly those who hailed from the south Indian states, were members 
of and eagerly participated in the cultural functions organized by their 
state associations. And the Hindus hailing from the same regions did not 
have much hesitation in sharing food and drink with their Muslim or 
Christian friends and neighbours. Yet the Muslims and the Christians 
had to depend on their masjid or church to celebrate their functions. The 
strategy of state cultural associations obviously was to draw maximum 
cooperation and minimum opposition from within their own ranks.
Agents of Integration
To what extent did these state associations succeed in integrat­
ing the migrants from their respective regions? A categorical answer to 
this question is difficult. A large number of those who joined the asso­
ciations belonged to middle class occupations, showing that the ability of 
an association to integrate the migrants from its region depended to some 
extend on the occupational homogeneity of those migrants. For example, 
most of the migrants from the state of Mysore were engineers, senior civil 
servants or skilled supervisors, and membership of and participation in the 
Kannada Sangha was universal. Most of the migrants from Tamil Nadu had 
middle class occupations and most of them were members of Tamil Manram.
On the other hand, migrants from Kerala were distributed over a whole 
range of occupations from top to bottom and membership in the Kerala state 
clubs was almost universal. The Bengali and Telugu associations were 
exclusively middle class affairs. Labourers from these states were not 
usually involved in the cultural functions of their associations. One 
could detect cultural variations in the patterns of integration. Contacts 
between the high and low occupational groups were more frequent among the 
Keralites and Tamils than among the Telugus and Bengalis.
The ability of a state association to integrate the migrants from 
its areas was also limited by the social and cultural needs of the community. 
The state cultural associations of Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya 
Pradesh existed only in name. They had no regular subscribers, they did
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not organize any cultural programmes and had no plans of any kind to build 
libraries or cultural centres. Bhilai is located in a Hindi-speaking 
state, so that those migrants from Hindi-speaking states were still living 
within their cultural and language area. Socially they had a feeling of 
security. When asked about this complacency, B.N. Singh, president of 
the Uttar Pradesh association said: 'People of all other states are
constructing their own temples and cultural centres. We do not want any. 
People from our region are already organized under Sanathan Dharma Sabha 
(an orthodox Hindu society). It has already constructed temples in 
different parts of the town. We already have Hindi medium school here.
We do not have any problem'.
Political Role
The political consequences of the integrative functions of these 
associations were not clear. To my question: 'Do you think that people
carreid political attitudes from their native places to this town? Do 
the participants in your association indulge in any political activities?' 
B.L. Majumdar, Secretary of the Bangiya Krishti Parishad, said: 'I think
I say yes to this. Once a person is politically-minded and has absorbed 
the ideology of a party it is difficult for him to come out of it. A few 
Bengalis here did try to use both Kali Bari and Bangiya Krishti Parishad 
as leftist political platforms. But they did not succeed in their attempts. 
People who already had some political sympathies not only continue to hold 
them here also but try to propagate them if it is possible.' K.C. Pillay 
of the Kerala Kala Kendram had a slightly different opinion: 'It is
difficult to say. While the hard core of every party is likely to continue 
to have the same political attitudes moderate sympathizers may change 
their opinions after seeing the progress in the country at large. You 
can take my own example. Once I voted only for the Communist Party but 
now I give one vote to the Congress and one vote to the Communists. When­
ever we organize a function most of the Keralites do attend but I don't 
think that all of them stand under the same banner. There is, however, no 
ban on informal political discussions.' Replying to the same questions,
B.S. Joshi, of Maharastra Mandal, said: 'Yes, in fact most of the members
of our association are also members or sympathizers of the Jana Sangh.
Our Vice-President is one of the office-bearers of the Jana Sangh.'
We have observed already that a relative majority of the migrants 
from Kerala, Andhra, and West Bengal supported Communists and most of them
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were members of the state associations, while the migrants from Maharastra 
played a vital role in organizing the RSS and Jana Sangh. The state 
associations did not appear to have been directly involved in any political 
activities. Some active members and office-bearers of these associations 
also played an active role in organizing political parties. Perhaps some 
meetings of the associations were utilized for unofficial discussion on 
politics and elections.
The Bhilai Mahila Samaj (Bhilai ladies' society) was in a class 
by itself and an excellent modern interest group. It drew its leadership 
primarily from the wives of officers with high incomes. With more than 
a thousand regular members mostly from the middle income groups but of all 
regions, languages and states, it opened branches in every sector of the 
town. Its primary aims were to provide recreation for all housewives and 
to explore spare time employment opportunities particularly for lower 
middle class housewives. It succeeded in these objectives by organizing 
tailoring classes and taking contract work to stitch uniforms for security 
forces. The organization until the time of the survey was certainly non­
political. But answering my question whether members of her association 
had any particular political preferences, Mrs Chopra, Vice-president of 
the Samaj, said: 'Yes, we are all proud of what Indira Gandhi has been
doing. She has nationalized the banks, won the presidential election and 
is fighting the old-guard Congress leaders single-handed. As women of 
this country we all think it is our duty to support her. I think the 
general opinion is in favour of the Congress'. Her opinion was significant 
in the then prevailing political atmosphere, though one can wonder how far 
housewives act independently of their husbands. The election survey report 
prepared by Srinivasan and Subramaniam brought out that more women than 
men voted for religious rightist parties (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 1969a: 
88).
RELIGIOUS ASSOCIATIONS
There were altogether seven organizations which could be called 
truly religious and in terms of community solidarity they fell into two 
categories. Firstly, Shri Gurusingh Sabha (Sikh), the Masjid Committee 
(Muslim), the Catholic Church, and the Jain Milan (Jainist) all represented 
important minority communities in India and possessed a very high sense of 
solidarity. Secondly, the Sanathan Dharma Sabha, the Arya Samaj and Kali 
Bari"^ represented different sects within the Hindu fold and only a small
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fraction of the Hindus supported them. 
Muslims and Christians
In the first category the solidarity of Muslims and Christians 
was high and their political preferences were unambiguous. According to 
the information supplied by Rashid Khan, Secretary of the Masjid Committee 
there were about 2,000 Muslim families in Bhilai. They came from different 
states such as Kerala, Maharastra, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar and Madhya Pradesh 
and belonged to different income groups and sub-sects. Yet almost all of 
them were members of the Committee. They made regular financial contri­
butions for the construction of a masjid and a school and attended weekly 
prayers at the masjid. Muslims were quite vocal in their support for the 
Congress. Barring a few individuals who preferred the Communist party, 
all had supported the Congress previously, and they continued to do so 
in Bhilai. If anything, Muslim solidarity and its support for Congress 
had been strengthened by the activities of the local RSS and the Jana Sangh 
and by the general consensus in the Muslim community that only Congress 
could protect them. 'We feel this solidarity is highly essential for our 
survival. A majority of us certainly feel that only the Congress can 
protect us', said Mir Ali Nady, an active participant in the Masjid 
Committee. Our survey data clearly confirmed this opinion. There was not 
a single Muslim who voted Jana Sangh and in fact a big majority of Muslims 
opposed the Jana Sangh.
The situation was more or less the same with regard to Christians. 
They also came from different states such as Kerala, Goa, Mysore, Maharastra, 
West Bengal, and Madhya Pradesh, they numbered slightly more than the Muslims 
and their community solidarity and support for Congress and their opposition 
to the Jana Sangh were equally zealous. Of the others the Jains were few 
in numbers and most were migrants from Gujarat; and their sympathies were 
divided between the Jana Sangh and the Congress.
Sikhs
Shri Gurusingh Sabha (Gurusingh conference) was a Sikh religous 
organization. Membership in the Sabha was universal among the Sikhs 
irrespective of caste, occupation and income. They had regularly attended 
the gurudwara at weekends and distributed sweets and cool drinks on religious 
occasions to the population at large all over the town. Sikh migrants were
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hard working, industrious and enterprising, and were in fact the only 
respondents who took up a second job during their spare time. In the 
absence of the Akali Dal, the Sikh religious party in Punjab, the pref­
erence of most Sikhs in Bhilai was for the Congress and of the next largest 
group for the Jana Sangh. A few Sikhs were openly critical of the 
Communists. 'I have a few Communist colleagues in the workshop. They do 
less work and make more noise and want to argue with everybody in the 
workshop', said a Sikh respondent.
Sanathan Pharma Sabha and Arya Samai
The Sanathan Dharma Sabha and the Arya Samaj are poles apart in 
their religous outlook. The first stands for orthodox Hindu principles 
and Vedic life including the caste system. The second is a reformatory 
sect encouraging reconversion of converts to the Islamic and Christian 
faiths back into the Hindu fold. The membership of the Sabha came from 
migrants from north Indian states, particularly those from Uttar Pradesh, 
Bihar, and Madhya Pradesh. The Sabha had only 150 subscribing members but 
was very enterprising in raising funds through donations and lucky prize 
schemes. It had already constructed three temples, one dispensary, and 
one marriage hall. At the time of the survey the Sabha had drawn up a plan 
to raise half a million rupees to construct a big Lakshminarayan temple. 
Srikrishna Janmashtami (Krishna's birthday) and Shivaratri (Shiva's night) 
were the most important functions that the Sabha celebrated. According to 
Narendra Prasad Sinha, the General Secretary, the Sabha was a purely 
religious and non-partisan organization. Only two respondents in the 
survey were members of the Sabha and both thought that the Congress was 
most likely to improve conditions of employees like themselves. Yet they 
had clear sympathy for the Jana Sangh and were very critical of the alien 
ideology of the Communists. 'The Jana Sangh is good but it is a long way 
before they can come to power. So what is the immediate benefit in 
supporting it?' was the general attitude. The Arya Samajists on the other 
hand came mostly from Punjab and Haryana where the Samaj is very popular.
In Bhilai the Samaj was dormant as an organization. The impressive 
Prardhana Mandir (worship hall) that it constructed in the town was the 
product of the generosity of an Arya Samajist contractor. Like the RSS 
workers the Arya Samajists were strong supporters of the Jana Sangh. But 
their number was negligible.
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Agents of Integration or Division?
Several generalizations can be made about the integrating or 
divisive effect and the political implications of the religious associations 
in Bhilai. Firstly, participation in an association was almost universal 
among the religious minorities while it was very low in the case of the 
sectarian Hindu organizations. Secondly, the cementing force in the state 
associations was language or culture while in the case of the religious 
associations it was religious persuasion. Thirdly, in the case of the 
state associations, it was the loyalties of religion, caste, and sub-region 
that were weakened while in the case of religious associations it was the 
loyalties of state and sub-sect that were weakened. In both cases the 
transfer of allegiance from a small to a new and bigger group was obvious.
But in the case of Sanathan Dharma Sabha and the Aryä Samaj, although 
members might have come from different states they belonged to the same 
language group (Hindi). In the case of the Sikhs they came mostly from 
the Punjab and Punjabi was their mother tongue.
It is, however, wrong to conclude that the solidarity of the 
Muslims and the Christians was purely religious and non-political. For 
example, the Muslims in Bhilai considered that a vote against the Jana 
Sangh and in favour of the Congress or a leftist party was as essential - 
for their survival as their religious solidarity. In fact one gets the 
impression that but for the constant and intensive anti-Muslim and anti- 
Christian campaign carried on by the Jana Sangh and the RSS, the minorities 
would have been less zealous about religious solidarity. Furthermore, in 
the case of the orthodox Hindu groups, loyalty to the Jana Sangh was a vote 
of approval of its ideology while in the case of the religious minorities 
religious solidarity and a vote for the Congress were protective measures.
TRADE UNIONS 
Participation in Unions
There were four trade unions in Bhilai at the time of the survey, 
organized as labour wings of the Congress (INTUC), Communists (AITUC),
Jana Sangh (BMS) and Samyuktha Socialist (HMP) parties respectively. The 
INTUC was the biggest and indeed the only recognized trade union in the 
steel, plant. Consequently an overwhelming majority of the workers, including 
some of those who had faith in the leftist political parties, joined the 
INTUC as a matter of expediency. Only those who had strong ideological
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convictions or whose interests were actively defended by the union leaders 
had joined the leftist or rightist trade unions. Of a total of 621 res­
pondents in Bhilai 195 (31%) were members of one trade union or another, 
and 24 (4%) were once members but had discontinued their membership at the 
time of the survey. Of a total of 195 trade union members, 145 (747o) 
reported membership in the INTUC, 28 (14%) reported membership in the AITUC,
14 (77o) reported membership in the pro-Socialist Hind Mazdoor Panchayat, 
and 8 (4%) reported membership in the pro-Jana Sangh Bharatia Mazdoor Sangh. 
Only about 3 per cent of the trade union members were also members of the 
state associations. Membership of trade unions in Bhilai was affected by 
two important factors. Firstly, officers were officially discouraged from 
joining the unions. Secondly, some of the respondents preferred not to 
join any union, allegedly because of dissensions in and ineffectiveness of 
unions. Otherwise membership in trade unions was almost universal particu­
larly among the manual, semi-skilled and skilled workers, and certainly 
cut across caste, religion, region and language. The reasons cited by a 
vast section of the respondents for joining the trade unions were either 
that 'it will help me and protect my professional interests', or that 'I 
can approach them whenever there is a dispute in regard to my job'. The 
help solicited from trade unions was of different kinds. It could be 
securing employment for somebody, getting temporary employment made permanent, 
securing housing accommodation, arranging for drinking water or electricity 
connections, and getting timely increments or a promotion.
Associations Between Parties and Unions
There was an almost indivisible association between the political 
parties and the trade unions promoted by them. The candidates nominated 
by different political parties for the 1967 election in the Bhilai assembly 
constituency were all leaders of trade unions promoted by their parties.
All the candidates had university education, and came from urban, upper 
caste, middle or upper middle income Hindu families. Territorially all 
were highly mobile and had lived in at least two cities other than Bhilai 
and their native place. The leftist trade union leaders (3) were Bengalis 
and had their initiation into politics in Calcutta. The fathers of most 
of these leaders were active participants in the Congress party and two 
of them courted imprisonment during the British rule and were later elected 
to the local legislatures. All the present trade union leaders were 
active participants in politics during their school and college days. The
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leaders of all trade unions developed sympathies for their respective 
political parties during their student days. All of them were deputed 
to Bhilai by their parties with the specific aim of organizing trade 
unions.
They did not in fact make much distinction between the political 
parties that they supported and the unions that they organized. Words 
such as 'my union' or 'my party' had the same meaning and the same 
emphasis. It was however difficult to assess the personal influence of 
the trade union leaders, particularly those of the leftist trade unions.
If a leader wanted to defect to some other party could he carry all his 
trade union following with him? On the face of it one would be inclined 
to say yes. For example, the trade union of the Jana Sangh was known 
among the respondents as 'Sadhu Union' by the name of the leader, and the 
union of the Communist Party was also known as 'Sudhir Mukherji's Union', 
by the name of the leader. But this did not mean that a leader had com­
plete personal control over the members of his union. After a split in 
the Communist Party in 1964, Sudhir Mukherji, the leader of the Communist 
union chose to support the moderate wing (pro-Russian) of the party and 
contested the 1967 election on its nomination. But he secured fewer votes 
(97c) than his Marxist rival (137o) . In much the same way the leader of 
the Congress trade union defected from the Ruling Congress group to 
the Organization Congress group and stood on its ticket in the 1970 election 
but was subjected to an ignominous defeat. There were also sufficient 
reasons to believe that the ideologically educated and organizationally 
trained following of the Jana Sangh would be left intact even if its 
trade union leader was to defect. A section of the labourers, however, 
appeared to be vulnerable in this regard. For example, the labourers who 
supported the Jana Sangh purely because of the trade union work put in by 
the Jana Sangh leader would most probably have followed him if he had to 
defect to some other party. But as the review of the literature on trade 
unions suggested, the loyalty of the trade union leaders was first to the 
parties that had promoted them and only then to the trade unions.
The leaders of all the non-Congress trade unions were non­
employees. The leaders of the Jana Sangh and Socialist trade unions were 
ex-employees and stated that they were victimized by the plant administra­
tion for their trade union activities. All the leaders were highly articu­
late and talked only in terms of secular ideologies, but conceded that 
primordial loyalties and secular considerations intereacted with each
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other. Everyone emphasized that block voting was not possible on the basis 
of caste or religious considerations, and claimed that his union members 
were loyal voters.
Yet trade unions did not hesitate to take advantage of organiza­
tional or voting support when it came from language or caste groups. For 
example, when the Communist Party broke into two the organizational and 
voting support for the Marxist candidate was provided by the Bengali youths, 
and the Marxist candidate accepted this fact without any hesitation or 
embarrassment.
Secular Role
The characteristics of and the role played by the trade unions 
are then obvious. Trade unions did cut across caste, religion, state and 
language barriers. But some unions drew a higher proportion of their 
supporters from particular regions than others. Among the trade union 
members, support for a particular trade union or political party was based 
primarily on secular considerations. Further, there was a very high corre­
lation between belonging to a particular trade union and voting for the 
particular political party that had promoted the union. Almost all the 
respondents who were members of the pro-Jana Sangh, pro-Socialist, and pro- 
Communist trade unions voted for their respective political parties. In 
other words, trade unions were created and exploited by political parties 
only as front organizations to expand their electoral support.
Support Structure of Unions
Under these circumstances, it was understandable that every 
candidate tried to draw an impeccable, secular, national, and patriotic 
image of his own party and of his own trade union while branding all other 
trade unions and political parties as sectarian and reactionary. In India, 
support from the lower middle class, educated people or peasants, is usually 
regarded as politically moral while support from rich people, businessmen, 
and particular religious and caste groups is usually regarded as politically 
unethical and reactionary. Among the political parties only the Communists 
and the Socialists are openly committed to the working class.
The opinions expressed by the candidates regarding the social 
sources of support for different political parties were interesting. For 
example, while all the other candidates thought that the Jana Sangh was 
supported by groups such as businessmen, upper middle class Hindus, religious 
fanatics, chauvinists, and government servants, the Jana Sangh candidate 
insisted that his party was supported 'especially by middle classes and 
educated people'.
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The Swatantra Party had never fielded a candidate in Bhilai but 
all the candidates in Bhilai were unanimous that the Swatantra Party was 
supported by rajahs, maharajahs, big industrialists, and landlords. There 
was also some unanimity of opinion about the social groups that supported 
the Congress. All the candidates agreed that the Congress drew support from 
all social sections but the non-Congress candidates thought that it drew 
more support from richer sections and minority religious groups than from 
others.
The candidates of the Communist and Marxist parties thought that 
their parties were supported by all except rich people but they agreed that 
the bulk of their support came from the working class. Also there was a 
unanimity of opinion that the Communist and Marxist parties were actively 
supported by regional groups such as Bengalis, Keralites, and Andhras.
CONCLUSIONS
The findings of this chapter may now be summarized. As expected, 
there were a large number of voluntary associations in Bhilai. Among these, 
cooperatives, state cultural associations and trade unions were more active 
than religious associations. These were the institutions to which the 
migrants eagerly transferred their loyalties.
Participation in consumer cooperatives and cooperative farming 
societies and cafeterias was universal and members had specific economic 
benefits from them. Most of these were organized on the basis of common 
workplace and common area of residence. Hence membership in these had 
clearly cut across state, language, caste, and religious boundaries.
Of all the cultural associations, those formed by the migrants from 
non-Hindi states were most active. They functioned as successful forces of 
integration on the basis of mother tongue, state of birth, and culture but 
had cut across caste, religious, and sub-regional loyalties (i.e. those 
within the state). The political role played by the state cultural asso­
ciations was not clear but a higher proportion of the members of the state 
cultural associations than of others supported Communists.
There were two Hindu religious associations in Bhilai -- one a 
reformist sect and another an advocate of traditional practices -- and each 
of these associations had only a few members. Participation in associations 
formed by religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians was universal 
among their adherents. Muslims and Christians exhibited a high degree of 
political solidarity and voted for Congress as an expression of faith in it
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as the protector of minority communities. At the same time members of the 
religious minority communities eagerly participated in the activities organized 
by state cultural associations.
As expected there were rival trade unions in Bhilai each organized 
by the Congress, the Jana Sangh, the Communists, and the Socialists. The 
trade union organized by the Congress was the biggest one and was officially 
recognized by the plant administration. There was an almost indivisible 
association between the political parties and the trade unions promoted by 
them. Unions were organized on occupational and secular lines and had cut 
across religious, caste, and state boundaries.
As expected, trade union leaders in Bhilai were sent from outside - 
by their political parties. They belonged to politicized middle class 
families and were highly educated and articulate. They had their political 
education during their student days and had put in considerable political 
work before they were sent over to Bhilai. Their loyalty was first to their 
political parties and only then to their trade unions. The organization of 
trade unions on a secular and ideological basis prevented the growth of 
personalized power structures in Bhilai.
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FOOTNOTES
XV
1. I am referring here to associations such as sports or hobby 
clubs, war veterens' organizations, occupational groups, labour 
unions, trades and professional associations.
2. There is a vast amoung of literature on voluntary associations
in Western Societies. For an excellent summary of these 
investigations see Chapter 10 of A.M. Rose, Sociology: The
Study of Human Relations. New York: Alfred A. Knopf 1968.
3. Sovani, in his study on Kolhapur conducted a thorough census 
of voluntary associations but did not investigate the role of 
these associations as agents of social integration. He was 
completely silent about the role played by these associations 
in the political field. Of a total of 585 organizations which 
he classified as 'social institutions', 243 were temples and 119 
were educational institutions.
4. One of the interesting findings of Karve and Ranadive was that 
caste panchayats were much more numerous in the town of Phaltan 
than in the surrounding villages. The authors concluded that 
the town of Phaltan was the centre of caste panchayats for the 
minority castes in the surrounding areas.
5 This analysis was done by me with the data collected from the
engagements columns of the Statesman from 1 March 1971 to 7 
March 1971.
6. For an excellent account of the present state of trade unionism,
trade union involvement in politics and the consequent rivalries 
see K.N. Subramanian, Labour-Management Relations in India. New 
York: Asia Publishing House 1967.
7. The figures quoted in this section are based on a comparison and 
recomputation of figures quoted by Johri and the Times of India 
Directory and Year-Book 1970 (Johri 1967:52,53; Shyamlal 1970: 
299).
8. For an account of the reasons for the popularity of labour
leaders drawn from outside the ranks of labour see Myron Weiner, 
The Politics of Scarcity. Bombay: Asia Publishing House 1963.
His chapter on trade unions gives an accurate picture of the 
close involvement of political parties in the affairs of trade 
unions.
9. According to the information specially supplied by the plant 
administration, there are a total of 81 voluntary associations 
recognized by the administration. Of these, 30 are consumer 
cooperatives, 11 are cooperative farming societies, 15 are 
cooperative cafeterias, 23 are state cultural or religious asso­
ciations and one is a pro-Congress trade union. In addition to 
these there is an officers' club and three unrecognized trade 
unions.
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10. The plant administration offered every state cultural associa­
tion and religious organization in Bhilai free office accommo­
dation at the Nehru House of Culture. An open air theatre also 
was kept at the disposal of these associations on a nominal rent 
for celebrating functions and meetings.
11. An excellent account of the aims and objectives of these asso­
ciations can be gained from the memorandum of association issued 
by each one. For example, see Memorandum and Articles of Asso­
ciation issued by Bhilai Tamil Manram (Tamil Manram 1965:5,6) 
and Draft Memorandum of the Association of the Maharastra Mandal, 
Bhilai (Thakur 1969:3-6).
12. See the Sectorwise list of members and the receipts and payment 
account for the year 1968-1969 (mimeographed) issued by Shri 
Gujarati Samaj Bhilainagar. At the time of the survey the Samaj 
had a cash balance of more than Rs5,000. Celebration of Gujarati 
religious festivals, contribution to Gujarat flood relief fund 
and expenses of funerals for the less fortunate were the main 
items of expenditure incurred by the Samaj.
13. The Maharastra Mandal in fact restricted its membership to 
Marathi speakers and among them too only to those 'who had good 
moral character and behaviour' (Thakur 1969:4). On the other 
hand, membership of Tamil Manram, Kerala Kala Kendram and Kannada 
Sangha was thrown open to all adults without any restrictions 
whatsoever.
14. While working on the field survey in Raipur I had the opportunity 
to go and attend the Kerala-Day celebration organized by the 
Kerala Kala Kendram. I observed that while people from all regions 
and language groups attended this function a majority of them were 
from south India.
Though the organization of Kali Bari was commonly known as a Kali 
worshipping body, several of its members insisted that it was 
essentially a non-religious Bengali cultural group.
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NEW PATTERNS OF LIFE AND LOCAL POLITICS1
LIFE IN VILLAGES AND TOWNS 
Life in Villages
In villages, and sometimes even in traditional cities like
Raipur, residential quarters are segregated on a caste basis. A person
lives, eats and associates usually with members of his own community or
of other communities of equal status. Within the traditional occupational
and economic structures he is usually a party to a patron-client, master-
servant relationship depending on his own ritual and economic status.
More often than not hereditary occupation, the joint family system, obedience
to some religious or caste customs and traditions (rules of the caste
2panchayat if one exists) set the pattern of living (Srinivas 1962a). In 
times of difficulty and rejoicing a person looks to the support of and the 
cooperation from his caste, friends, and neighbours. Membership in such 
groups is informal, and perhaps obligatory and in most cases it cannot be 
acquired and relinquished at will. To take up his traditional occupation 
or trade, a person does not have to pass any formal examinations or attend 
interviews, or retire at a particular age. Membership in such groups 
usually cuts across income-group boundaries. In villages and also in local­
ities of traditional cities usually every person is known to everybody else.
Movement to Towns
VII
The decision of a person with such a background to take up employ­
ment in a place like Bhilai requires many changes of life-style and has far- 
reaching consequences. Formerly a self-employed person or hired worker, he 
must now be psychologically prepared to work in a big bureaucracy or techno­
cratic organization. Formerly having inherited a job (occupation) from 
his father as a matter of course, he must now secure employment on the basis 
of his educational qualifications, technical knowledge and skills. (The 
initial information about the job may, however, have been provided by his 
friends or relatives.) In the Indian situation of employment scarcity, a 
person must be prepared to work for a long time where he first secured a 
job but be ready to move out if a better job is available. To secure such 
employment he may have to move across caste, sub-regional, state and 
language boundaries. So he must be willing to live away from his rural
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home and family ties, and the informal or formal assistance provided by 
his native community. Having been uprooted from his own culture, the 
person must be prepared to acclimatize in a new culture i.e., to live 
in a nuclear family with neighbours of diverse cultures, to create a new 
friendship circle, to acquire membership and assistance of new institutions 
(unions, parties, associations, etc.), perhaps to acquire a working know­
ledge of a new language and to face the possibility of his children being
3brought up in a new culture and most probably with a new set of values.
Not every migrant, of course, will face all of these new demands. 
Those from nearby areas may be relatively unaffected while inter-state 
migrants and particularly those who move across language boundaries may 
have to face a great many. Rural-born migrants who were never involved 
in traditional occupations or have lived for some time in urban areas will 
be better prepared for the changeover than those who come straight from 
the village. With the exception of three groups -- those who had lived 
in the same town since their birth, those who had lived in joint families, 
and those who lived in urban areas but had agricultural interests in the 
adjoining countryside -- all urban to urban migrants in the sample were 
already used to the pattern of living in the new towns.
PATTERNS OF ADAPTATION IN BHILAI
In the light of the above discussion how different was the social, 
religious and political life of the migrant in Bhilai from that in his 
native village or old town? To what extent were older patterns of loyalties 
and organizations destroyed or weakened? What were the links that the 
migrant in Bhilai still maintained with his native place? How close was 
his attachment to the new institutions or styles of life in the industrial 
town? What was his perception of the local power structure? How did he 
try to influence it to secure his interests? These are the main questions 
in this chapter.
Initiative and Determination
The situation in Bhilai was almost a paradigm of the migration 
experience. Very few respondents in Bhilai were self-employed, and all 
the rest worked in the steel plant either on the administrative or the 
operational side. Save for some semi-skilled manual workers and civil 
servants, the occupations of all respondents were different from those of
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their fathers and they had all been, entered on the basis of the migrants' 
qualifications and skills. A large proportion of the migrants had already 
demonstrated a high degree of initiative and were prepared to face hard­
ships before and after they secured employment in Bhilai. Chowdary’s 
study revealed that only about four in ten applied for their jobs in 
response to press advertisements, while the rest came straight to Bhilai 
and secured work through the local employment exchange. Only about two 
in ten were able to secure residential accommodation from the plant and 
the rest had to fend for themselves. This they did by staying with their
friends or relatives or renting houses in the nearby villages or by con-
4
structing huts of their own (Chowdary 1967:39).
Although we do not have any data on the turnover of employees 
at the plant, the information obtained from our respondents suggested that 
most had a long-term commitment to their jobs. Of a total of 621 respond­
ents about one-third had been in Bhilai for more than ten years, and 
about two in three for more than five years; almost all said they were 
likely to continue in their jobs in Bhilai unless they were offered higher 
remuneration elsewhere. They were not the type of worker who disappears 
from the factory at every harvest period, religious festival or village 
wedding.
About eight in ten of our respondents had moved across state 
or language boundaries or both, generally from a long distance; they had 
demonstrated an ability to live away from their homes. They could not 
expect any help from the rural primary groups in their native places in 
the day-to-day problems that arose in Bhilai.
Language Orientation
We can discuss the ability demonstrated by the migrants to 
become acclimatized in the new situation at the individual and at group 
leve1.
About half of the respondents had migrated from non-Hindi-speaking 
states and had a different mother tongue. But all of them had a working 
knowledge of Hindi by the time of the survey. Chowdary's study found that 
all respondents had a working knowledge of Hindi and that about half had 
learned a language other than their mother tongue after arriving in Bhilai 
(Chowdary 1967:27). The medium of instruction in the local schools and 
colleges was Hindi, although students were given the choice of selecting
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the English medium as well. However, most of the migrants had no hesi­
tation in sending their children to the local schools having Hindi as the 
medium of instruction. At the same time, migrants were anxious that their 
children should be able to read and write in their regional languages and 
this they ensured through private tuition.
Residence
Residential accommodation in Bhilai was allotted on the basis 
of job-status and income. Consequently, migrants from different states, 
languages, religions, and castes were mixed and widely distributed over 
all residential sectors. For example, B.M. Rao with whom I stayed in 
Bhilai was a migrant from coastal Andhra, his next door neighbour on the 
east was a Bengali, on the north was a Punjabi, on the west was a migrant 
from Andhra but from Telangana region and on the south was a migrant from 
Delhi city. Rao had friendly relations with all of them though not in a 
close way. On the occasion of religious festivals or family functions they 
distributed sweets to one another and made financial contributions to each 
other's regional functions.
Because of a strong correlation between high caste and high 
occupation on the one hand, and low caste and low occupation on the other, 
there was some concentration of high castes and of low castes within each 
residential sector. But even in such cases residents belonged to different 
state and language groups. Residents used Hindi more than English for con­
versation with strangers, and their mother tongue within their own group.
Work-Mates and Cooperatives
To ensure his job security, increments, promotions and even over­
time work the migrant maintained good relations with his colleagues and 
superiors at the office. Here again the colleagues and officers belonged 
to different states, languages and castes. Colleagues of the same status 
at work often visited each other and shared food and drink, and helped 
each other in tending the kitchen garden or pruning the hedge.
Employees in the same workshop usually joined the same trade 
union as a matter of expediency, and the same cooperative farming society 
because of the restrictions imposed by the plant administration. Employees 
living in the same sector also joined the same consumers' cooperative 
society because of the limitations imposed by the administration, and also
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for geographical convenience. In other words in his work-place and in 
his neighbourhood the migrant was forced to function collectively with 
people of diverse cultures. In none of the above individual or group 
spheres of life could caste, religion, or language be called a determinant 
even in a remote way.
The Circle of Friends
Most of the closest friends of a migrant usually came from 
within his own language group but from all castes and sub-regions, and 
some from across religious boundaries. The migrant would discuss most 
of his personal problems with them and seek their advice or help if they 
were in a position to offer any. Mutual financial assistance, partici­
pation in chit-fund companies, exchanging books in the regional language, 
paying a collective visit to the temple, collectively watching a motion 
picture in the regional language, occasional visits to one another's homes, 
and occasional lunch or dinner parties, were the preoccupations of a 
friends' circle. Here, it was my distinct impression that caste and sub- 
region were completely ignored. For example my host friend Rao was Kamma 
by caste and came from central coastal Andhra. Among eight of his closest 
friends from Andhra, one was a Raju and two were Naidus from north Andhra 
(Visakhapatnam and Srikakulam districts), two were Reddys from south 
Andhra (Nellore district), one was a Muslim from his own district (Krishna), 
one was a Brahmin from his own region but a different district (Rajahmundry) 
and only one was from his own district and belonged to his own caste. 
Chowdary, in his study of Telugu-speaking people in Bhilai, found that more 
than half of his respondents made friends with persons of other language 
groups such as Hindustanis, Malayalis, Bengalis, Maharastrians and 
Tamilians (Chowdary 1967:62).
Religion and Caste
Was there, then, any room left for the influence of religion 
or caste? Religious divisions were clear in the sense that only Muslims 
frequented the Masjid, only Christians attended the weekend mass, and 
only the Hindus visited the temples. But here again not all the people 
were equally devout in their religious observance, even among those who 
were deeply religious. For example, there was very little talk about 
religion among the scheduled and lower castes. Among the middle class 
occupational groups some were outspokenly atheistic. Other groups were
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religious-minded but caste distinctions were completely ignored. For 
example, the 'Mitra Mandali* (friends' council), a common prayer group 
of middle-income south Indians, included persons of all regions and 
castes, but only Hindus. The practice of restricting temple entry to 
clean Hindu castes was not observed in Bhilai. The temples were open 
to one and all who wished to worship the deity. Even among the members 
of the 'Sanathan Dharma Sabha' which is usually considered to be a highly 
tradition-conscious Hindu society, the observance of caste distinctions 
was relaxed partly because of local realities and working conditions in 
an industrial plant. For example, Narendra Prasad Sinha, General Secretary 
of the Sanathan Dharma Sabha, after giving me a long and helpful interview, 
extended a lunch invitation and insisted on my accepting it. Both Sinha 
and his wife are highly religious and religious pictures were hung all 
around their house. They did not enquire about my religious or caste back­
ground and served a sumptuous meal. In fact, in terms of religiosity,
Sinha appeared to be much less rigid than some of the politicized Arya 
Samajists and the RSS workers.
Caste as such did not serve any purpose in Bhilai. Excepting 
the Brahmins and the Vaisyas the number of persons from each caste was so 
small that they could not function as an effective social organization. 
Within the Brahmins and the Vaisyas again there were state and language 
distinctions. Most of the other castes including the untouchable castes 
were not comparable across the state and language boundaries. So caste 
could not serve as an integrating agent. Had anyong attempted to form a 
caste organization, occupational and status distinctions would have made 
it impossible for the project to succeed. The only caste association of 
which I heard (whose office-bearers I interviewed) was the 'Settibalija 
Sangham' (Settibalija Society). It was an association formed by south 
Indians and had a total membership of 93. Its objectives were primarily 
educational and financial. It provided financial assistance to members 
facing any difficulties. It had no caste 'panchayat' (caste council) and 
there were no caste rules or regulations to which its members had to adhere.
At the same time marriage alliances across caste or language 
boundaries were infrequent. During my stay in Bhilai I heard of engineers 
who had married Russian girls when they were sent to Russia for technical 
training, and a few higher civil servants who had married European girls 
during their studies in western countries, but these cases were quite 
unusual. Reddy in his study of problems of cross-cultural marriages con-
TABLE VII.1
Newspaper Circulation in Bhilai Classified 
according to Language and Place of Publication
Language of newspaper Circulation in Bhilai
%
English 38
Hindi 32
Vernacular 30
Total 100
(N = 8191)
Place of publication Circulation in Bhilai
of English dailies 7o
Bombay 41
Del hi 38
Calcutta 14
Madras 3
Nagpur 2
Bhopal 1
Vijayawada 1
Total 100
(N = 3101)
Place of publication Circulation in Bhilai
of Hindi dailies %
Raipur 86
Bombay 8
Delhi 6
Total 100
(N = 2652)
Note : Information regarding newspaper circulation
was collected from all the newspaper agents 
in Bhilai. Hence the figures are actuals.
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eluded that most of these had worked well (Reddy 1968). Chowdary found 
than about nine in ten of his respondents disapproved of marriage alliances 
across caste and language boundaries (Chowdary 1967:63).
With respect to the role played by caste and religion at group 
level we must return to our previous conclusions. Religious solidarity 
was a question of survival for the minorities and block voting was an 
expression of their belief in the role played by Congress as the protector 
of minorities. In the case of scheduled castes voting was on secular lines. 
Congress was the only party which had been in power for long and it was 
the only party that could help the poor through its control of government. 
Members of scheduled castes wished that something more could be done to 
improve their living conditions. But securing their immediate needs by 
voting leftist opposition parties into power had only a remote chance of 
success. So a majority of them preferred to bargain with and vote for 
Congress. Only in the case of the RSS workers and the Arya Samajists were 
caste and ideological convictions closely related. But these two groups 
made up only a fraction of the Hindus. A relative majority of the upper 
caste respondents definitely supported the Jana Sangh on a caste basis; 
but it was difficult to determine whether any others voted on a caste basis.
LINKS RETAINED WITH NATIVE PLACE 
Letters and Visits
Then what were the links that the migrants still retained with 
their native places?
Many migrants still retained their share of ancestral properties, 
and maintained communications by regularly writing letters, by paying 
annual visits, and in some cases by sending money back home. In addition 
to his attachment to his own parents and family estate, a migrant also kept 
up his interest in the political affairs and culture of his native state. 
This was clearly brought out by the analysis of newspapers circulated and 
films screened in Bhilai.
Subscriptions to Native-State Newspapers
The tables presented in this chapter show that people belonging 
to different language groups preferred to subscribe to newspapers published 
from their own state and in their own language, even though these papers
TABLE VII,2
Vernacular Newspapers Circulated in Bhilai 
Classified According to Place of Publication
• Place of 
publication
Percent of total copies 
circulated in Bhilai
%
Bombay 6
Poona 1
Delhi 5
Calicut 17
QuiIon 2
Trivendrum 16
Kottayam 16
Kerala 52
Calcutta 28
Vijayawada 3
Madras 5
Total (all vernacular 100
newspapers) (N = 2438)
TABLE VII.3
Newspaper Circulation in Bhilai Classified 
According to Languages
Language of 
newspaper
Circulation in 
Bhilai
7o
♦
Circulation in 
India*
7o
Hindi 52 19.54
Malayalam 25 14.35
Bengali 13 9.33
Marathi 3 13.23
Urdu 2 6.20
Tamil 2 15.05
Telugu 1 3.45
Gujarati 1 11.02
Oria 1 1.30
(others 0.25)
Total 100
(N = 5090)
100.00
(N = 7041 000's)
* For details see Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, 
Government of India, Press in India. Delhi: The Manager
of Publications 1969. See especially the third chapter.
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arrived up to three days late. Of a total of about eight thousand copies 
of newspapers sold in Bhilai, about four in ten were English newspapers 
and three in ten each were Hindi and regional language papers (TABLE VII.1). 
Bombay, Calcutta, and Delhi, and different centres in Kerala were the most 
important places of publication (TABLE VII.2). Hindi-speaking people con­
stituted about 47 per cent of the population in Bhilai but the circulation 
of the Hindi newspapers covered only about 32 per cent. Most of the cir­
culation (86%) of Hindi newspapers was accounted for by those published 
from Raipur. Among the non-Hindi language groups Keralites, Bengalis and 
Tamils overwhelmingly preferred to read newspapers of their own states 
and in their own languages. Of the non-Hindi language groups Telugus 
appeared to be very poor newspaper readers. The Telugus made up about 
15 per cent of the Bhilai population, but while Telugu newspaper circulation 
was about three per cent of the Indian total, it was only about one per cent 
of that in Bhilai (TABLE VII.3).
Films in Native Languages
While every language group preferred an occasional film in its 
own language and all of them equally favoured English-language films,
Telugus seemed particularly devoted to films in their own language. On 
average about one in five film-screenings in Bhilai were in the Telugu 
language (TABLE VII.4). Furthermore, it was common for migrants to listen 
to music and news bulletins broadcast by radio stations in their own states.
THE NEW GENERATION IN BHILAI
At the same time, it was possible to see a distinct new gener­
ation emerging at the time of the survey. These were the migrants' 
children, who had no sentimental attachments whatever to their parental 
cultures. These children spoke in their mother tongue at home and 
in Hindi to their friends and neighbours. Srinivasulu, the six-year-old 
son of my host friend Rao, spoke excellent Hindi with friends and neighbours 
but Telugu with an admixture of Hindi words at home. The children of the 
migrants attended Hindi medium schools. They wore uniforms and shoes 
supplied free by the plant and at the mid-day meals freely served by the 
school sat side by side without observing any religious, caste or language 
distinctions. They were also trained to present mass drills and community 
singing (Chowdary 1967:42,43). The children accompanied their parents to 
social functions of different regional groups. They knew very little 
about the customs and traditions of the caste atmosphere in which their
TABLE VII.4
Film Screenings in Bhilai Classified According 
to Language of Picture
Language of 
picture
Screenings
I
Hindi 66
Telugu 21
English 5
Malayalam 3
Bengali 2
Tamil 2
Marathi 1
Total 100
(N = 551)
Note : The above analysis is based on 551 film
screenings in all the picture halls in 
Bhilai during the month of May 1969.
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parents were brought up and they had little knowledge of the pattern of 
rural life. Their only contact with the native place of their parents 
was a short and occasional visit. I was certain that by the time these 
children came of employment age the barriers of state and language which 
their parents had to encounter would have completely disappeared, the 
more so if they were to seek employment within the Hindi-speaking region. 
Caste and perhaps religion would be further weakened. Or as they were 
now coming into contact with different regional cultures and different 
versions of Hindu traditions, they would be more likely to adopt a wider 
view of caste and religion.
SITUATION IN RAIPUR 
State Associations
How does the situation in Raipur compare with that in Bhilai? 
Inter-state migrants were few and they had only one major state association. 
It was formed by the Maharastrian migrants from the nearby state. Its 
activities were limited to common prayers in the Maharastrian temple and 
celebrating the Ganesh festival (festival of the Hindu god with an elephant 
head). According to local opinion a majority of its members supported the 
Jana Sangh. But it was not an organization in the strict sense: it was
not registered, and had no regular members, but derived informal support 
from most of the Maharastrians and provided them with a common meeting 
place. There were also small associations such as the 'Sindhi Panchayat' 
constituted by the Sindhi migrants from West Pakistan, and the Parsee 
Panchayat constituted by the local Parsee residents.
Religion and Caste
Religious, caste and in some cases occupational segregation of 
residential areas were obvious in the old parts of Raipur. Names of 
municipal divisions such as 'Brahman Para' (Brahmin part), 'Satnami Para' 
(scheduled castes' part), 'Civil Lines' (government servants' part),
'Bhangi Colony' (Scavengers' part) bore witness to this practice. Most 
of the Muslims, Vaisya businessmen, potters, and Maharastrian Brahmins were 
concentrated in particular parts of the city. It is important to note, 
however, that this did not apply to the new housing colonies being developed 
by the town administration or the state government. While informal caste 
traditions, customs, and collective behaviour were apparent there were no
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registered organizations, with definite parliamentary procedures, regular 
members, and fund contributors. On special religious occasions residents 
in the neighbourhood arranged collective functions such as Ganesh Puja.
Here again, such festivals were conspicuously absent in the residential 
areas of the scheduled castes.
POLITICAL STYLES IN BHILAI
What was the political role played by the migrant at the local 
level in Bhilai? How different was it from the role he would have played 
in his native place if he had not moved to Bhilai?
We did not collect information directly on the second question.
But several studies in the past have indicated that membership of political 
parties is very low in rural India (Srinivasan and Subramaniam 1969a; 
Bashiruddin Ahmed 1971). Neither the farmers nor the agricultural labourers 
who constitute about two-thirds of the Indian workforce, form professional 
organizations or trade unions. Their social and political behaviour is 
guided usually by informal group loyalties. This situation has been 
changing, but not radically.
Involvement with Institutions
It will be clear that in Bhilai grass roots politics was very 
different from this. Caste and religious loyalties were weak, and their 
political relevance was small. Social relationships and political processes 
were highly institutionalized. In rural India a person does not have to 
be a member of a political party to be counted as its sympathizer. In 
Bhilai, most of the industrial workers were members of party-sponsored 
trade unions. In fact, a worker had to first pay his membership fee and 
become a member of a union before he could present his grievances through 
it to the higher authorities. Of course in some cases a union might first 
fight for the rights of the workers and then appeal to them to join it.
The Jana Sangh had done precisely this in relation to the workers in Bhilai 
Hospital.
Moreover, there were no link-men who controlled vote banks. There 
were influential leaders in Bhilai. The prominent leaders of all trade 
unions worked hard in building up a following for their unions. But this 
was done mainly on the basis of the social and economic policies of their
165
unions and parties. What they built were institutions rather than person­
alized power structures. For example, the pro-Communist trade union in 
Bhilai was formed, built up, and led by Sudhir Mukherji. When the Communist 
Party of India broke into moderate and extreme wings, Mukherji joined the 
moderate wing (CPI) but a majority of his following supported and voted for 
the CPIM.
Local Politics
Ordinary civic amenities in Bhilai were provided by the plant.
Any complaints regarding the supply of electricity, drinking water, 
drainage, and repairs to residential units were well attended to by the 
department of Town Adminis tration. The town was governed by the plant 
itself and there was no popularly-elected municipal council. So the only 
interest groups or political organizations with which the migrants were 
familiar and involved were the trade unions, which were also the only 
organizations through which the parties could make contact with the elector­
ate. Splits in parties and trade unions occurred but they were based on 
ideological considerations. For example, when the Congress Party broke into 
two, the trade union promoted by the Congress also broke into two. One of 
the Congress trade union leaders joined the Organization Congress led by 
Nijalingappa but an overwhelming majority of the union members and leader­
ship remained with the Ruling Congress group led by Indira Gandhi. The 
involvement and attachment of the migrants to new institutions can therefore 
hardly be overstressed. A migrant was most likely to be a member of a trade 
union, cultural association, or library. He was likely to be a member of 
one of the consumer cooperatives in his residential sector, and of the 
agricultural farming society in his workshop. In rural India and even in 
traditional cities such multiple membership in associations is rare. This 
was, for the main part, why primordial loyalties were weakened in Bhilai.
POLITICAL STYLES IN RAIPUR 
Religion and Caste
Raipur provided an excellent case study of political factions, 
defections, dominance of leaders of higher castes, and splinter vote 
tac tics.
Of the 12 candidates interviewed (of a total of 14), six were 
Brahmin or Vaisya men nominated by the major parties, four belonged to
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the newly rising agricultural castes, one was newly converted Buddhist, 
and one was a Muslim. There was not a single candidate representing the 
lower, artisan and scheduled castes or tribes. At the time of the 1967 
election, the Jana Congress (a short-lived splinter group from the Congress), 
the Congress, and the Jana Sangh were the most important contending parties 
and all three nominated Brahmin or Vaisya candidates. The election winner 
and the candidate who secured the second highest vote were both Brahmins.
Defections of Leaders
In contrast to the situation in Bhilai, inter-party defections 
and electoral alliances of convenience appeared to be common in Raipur.
For example Bulakilal Pujari, a wealthy lawyer, stood on a Socialist 
ticket in 1952 and on a Congress ticket in 1967. Sharada Charan Tiwari, 
an enterprising country cigar manufacturer, actively helped the war effort 
of the British during the second world war and was not even a member of 
the Congress until after independence. He stood on a Congress ticket in 
a 1952 by-election and in the 1957 and 1962 general elections, and won in 
the latter two elections.'7 In 1967 he broke away from the Congress and 
contested and won the election on the ticket of the Jana Congress; he 
served as a minister for some time but returned to the Congress fold after 
the election. At the time of the survey, both Pujari and Tiwari were in 
the Congress but heading two different factions.
Since 1952 the Communists have nominated a candidate at every 
election save that of 1967, when the party concluded an alliance to 
support the candidature of Sharada Charan Tiwari against the official 
Congress candidate. It was alleged by Devarajsingh Surana, the Jana Sangh 
candidate, that his candidature had been proposed and actively canvassed 
by Sharada Charan Tiwari. But Tiwari was said to have changed his mind, 
concluded an alliance with the Communists and the Republican Party, and 
decided to contest the election himself. This version was later confirmed 
by Sudhir Mukherji the leader of the CPI, and Narvani, the candidate of 
the Samyuktha Socialist Party. Soon after the PSP candidate withdrew from 
politics and accepted membership of the Madhya Pradesh Public Service 
Commission offered by the government. This it was alleged by some candi­
dates was a part of the shady bargain for Thakur's unofficial support of 
the official Congress candidate (Pujari). After interviewing the candi­
dates I found it difficult to predict who would stand on which ticket in 
the next election. There was certainly a demand for the Congress ticket.
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But some candidates were simply in search of party labels and they would 
stand even if no party ticket was available. The money offered by the 
major candidates in return for the withdrawal of a candidature or voting 
support was one of the factors that prompted some minor candidates to 
file their nominations For example, Lakshman Rao Asram the candidate 
of the Republican Party alleged that Tiwari and Pujari each offered him 
5000 rupees to withdraw from the election contest and canvass in his
g
favour. This state of affairs indicated the poor discipline and 
organizational abilities of political parties.
Aims of Candidates in Filing Nominations
The aims of the candidates in filing their nominations were 
typical of the electoral tactics and group loyalties in a traditional 
city. Some candidates were nominated by their parties. But the ideolo­
gical convictions of candidates (except the Jana Sangh and Communist 
candidates) were not deep and their party affiliations were lightly held. 
Some candidates were encouraged to contest the election to split votes 
on a communcal and neighbourhood basis and thus reduce the chances of 
success of one candidate to promote those of another. For example, 
Azizuddin, a Muslim, and Duryodhansingh Ramsingh, a Hindu Kshatri by 
caste, both contested as independents. But both confessed that they had 
personally voted and canvassed for the Congress candidate. Both of 
them had faith in the efficacy of the Congress and always voted for it 
previously. Then why did they contest as independent candidates? Their 
answer to this question was evasive. ’All my friends and well-wishers 
encouraged me to contest and voted for me. But myself and my family 
always voted for the Congress, and did so in the recent election', was 
a typical answer. The facts were, however, made known when Devarajsingh 
Surana, the Jana Sangh candidate, said that four independent candidates 
including Azizuddin and Ramsingh 'were set up by the Bulakilal Pujari to 
split the votes of Sharadacharan Tiwari'. 'All the independent candidates 
other than I were set up by rival Congress candidates', claimed Gajjulal 
Sharma. Bulakilal Pujari, the official Congress candidate, was evasive 
on this point. 'Some independent candidates said that they and their 
families voted for you. Do you think it was true? What do you think was 
the reason for their doing so?' In reply Pujari said: 'Those independent
candidates who said that they had voted for me might be my friends. They 
might have told you the trueth. I can only say that all Congress men and
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my friends voted for me’.
Some candidates were deeply committed to promoting the interests 
of certain occupations or professions and contested the elections with 
the purpose of educating the public. They knew well that they stood 
little chance of victory in the election. Govardhandas Bagdi, President 
of the Chamber of Commerce, who stood as an independent candidate, and 
Gajjulal Sharma, an ex-government employee now a teacher, who stood with 
the support of the government employees’ union, were of this kind. Bagdi 
spoke at length about the difficulties of small businessmen and pleaded 
for their unity of action. The election in his opinion was the best oppor­
tunity to exert pressure on the government. But his plea to the business 
community went unheeded and he drew only a couple of hundred votes.
Gajjulal Sharma alleged that he was victimized by the government for his 
union activities. ’If only the government employees are united we can 
successfully pressure the government. But not all the employees voted 
for me. Only my friends and relatives did', Sharma said. The conclusion 
that the election was fought on other than ideological considerations 
is obvious.
It was surprising that practically every independent candidate 
said that the Congress was more likely to help improve things than any 
other political party. Reasons for voting were different in Raipur and 
Bhilai. Friends, relatives, people of the locality, co-businessmen, 
caste people, customers were the most important categories of supporters 
mentioned by all the independent candidates. In this pattern of replies 
one could also detect that co-religionists and co-caste people were implied 
in replies such as 'people of the locality', 'friends', and 'relatives'.
Personalized Power Structures
The personal influence of Sharada Charan Tiwari in Raipur was 
an excellent example of how personalized power structures are created and 
sustained in India. Not only did a majority of the respondents mention 
the candidate by name but also a significant proportion of them, particu­
larly in the high income and business groups were on personal friendship 
terms with Sharada Charan Tiwari. In fact people in almost all social 
sections had something to say to the credit of Tiwari. Some of them grate 
fully mentioned the personal favours he had one them. Such favours ranged 
from preventing the government from evicting the poor squatters from
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government waste land, to securing a small job for the son of a middle 
class employee, helping food grain dealers out of difficulties, and 
collecting funds for educational, institutions in the region. I met Tiwari 
for the first time in the district collector's office where he was moving 
from officer to officer with a band of civilians who sought his help in 
expediting their files. No other candidate in Raipur had put in such 
intensive work in the constituency as a whole.
Replying to the question, 'What do you think is the reason for 
your repeated successes?', Tiwari said, 'I stand for the voters whenever 
they have problems, and they stand for me whenever there is an election'. 
Replying to the question, 'What kinds of people generally support the 
Congress Party?', he said, 'The party is only nominal. People vote for 
me on the basis of my personal contacts'. The reply could not be any 
more simple or blunt. I doubt whether any candidate in Bhilai would be 
courageous enough to put things so bluntly.
CONCLUSIONS
The findings in this chapter may be summarized as follows.
By learning a new language and by active social intercourse with 
other regional, religious, and caste groups the migrants demonstrated an 
ability to readjust to a new style of life.
By educating their children in a language other than their 
mother tongue and by freely exposing them to the influences of the cultures 
of different regions, the migrants permitted them to shed primordial loy­
alties and become true urban citizens with a modern outlook.
As expected, in residence, eating and social intercourse, caste 
and religion were considerably weakened. True, marriage alliances were 
favoured only within language and caste boundaries, but it might be expected 
that the younger generation would adopt more liberal views than their 
parents in this sphere also. Further, the role of caste and religion in 
politics was highly reduced.
It was brought out that primordial groups could not be formed 
and would not be useful in a modern town like Bhilai. The migrants in 
Bhilai instead actively participated in several voluntary associations to 
fulfil their professional, economic, and cultural needs. Trade unions, 
regional cultural associations, and farming and consumer cooperative
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societies were the most important among these.
It was noted that the migrants maintained regular contacts 
with their parents and relatives in their native places and took a keen 
interest in the politics and cultures of their native states. But it 
might be expected that the younger generation would have much less interest 
in these matters.
As could be expected, electoral politics in Bhilai were based 
on ideological considerations. Trade unions played a vital role and per­
sonalized power structures were non-existent in shaping the party-support 
patterns. On the other hand, electoral politics in Raipur had all the 
features more generally characteristic of the Indian political system and 
voting behaviour. Party splits, inter-party defections, formation of new 
parties, opportunistic electoral alliances, personalized power structures, 
bribery of candidates, vote splitting tactics, and collective bargaining 
on the basis of caste and religion were all features of electoral politics 
in Raipur.
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FOOTNOTES
1. The information contained in this chapter is based on the obser­
vations of the writer during his stay in Bhilai and Raipur in 
1969, on the interview he had with the candidates who contested 
the 1967 general election in Bhilai and Raipur, and on the inter­
views he had with the officers of different state-cultural and 
religious associations in Bhilai. For details of leaders inter­
viewed see Appendices III and IV.
2. For a general account of the inter-group socio-economic and 
cultural relations in village India see M.N. Srinivas, Religion 
and Society Among Coorgs of South India. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press 1952; also Srinivas (ed.), India's Villages. Bombay:
Asia Publishing House 1966; Adrian C. Mayer, Caste and Kinship 
in India: A Village and its Region. Berkeley and Los Angeles:
University of California Press 1960; F.G. Bailey, Caste and 
Economic Frontier: A Village in Highland Orissa. Manchester:
Manchester University Press 1957.
3. For an excellent study on the impact of modernization and indus­
trialization on social structure in India see Michael M. Ames, 
Modernization and Social Structure: Family, Caste and Class in
Jamshedpur. Economic and Political Weekly IV, 1969.
4. Chowdary's study, Thesis on Problems of Adjustment of Telugu 
Speaking People of Bhilai Nagar, was based on a small sample 
drawn from a single residential sector (Sector VII). But his 
findings are useful and in all probability the problems of 
readjustment of all non-Hindi speaking people were similar to 
that of Telugu-speaking migrants.
5. Reddy's study, Thesis on Problems of Cross Cultural Marriages 
in Bhilai, investigated mainly the families of Indian employees 
(most of them engineers) who married Russian girls. In total 
he interviewed 33 couples (both husbands and wives).
6. For a general background to the split in the Congress, see G. 
Lakshmana Rao, The Background to the Recent Crisis in the Indian 
Congress Party. The Australian Quarterly 42, 1970.
7. In 1952, soon after the general election, there was a by-election, 
owing to the death of the sitting member of the state legis­
lative assembly from Raipur.
8. Devarajsingh Surana, the Jana Sangh candidate, alleged that 
Asram had in fact accepted money from Sharada Charan Tiwari
and withdrew in his favour. When I questioned Asram again, about 
this, his answer was evasive: 'I don't remember', he said.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR 
FURTHER RESEARCH
VIII
Now we can pull together the threads of our findings, draw some 
conclusions and put forward some recommendations for further research.
In the first chapter I observed that the introduction of adult 
franchise to India and the location of 80 per cent of the electors in rural 
areas enabled the rural agricultural elites to rise to positions of power.
By the middle of the 1960s the representative institutions up to the district 
level were a monopoly of the rural elites. At the state level, rural agri­
cultural elites predominated; urban and non-agricultural interests were rep­
resented though they did not have an effective say in formulating or imple­
menting policies. At the federal level the representation of rural elites 
was increasing, though slowly. At the central government level most ministers 
were still of urban origin, had university education, and belonged to the 
middle or upper-middle class. Particularly after the death of Nehru, the 
pressure of rural elites was increasingly felt at the centre. In practice, 
though not by law, power devolved from the centre to the states.
I argued that the predominance of rural power and its extension 
to higher levels of government is only a passing phase -- perhaps lasting 
a few decades -- in the Indian political system. As industrialization and 
urbanization pick up momentum the distribution of electors between rural and 
urban areas will change and, probably within a few decades, the electors in 
urban areas will constitute a majority of the total electorate in the country. 
In that event the rural elites can play only a secondary role at the centre, 
in the states, and perhaps in the districts as well.
As rural people move into urban areas they find themselves in a 
new occupational, social, and political environment. Depending on his occu­
pational interests and cultural needs a migrant is likely to join voluntary 
associations such as trade unions, traders' associations, state cultural 
associations, or sports clubs. Often these associations cut across religious, 
caste, and state loyalties and may be called upon to exert pressure on 
political parties at election time, either to protect the employment interests 
of their members or to meet some special need of the community concerned. It 
is in this process that the primordial loyalties which the migrants had in 
their native places will gradually disintegrate or become irrelevant and the 
migrants will have to realign their political affiliations on the basis of
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secular interests and associational involvement.
On the other hand in such a changed situation political parties may 
have to take electoral realities into consideration and re-orient their 
policies on the basis of new interest groups. Alternatively, entirely new 
political parties may be established to protect the interests of the urban 
workers; or parties which already exist may penetrate into new areas by 
appealing to the political attitudes of the migrants. So I suggest that the 
patterns of political resocialization of those who have moved from rural to 
urban areas and particularly to industrial towns will give some clues to 
future changes in the Indian political system.
Aggregate Analysis
A joint analysis of socio-economic and demographic data and election 
statistics of 88 traditional cities and 22 new industrial towns helped gener­
ate more specific hypotheses. A field survey and leadership interviews in 
one new industrial town (Bhilai) and one traditional market town (Raipur) pro­
vided data to test the hypotheses. The new industrial town surveyed is located 
in a backward region of a backward state. As expected, the survey data showed 
that there was a heavy inter-state migration from rural areas to Bhilai.
Among the respondents in Bhilai about two in three had migrated from rural 
areas, eight in ten came from states other than Madhya Pradesh, less than 
half spoke the local language, three in four had moved from a distance of 
more than 600 kilometres, and about half had lived in at least one place other 
than Bhilai and their native place. On the other hand, in Raipur most of the 
migrants came from surrounding rural areas or nearby states.
The lack of technically trained people in the region, the initiative 
taken by the inter-state migrants in exploring employment opportunities, and 
inter-personal communication networks were the most important factors contrib­
uting to the high rate of inter-state movement.
Religious and caste groups such as Christians, Brahmins and Jains 
were over-represented in Bhilai. In general, educational levels were high 
and income disparities were low. As expected, most of the respondents in 
Bhilai were engaged in engineering, skilled, or semi-skilled jobs. Among the 
respondents, there were fairly high positive associations between caste, 
literacy, occupation, income and type of native place.
Our data in Bhilai confirmed that the pace of industrialization is 
fast in the respondents' generation. About two in ten grandfathers, four in
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ten fathers, and all the respondents lived in urban areas. Over the gener­
ations there was a close positive association between type of residence, 
caste, education, occupation, and income and this had a definite impact on 
the present occupational placement of the respondents. Most of those who 
moved from rural areas to Bhilai were the sons of rich or middle peasants.
On the other hand the movement from rural areas to Raipur was gradual.
In general occupational and income mobility were high in Bhilai. 
Promotions and salary increments were common and they were taken for granted 
by the respondents. Consequently an overwhelming majority of the respondents 
thought that their jobs were secure and hopefully aspired to higher things. 
Occupational mobility and job aspirations were low in Raipur.
Before the establishment of the steel factory in Bhilai, the 
Congress, the Praja Socialist Party and the Ramarajya Parishad were the most 
prominent political parties in the region. There was no Jana Sangh or 
Communist Party there. Now about one in five in Bhilai supported the 
Communists and one in six supported the Jana Sangh. The Congress had been 
able to retain the state assembly seat though with reduced support.
Impact of Socio-economic Variables
In general, the impact of socio-economic variables is different on 
different political parties. The support for the Congress was fairly high 
and came from heterogeneous socio-economic and occupational groups. However, 
it was marginally higher among non-Hindu, low caste, low income, low occu­
pation, and low literacy groups than among others. There was a significant 
tendency for respondents among other religions, scheduled castes, skilled 
workers, and members of cultural associations to support the Communists. 
Support for the Jana Sangh was fairly concentrated in certain socio-economic 
groups. A significantly high percentage of urban natives, Hindus, Jains, 
traditional elite castes, professionals, well-educated people and members 
of the pro-Jana Sangh trade union supported the Jana Sangh. Among Muslims 
and Christians, support for the Jana Sangh was nil, among scheduled castes, 
the older generation and manual labourers it was very low.
While such clear patterns of party support can be discerned from 
two-way tables the proportion of total variation in Congress support accounted, 
for by these variables was less than five per cent. In relation to the 
Communist support it was almost negligible. The proportion of total vari­
ation in Jana Sangh support accounted for by the socio-economic variables 
was about eight per cent. This pattern in fact confirms the findings of 
earlier studies that the proportion of total variation in party support 
accounted for by socio-economic variables is limited.
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In Bhilai, variation in support for the Communists accounted for by 
the dummy variables based on territorial movement was much higher (10.17.) 
than the variation accounted for by the dummy variables based on socio-economic 
attributes (1.67>). When both socio-economic and mobility variables were 
included in a single regression model 'strong Communist' state of origin 
emerged as the most significant predictor of Communist support. The pro­
portion of total variation in the support for the Jana Sangh accounted for 
by the dummy variables based on socio-economic attributes was far higher (8.17>) 
than the proportion of total variation accounted for by the dummy variables 
based on territorial movement and occupational mobility (2.37.) . When both 
socio-economic and mobility variables were included in a single regression 
model the variables of Businessmen and Brahmin-Banias emerged as the most 
significant predictors of Jana Sangh support. On the other hand, in relation 
to Congress the proportion of total variation accounted for by the dummy 
variables based on socio-economic attributes and the dummy variables based on 
respondents' state of origin and occupational mobility was more or less equal 
(about 47.). So in general our analysis confirmed that territorial movement
helped in the establishment and the growth particularly of the Communists in 
Bhilai.
The Role of Voluntary Associations
As expected, there were a large number of voluntary associations 
in Bhilai. Among these, cooperatives, state cultural associations and 
trade unions were more active than religious associations. These were the 
institutions to which the migrants eagerly transferred their loyalties.
Participation in consumer cooperatives and cooperative farming 
societies and cafeterias was universal and members gained specific economic 
benefits from them. Most of the institutions were organised on the basis 
of common workplace and common areas of residence. Hence membership cut 
across state, language, caste, and religious boundaries.
Of all the cultural associations, those formed by the migrants from 
non-Hindi states were the most active. They functioned as successful forces 
of integration on the basis of mother tongue, state of birth, and culture 
but cut across caste, religious, and sub-regional loyalties (i.e. those within 
the state). The political role played by the state cultural associations was 
not clear but a higher proportion of the members of the state cultural 
associations than of others supported the Communists.
There were two Hindi religious associations in Bhilai -- one a 
reformist sect and another an advocate of traditional practices -- and each 
of these associations had only a few members. Participation in associations
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formed by religious minorities such as Muslims and Christians was universal 
among their adherents. Muslims and Christians exhibited a higher degree of 
political solidarity and voted for Congress as an expression of faith in it 
as the protector of minority communities. At the same time members of the 
religious minority communities eagerly participated in the activities organ­
ized by state cultural associations.
As expected there were rival trade unions in Bhilai organized by 
the Congress, the Jana Sangh, the Communists, and the Socialists. The trade 
union organized by the Congress was the biggest and was officially recognized 
by the plant administration. Trade unions were very closely integrated with 
the political parties which promoted them. Unions were organized on occu­
pational and secular lines and cut across religious, caste, and state bound­
aries .
As expected, trade union leaders in Bhilai were sent from outside 
by their political parties. They belonged to politicized middle class 
families and were highly educated and articulate. They had their political 
education during their student days and had put in considerable political 
work before they were sent to Bhilai. Their loyalty was first to their 
political parties and only then to their trade unions. The organization of 
trade unions on a secular and ideological basis prevented the growth of 
personalized power structures in Bhilai.
New Patterns of Life
By learning a new language and by active social intercourse with 
other regional, religious, and caste groups the migrants in Bhilai demon­
strated an ability to readjust to a new style of life.
By educating their children in a language (Hindi) other than their 
mother tongue and by freely exposing them to the influences of the cultures 
of different regions, the migrants permitted them to shed primordial loyalties 
and become true urban citizens with a modern outlook.
As expected, patterns of residence, eating, and social intercourse, 
showed a considerable weakening of caste and religious influences. True, 
marriage alliances were favoured only within language and caste boundaries, 
but it may be expected that the younger generation will adopt more liberal 
views than their parents in this sphere also. Further, the role of caste 
and religion in politics was much reduced.
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Local Politics
As expected, electoral politics in Bhilai were based on ideological 
considerations. Trade unions played a vital role and personalized power 
structures were non-existent in shaping the patterns of party support. On 
the other hand, electoral politics in Raipur had all the features generally 
characteristic of the Indian political system and voting behaviour including 
party splits, inter-party defections, formation of new parties, opportunistic 
election alliances, personalized power structures, bribery of candidates, 
vote-splitting tactics, and collective bargaining on the basis of caste and 
religion.
Impact of Bhilai
The impact of Bhilai on the surrounding areas is limited As 
Bhilai is almost a self-contained town with its own shipping, entertainment, 
sports centres, educational institutions and transport, there was no need 
for the residents to maintain contact with the surrounding areas. Residents 
pay only occasional visits to the nearby town of Durg and the nearby city of 
Raipur. Bhilai however, serves as a market for the agricultural produce of 
the surrounding areas. The Jana Sangh and the Communists had chosen Bhilai 
as the centre for organizing their trade union activities in the state of 
Madhya Pradesh, but their organizations are still small. Only the establish­
ment of many steel factories such as those in Bhilai and further heavy inter­
state migration can help them to expand their unions on a large scale and so 
to affect the state party system. This is more true in the case of the 
Communists who are very weak in Madhya Pradesh then of the Jana Sangh which 
has considerable strength in the state.
The most significant organizational ties between the workers in 
Bhilai and the state party organizations are provided by the local trade 
unions. While cultural exchanges between different language groups were 
common within Bhilai they were almost non-existent between the inter-state 
social groups in Bhilai and the people in the surrounding areas. We do not 
have any information on whether some of the workers who are employed in the 
plant but reside in the surrounding villages, and those agriculturists and 
dairy and poultry farmers who live and work in the surrounding areas but 
regularly sell their products in Bhilai, take back any new social or political 
ideas to their villages. If there is any impact of this kind it is not yet 
visible.
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Will the patterns of political re-socialization in Bhilai be 
typical of changes in the industrial centres in India? A categorical answer 
to this question is difficult. It has to be borne in mind that our analysis 
is based on data from a single industrial town in a particular region. One 
can, however, speculate that the social and political situation in any other 
new industrial town may not be much different from that in Bhilai. But if 
an industrial town is established in a region which can readily supply tech­
nically trained and skilled personnel the rate of inter-state migration to 
such a town is likely to be much lower than in Bhilai. In such a case the 
number of state cultural associations and their membership will be limited.
Or if the number of inter-state migrants with political sympathies for non- 
regional parties is too small, such migrants may be absorbed by the local 
political parties. But in any industrial town trade unions and professional 
associations will be important and they are the organizations to which the 
migrants will develop new loyalties.
In the Indian context the above question has also demographic impli­
cations. In India there is an upper ceiling on the number of electorates of 
the lower house of federal parliament (525) and on the number of state 
assembly electorates (500) in each state. If the population continues to 
grow at the present rate, in a few decades an industrial town of the size of 
Bhilai may not constitute even half of the state assembly constituency in 
which it is located. In such a case its impact will be limited.
If the pace of industrialization is too slow, the impact of 
migration and the change in occupational structure will also be gradual and 
it will give ample time for political parties to re-orient their policies.
On the other hand, the political impact of the new industrial towns will be 
greater if a large number of them are located in a single region than if 
they are widely distributed in different regions.
Recommendations for Further Research
Firstly, studies in other regions similar to that in Bhilai will 
provide data for broad generalizations on the nation as a whole. Secondly, 
this is only a case study of one aspect of the demographic changes that are 
coming about in the developing countries. Using the same research model, 
other areas can be investigated on the rural-urban continuum to show the 
effects of migration and occupational mobility. It would also be worthwhile 
to investigate occupational mobility within rural areas, particularly from 
agricultural to non-agricultural occupations; the movement of people to
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to smaller towns; the social and political feed-back effects on the villages 
that supply these educated and skilled workers to urban areas; the social 
and political effects of the industrial towns on the surrounding areas; and 
last but not least the formation of the political attitudes of the children 
of the rural to urban migrants who are now growing up in the urban areas.
Also of value would be a panel study of the political attitudes of rural to 
urban migrants at different points of time over a long period, and the 
political consequences of economic prosperity caused by new industrial 
estate plans.
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APPENDIX I
Questionnaire
Good morning Sir,
I am helping a research scholar who is working with the 
Department of Political Science, The Australian National 
University, Canberra, Australia. This research survey is intended 
to help produce his Ph.D. thesis, and information collected from you 
will be kept confidential and used solely for research purposes.
1. About how long have you been living in this town?
[Length of residence in years] ____________________________
your age _____________________
2. What is the highest educational level you have reached?
1. Illiterate
2. Literate without any educational level
3. Primary or junior basic
4. Some high school
5. High school completed
6. Some university or higher 
8. No reply
[Mention any degree or diploma obtained by the respondent]
3.
What is your 
native place? 
(Name)
Is it a 
village or 
town?
In which State 
is it? (Name)
About how far is it 
from this town?
[Distance in kilometres]
4. Could you name the places where you have lived -- I mean for 
two to three years at a time -- since you were born, and the 
reasons for living there?
Name of Place Length of Residence R's Reason for
[Circle V or T for each Residence
place]
[V=Village, T=Town]
V T ____________________ ____________________ _______________
V T
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5. What is your religion?
1. Hindu
2. Muslim
3. Christian
4. Sikh
5. Buddhist or Jain
6. Other
8. No reply
6. [If Hindu] What is your caste or tribe? ______________
7. Are you married?
1. Yes
2. No
8. No reply
8a. [If married] How many children do you have? [Write number 
in box] ----
8b. Who are the other members of the family that usually live 
here?
Relationship to R Age Occupation
9. What was your first job? [Obtain as much detail as possible]
First job/occupation ________________________________
10. How much did you earn monthly [or annually]?
Monthly salary _____________ Annual income __________
11. What is your present job? [Obtain as much detail as 
possible]
Present job/occupation ______________________________
12. How much do you earn monthly [or annually]?
Monthly salary ____________ Annual income ___________
13. Do you have any other source of income?
[if yes] What is the total annual income from it?
In rupees ___________________
14.
[Repeat questions in the boxes with regard to father and 
grandfather. Ask all questions about R's father before 
asking about grandfather.]
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15.
What is/was the 
occupation of 
your (father)?
Do you regard 
him as rich/ 
middle class 
or poor?
What is his 
educational 
qualifica­
tion?
Is he mostly 
a native of 
a town or a 
village?
Father
Paternal
Grandfather
16. What kind of interests do you still retain in your native 
place? [Circle all the codes mentioned by the respondent]
1. Landed property or house
2. Business interests
3. Children
4. Parents, brothers & sisters
5. Close relatives
6. Friends
7. None
8. No reply
17. How often do you go back there?
1. Thrice or more than thrice in a year
2. Twice in a year
3. Once in a year
4. Once in two or three years
5. Occasionally
6. Rarely
7. Never
8. No reply
18. How frequently do you write to your relatives and friends in your 
native place?
1. Once in a week
2. Once in a fortnight
3. Once in a month
4. Once in two or three months
5. Once in six months
6. Occasionally
7. Rarely
8. No reply
9. Never
How often do you send back money to your parents or relatives 
in your native place?
1. Regularly
2. Occasionally
3. Used to, but not for a long time
4. Never
5. Other
8. No reply
When you were young -- I mean when you were 14 or 15 years old -- 
did you follow political developments in the country?
1. Yes
2. No
8. No reply
During this period -- when you were 14 or 15 -- which party did 
your family think worth supporting?
Name of party _____________________________________________
How did you get a job here?
1. Just applied and got the job
2. Came to know of it from friends here
3. On deputation from government
4. Got it through employment exchange
5. Other
8. No reply
What kind of friends have you made since coming here?
1. People from my native place
2. Colleagues at work
3. Neighbours
4. People whose political views are similar to mine
5. Others 
8. No reply
Do you read newspapers daily?
1. Yes
2. No
8. No reply
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25. [If yes] Which newspapers are they?
(Names of newspapers)
26. What items in them interest you most?
(Items that interest the respondent) ___
27. Do you listen to the radio regularly?
1. Yes
2. No
8. No reply
28. [If yes] What items in it interest you most?
(Items that interest the respondent) ________
29. What do you usually discuss when you meet your friends?
[Circle all the codes mentioned by the respondent]
1. About our native place or State
2. Service problems (Salary, increment, etc.)
3. Local politics, trade union affairs
4. State or national politics
5. Neighbourhood problems
6. Other matters 
8. No reply
30a. Are you at present a member of any association, such as a trade 
union, or N.G.O.'s association?
1. Yes
2. No
8. No reply
[If yes obtain such name or names]
30b. Why did you join that particular trade union?
What do you think are the most important local problems here 
that concern people like you?
What do you yourself think should be done to solve these
problems?
1. There is nothing we can do
2. Individuals should work hard and help themselves
3. Employees should unite and organize collective actions 
such as 'work to rule', 'go slow tactics', strike, 'bundh', 
etc.
4. People should elect a government which will take measures in 
favour of employees
5. Revolution is the only alternative
8. No reply
Which political party do you think is most likely to improve the
conditions of employees like you?
Which political party do you think is least likely to improve 
the conditions of employees like you?
Would you say that your life is much better now, say, than ten 
years earlier?
1. Yes, very much better
2. Yes, (slightly) better
3. I don't think there is any change
4. Now it is worse
5. Now it is far worse 
6„ Cannot say
7. No reply
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36. (Repeat the questions in the following box with regard to every 
election.)
Election Which party did you In which constituency
vote? (TY if too did you vote?
young to vote)
Do you remember 
which party you 
voted for in the 
Assembly Election 
in 1957, etc.?
1957
1962
1967
37. Could you tell me what kinds of people generally support the 
following parties?
CPI(M)
Bharatiya Jana Sangh
Congress Party
Swatantra Party
CPI
SSP
38. If you had a free choice now, which job would you like to hold?
39. Do you think your job is secure here?
40. Lastly, what do you think Government should do to improve your
conditions ?
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APPENDIX XI
Report on Fieldwork in India
The fieldwork in India was to supplement primary data on 
socio-economic and demographic mobility and political preferences of 
people that live in new industrial towns and cross-check the conclusions 
drawn on the basis of aggregative analysis.
Collection of Assembly constituency maps, polling-booth data 
and any other published material such as the socio-economic background 
of legislators, and a sample survey of one new industrial town and one 
traditional town, were the tasks set for fieldwork in India.
Selection of Industrial Town
The selection of an industrial town for field survey is not 
an easy task in the Indian context. There are altogether 22 industrial 
towns located in 10 different states, 8 different language speaking areas 
and as far apart as 2,000 miles from north to south or east tro west.
The survey was intended to be only a case study that could provoke 
further theoretical and empirical interest in the field. However, it 
was considered better that the town to be surveyed should be as rep­
resentative as possible of the new industrial towns.
Considered from this point of view, as many as 13 out of the 
22 new industrial towns are situated in east India (7 in West Bengal,
1 in Assam, 3 in Bihar, 1 in east Madhya Pradesh and 1 in Orissa). Of 
these 13 towns, seven are dependent on heavy industries, two each on 
mining and medium scale industries. Hence it was considered best to 
select a heavy industry-based town in the state of West Bengal. Of the 
seven towns located in West.Bengal, four are based on medium scale 
industry and are too close to metropolitan Calcutta, hence these were 
eliminated. Of the other three towns, one is a private sector steel 
town (Burnpur) one is a public sector railway engine manufacturing town 
(Chittaranjan -- on which a socio-economic survey had already been done) 
and the last (Durgapur) is a public sector steel town. So the choice 
fell on Durgapur, a British-built steel township, and Burdwan, a 
traditional town about 50 miles from Durgapur.
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Polling-Booth Data
My first task as soon as I arrived in Delhi in April 1969, was 
to contact the Election Commission of India to seek their help to collect 
polling-booth data for the general elections of 1962 and 1967. My 
personal acquaintance with the officers concerned over a period of five 
years made the task easier. The initial reaction of Mr A.N. Sen, Secretary, 
Election Commission of India, was rather sceptical. He was not sure 
whether data relating to the 1962 general election were still kept with 
the district election officers since the data are supposed to be destroyed 
after three years. Mr Sen was quite friendly, amiable, informal and was 
always ready to help and relax the bureaucratic rules if possible. He 
immediately issued letters to all the state chief election officers 
concerned to collect and send the necessary polling-booth data for 1967 
to New Delhi. He also gave me letters of introduction to the district 
collectors in different states. I made arrangements to secure all the 
necessary assembly constituency maps through informal sources.
Visit to Durgapur
I arrived in Durgapur on 16 April; met Mrs Gita Ghosh,
Principal of the local multipurpose girls' high school; contacted a 
few graduates to be interviewed and recruited by my supervisor, Mr Michael 
Kahan, later; held brief discussions with Mr S.N. Roy the local sub- 
divisional officer; collected electoral rolls and assembly constituency 
maps of Durgapur and Burdwan and returned to New Delhi on 19 April. 
Incidentally, in Burdwan I discovered in the district election office, 
the polling-booth data on all the general elections safely kept.
'Officially speaking, the data may be destroyed three years after the 
election. But you never know who wants these and when. So we play 
safe and keep all records', said the officer concerned. When this 
situation was explained, Mr Sen immediately issued letters to chief 
election officers of the states concerned to collect and send polling- 
booth data of the 1962 election as well.
Mr Kahan arrived in New Delhi on 26 April, and on 27th we had 
a busy day. We met Mr Sen of the Election Commission, Professor N.G.
Ranga, Chairman of the Swatantra Party, and Professor D. Anand of the 
Lady Hardinge Medical College (Dr Anand had done extensive research in 
sociology and population) and visited a few places of tourist interest.
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We arrived in Durgapur on 29 April. Mr Kahan interviewed the investi­
gators and felt satisfied. Later we met the local Sub-divisional Officer, 
and Chief Executive Officer officer of Durgapur Development Authority.
To suit the convenience of all the research investigators, it was decided 
to start the survey on 15 May 1969. That evening we finalized the 
sampling design on the basis of the latest electoral lists.
We arrived in Calcutta by 4 p.m. on 31 April. It was my first 
visit to Calcutta. As soon as we got out of the train we were in the 
midst of unending streams of population flowing in and out of the railway 
station. Population pressure is quite high in Indian cities but Calcutta 
has no parallel in this regard. The whole city looks old, neglected 
and in bad repair. Traffic is unregulated and pedestrians, cyclists, 
cycle rickshaws, motor cycles, cars and animal-drawn vehicles all move 
on the same road at a slow pace. Street hawkers peddle all kinds of 
merchandise from vegetables to ready made clothes. Pavement book stalls 
freely sell Chinese and Vietnamese literature (in other parts of India 
these are proscribed). A peep into any shop or office or book stall 
will reveal a prominent display of photographs of state political leaders, 
poets, and religious teachers and pictures of the goddess Kali. After 
visiting a few interesting places Kahan left Calcutta on 1 May. That 
evening (in the May Day celebration) I had the opportunity of witnessing 
a political battle with sticks, stones and crackers between the extreme 
and moderate elements of Communists in the heart of Calcutta city. The 
police were just helpless onlookers (Communists were in power in West 
Bengal). I flew back to Delhi on 2 May. Until 14 May I was scanning 
the literature on socio-economic studies and census data. I had the 
questionnaire translated into Bengali and drew the sample on the lines 
suggested by Mr Kahan.
Experience in Durgapur
I went back to Durgapur on 17 May 1969. The political situ­
ation in Durgapur was already tense. Extreme Communists (pro-Maoists) 
and their student leaders were organizing strikes and processions. 
However, I thought that my survey would not be hindered. The training 
of the interviewers went on well and the field survey would not be 
hindered. The training of the interviewers went on well and the field 
survey was about to be started. Then Communist opposition came like a 
bolt from the blue.
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My first encounter with the Communists was at a public meeting 
they organized for industrial workers, agricultural labourers and students. 
I had prior permission from the trade union leaders to attend the meeting 
and take a few photographs if I liked. But the student and youth leaders 
vehemently opposed my attempts to take photographs and made it clear 
that they were opposed to the survey itself. They forced me to destroy 
the film already exposed. My discussion with the local Communist and 
trade union leaders did not improve the situation. Mr Dilip Majumdar, the 
local MLA, expressed his inability to control his student and youth 
leaders. Instead he said: 'Try to persuade them, if they agree you can
pursue your survey.' I had the feeling that the leaders were pretending 
to be polite while actually encouraging the younger elements at the lowest 
level to oppose the study. The local Sub-divisional Officer and Chief 
Executive Officer had no assistance to offer. In view of the lack of 
alternatives I felt that the study should be abandoned. Dr Gita Ghosh 
had come to the same conclusion. Interviewers felt disappointed.
I left Durgapur on 30 May. On the next day the political 
situation, which was already at boiling point, blew up. A big student 
riot was followed by extensive police shooting, the closure of the whole 
steel plant, and the spreading of the disturbances to the surrounding 
towns and ultimately to Calcutta. The situation in Bengal was thus 
highly explosive.
Selection of Bhilai
When acquainted with the circumstances, both of my supervisors 
agreed that work in West Bengal should be abandoned and that the study 
be transferred to Bhilai, Madhya Pradesh. Three reasons prompted the 
selection of Bhilai. Firstly it is a new steel town which is also 
located in the industrial belt of east India. Secondly, the population 
has migrated there from all parts of the country, and is highly cosmo­
politan; it provides a good locale for a case study of patterns of 
social mobility and political change. Lastly, the political situation 
in Madhya Pradesh is quiet. Once Bhilai was selected the nearby trad­
itional town of Raipur automatically selected itself.
I reached Bhilai on 14 June and started work all over again. 
Even by western standards Bhilai undoubtedly is a well-planned, orderly, 
and picturesque town with good houses, paved roads at right angles, 
schools, parks and shopping and entertainment centres. Even a casual
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glance across the town indicates that the residents have a feeling of 
security and a sense of attachment to the town. Most of the houses have 
well tended lawns, flower patches and kitchen gardens surrounded by green 
hedges -- all symbols of the private efforts and energies of the residents 
(this is deplorably absent elsewhere in India). The city also looked 
clean and prosperous.
My initial contact in Bhilai was an old boyhood friend, Mr 
B.M. Rao, a graduate who is working on the operation side inside the 
plant. We first contacted the city administrative authority and obtained 
a blue print of all the sectors, roads and houses and number of residen­
tial units. Initial talks with officers of both the town and plant admin­
istrations revealed that social life in Bhilai is quite harmonious, and 
religious, language and state groups have become reconciled to a kind 
of cooperative life of mutual coexistence. The level of political and 
trade union activity is low and it is peaceful. Officers proudly stated 
that there had never been a strike in the Bhilai steel plant. But for 
caution's sake they advised me to approach the respondents on my own 
rather than taking an introductory letter from the project adminis tration 
which might bias the responses.
Training of Interviewers
The recruitment and training of interviewers was an easy affair. 
Bhilai abounds in graduates and postgraduates. B.M. Rao immediately 
contacted four local employees who are postgraduates in sociology. Every 
one of them was experienced, having already produced a Master's thesis.
So work was started soon after the residential units were selected. I 
accompanied every investigator into the field for two or three days in 
the beginning and was satisfied with their performance. Also, I did a 
good part of the interviewing myself with the help of my friend to 
locate the streets and houses.
Both the level and the quality of the responses were good. 
Firstly, as a student attached to a foreign university, I was welcomed. 
The reason probably was that a large proportion of the employees them­
selves had been sent abroad for tertiary training. On the whole only 
a few respondents had to be persuaded. Work went on slowly but effic­
iently and satisfactorily without a hitch. Out of all the respondents 
contacted, only two Bengalis rejected interviews outright and alleged 
that the study was illicitly motivated. A few Keralites hesitated in
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the beginning but they cooperated after a brief explanation. Political 
leaders and office bearers of different cultural and regional organiza­
tions cooperated well, talked at length about every issue and were 
pleased to be photographed. The survey in Bhilai was completed by 
the middle of August.
Survey Work in Raipur
In the meantime I visited Raipur, contacted Dr Shrivastav,
Head of the Department of Sociology, Ravishankar University, Raipur, 
to seek his help in recruiting and training a few interviewers with a 
good knowledge of the layout of the town, and had a discussion with the 
district collector. After a brief visit to New Delhi to assess the 
progress of the collection of polling-booth data, fieldwork in Raipur 
was started in the middle of August. Three of the interviewers who 
had worked in Bhilai continued with the survey and three more unemployed 
graduates proposed by Dr Shrivastav joined the team.
Raipur is an old administrative town in the region of 
Chattisgarh -- comparatively a backward region within a backward state. 
Even by Indian standards, it is a dirty and uncleanly city -- particu­
larly in the rainy season. The city has a high density of population, 
and very narrow and badly paved roads. Some of the bylanes are no more 
than two feet wide. Drinking water and draining facilities are poor.
As many as half of the houses have mud walls and a mud or tile roof.
The city undoubtedly has a mediaeval look. It has about a dozen rain- 
fed lakes which are used for washing clothes and cattle, human bathing 
and even for the supply of drinking water.
By the time I started my survey Raipur was experiencing very 
heavy rains and this proved to be a blessing in disguise, enabling us 
to find most of the respondents at home. Again work in Raipur was slow 
but smooth. Only a few of the respondents entertained doubts and rejected 
interviews despite our explanations. Houses are built like a big honey­
comb and locating the selected houses was rather difficult; we could 
interview only 573 respondents out of 675 selected. However, both the 
level and quality of the interviews with the community leaders and 
candidates were good. Leaders gave long interviews and felt pleased 
to be photographed. Only the Congress•candidate in the general election 
of 1967 (Mr Bulakilal Pujari), though giving a long interview, objected 
to being photographed. The distirct collector of Raipur, Mr Acharya,
193
was cooperative and helpful in having his office dig out election data 
from old files.
After completing all the survey work in Raipur and thanking 
all the fieldworkers and officials who helped me I went back to New 
Delhi in the first week of October. By that time the Election Commission 
had been able, to collect most of the data needed. I stored all the 
survey material, polling-booth data, constituency maps, newspaper 
clippings and some published socio-economic studies and went on leave 
to visit my home. In the second week of November, however, on the 
advice of the Election Commission, I had again to visit Dhanbad (Bihar) 
and Calcutta (West Bengal), to collect polling-booth data from the 
centres which failed to respond to the circulars of the Election 
Commission. This last bit of work was not an easy job for I myself 
had to search for the data in the dusty old record rooms. But it was 
gratifying that ultimately I was able to secure all that I wanted.
Questionnaire
With a few exceptions questions were well received by the 
respondents. Introducing personal socio-economic data in the first 
part of the questionnaire was useful. Enquiring about a person's 
job, his father and grandfather, is a part of enquiring about his wel­
fare, in India. So the questions on personal data helped to establish 
rapport between the respondent and the interviewer. In some cases 
interviewers were given freedom to explain the questions or put the 
questions in a format that could be grasped by the respondent. The 
following questions need special mention.
The first part of question 3, 'What is your native place?'
(name) worked very well in Raipur but in Bhilai 'What is your home town 
or village?' proved to be easier and effective. In Bhilai the employees 
are granted annual travelling allowances (by rail) to visit their home 
town or village. Hence the term 'home-town' is easily understood by 
the respondent and as employees have filled their travelling allowance 
bills many times, they remember the distance between Bhilai and their 
home town.
With a vast majority of the respondents, question 6 worked 
very well. Along with caste affiliation, information on the traditioal 
occupation of that particular caste was also collected. A few respondents
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who o b j e c t e d  to  be c l a s s i f i e d  i n  a p a r t i c u l a r  c a s t e  o r  r e l i g i o n  
m en t ione d  t h e i r  c a s t e  and r e l i g i o n  a f t e r  a b i t  o f  p e r s u a s i o n  as  
' a n c e s t r a l  c a s t e  and r e l i g i o n ' .
When c o l l e c t i n g  r e s p o n s e s  to  q u e s t i o n  8,  p a r t i c u l a r s  r e g a r d ­
in g  t h e  t o t a l  number o f  p e r s o n s  l i v i n g  w i t h  t h e  r e s p o n d e n t ,  t h e i r  age 
and o c c u p a t i o n  were a l s o  c o l l e c t e d .
Q u e s t io n s  9 to  14 worked w e l l ,  bu t  i n  r e p l y  t o  q u e s t i o n  15 
a few r e s p o n d e n t s  s t a t e d  t h a t  t h e y  d i d  no t  remember t h e  e d u c a t i o n a l  
q u a l i f i c a t i o n  o f  t h e i r  g r a n d f a t h e r .  Again r e s p o n s e s  t o  q u e s t i o n s  16 
to  19 were s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d  and smooth.
Q u e s t i o n s  20 and 21 were e a g e r l y  answered  b u t  a few r e s p o n d e n t s ,  
p a r t i c u l a r l y  on t h e  lower  r ungs  o f  t h e  s o c i e t y ,  i n t e r p r e t e d  the  te rms  
' f o l l o w '  i n  q u e s t i o n  20, and ' s u p p o r t i n g '  i n  q u e s t i o n  21 to  mean 
' p a r t i c i p a t e '  and ' p a r t i c i p a t i n g '  r e s p e c t i v e l y  and t e n d e d  to  say  ' n o '  
i n s t a n t l y .  As soon as  t h i s  t e n d e n c y  was d i s c o v e r e d  I  l e f t  i n s t r u c t i o n s  
w i t h  t h e  i n t e r v i e w e r s  to  change t h e  fo rm a t  o f  t h e  q u e s t i o n s  t o :
20. When you were young - -  I  mean when you were 14 o r  
15 y e a r s  o ld  - -  were you aware o f  the  p o l i t i c a l  
deve lopm en ts  i n  t h e  c o u n t r y ?
21.  During  t h i s  p e r i o d ,  when you were 14 o r  15, which 
p a r t y  d id  your  f a m i l y  t h i n k  w o r th  s y m p a t h i z i n g  w i t h ?
These  q u e s t i o n s  worked w e l l ,  f o r m u l a t e d  i n  t h i s  way.
Q u e s t i o n  23 needed  some e x p l a n a t i o n .  I t  was found t h a t  the  
te rm ' k i n d  o f  f r i e n d s '  could  n o t  be e a s i l y  t r a n s l a t e d  i n t o  H in d i .  An 
a v e ra g e  r e s p o n d e n t  t e n d e d  to  r e s p o n d  a t  f i r s t  by s a y i n g :  'What do you
mean by ' k i n d  of  f r i e n d s ' .  A l l  my f r i e n d s  a r e  g o o d . '  So I  i n s t r u c t e d  
t h e  i n t e r v i e w e r s  to  r e a d  a few c a t e g o r i e s  o f  answers  to  the  r e s p o n d e n t .
At any r a t e ,  pe op le  f rom t h e i r  own n a t i v e  p l a c e ,  c o l l e a g u e s  a t  work 
and n e ig h b o u r s  t u r n e d  ou t  to  be t h e  most  i m p o r t a n t  f r i e n d s  o f  most  of  
t h e  r e s p o n d e n t s .
Q u e s t i o n  32 i s  t r e a t e d  as  a c l o s e d - e n d  q u e s t i o n  and r e s p o n d e n t s  
were aksed  to  choose  one among t h e  f i v e  c a t e g o r i e s  o f  answers  g i v e n .
To compensa te  f o r  t h i s  c l o s e d - e n d  q u e s t i o n ,  q u e s t i o n  40 i s  made an open-  
ended q u e s t i o n  to  e n a b le  us t o  know what  the  r e s p o n d e n t  p r e c i s e l y  wants  
from the  Government  and th e  methods  t h a t  he a p p ro v e s  to  e x t r a c t  t h e s e  
p r i v i l e g e s  from the  Government .
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Questions 33 and 34 were very successful. Respondents poured 
out all their pent-up feelings. Responses varied from 'unqualified' 
admiration for some parties to outright condemnation of other parties.
A few respondents equated and condemned all Indian political parties 
and emphasized the need for a military government to save the country 
from political anarchy and economic troubles. In Raipur, a number of 
respondents stated that the British Raj was far more efficient and 
effective than the independent government.
Again in question 37, the phrase 'kinds of people' was not 
easily understood by the respondents. So the interviewers were 
authorised to name different caste, religious, occupational and lang­
uage groups to the respondent. This question also worked quite well.
(contd.
196
CO (D
o crn o>
03 r t
3 H*
Cö Pd 03 03
»-1 a
p> CO
C H-CTQ O OQ O-i
rf O
t-* O
a> o
VO 1-i
o
033aH*a
03
r tCO
CO
I—I 
3 rra>3
<H*
03s
fDa.
APPENDIX III
197
o w
o o
O  CO H*
P  rt £
(t rf ftW C fD
0) p
cl n cr
P n
rt i-i
ui cn t—» W Cö
> w
O  I— > 1-5 P H-0Q D-C fl>m  p
rt o
APPENDIX III : 
Candidates Interviewed (contd,)
198
o cr
3  Cl
r r  i-h
3" i-h
cn to
H  Ö) pÖl—  po
(-> ft)
H* W
i >  H* >  I—1 3 -
CTO fl>
cn o
rt fD
O  fD
>X) o
\r*
fDto
CL
fD
3
cn
o
i-h
>
cn
cn
o
o
3 -to
r t
H*
O
3
cn
M
3
rr
fD
3
<
3 -
fD
3
fD
CL
A
PPEN
D
IX
 
IV
199
o o
1-f o
<Z co
oo n>
>  H*
CO o
ON fD
A
PPEN
D
IX
 
IV
 
: 
L
ead
ers 
o
f 
A
sso
ciatio
n
s 
In
terv
iew
ed
 
(co
n
td
.)
200
APPENDIX IV 
: 
Leaders of Associations Interviewed 
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APPENDIX V
Sampling
The different ecological layouts and residential patterns in 
Bhilai and Raipur made it essential to adopt different sampling procedures. 
In India most of the workers are males and social mobility political aware­
ness and involvement are essentially male pre-occupations. Moreover, 
political preferences of females are assumed not to be much different from 
those of males. According to the Census of India 1961 about one in six 
workers in Raipur and one in sixteen workers in Bhilai were females. But 
the census does not give us an accurate picture of the proportion of females 
in the workforce because females engaged in household activities were 
included in the category of ’workers' in 1961. So it was considered better 
to interview males of working age. Electoral lists were the only source 
from which such a sample could be drawn.
Our survey was being conducted about three years after the 
most recent election and electoral lists were out of date. This problem 
had to be tackled differently in Bhilai and in Raipur. According to the 
information supplied by the Department of Town Administration in Bhilai 
there were 22,884 temporary or permanent residential units, each allotted 
to an employee and regularly numbered and divided into streets and sectors. 
We divided the sample size (675) into the total number of residential units 
(22,884) and got an answer of approximately 34. We then chose a number at 
random between 1 and 34 as our first sample unit and then took every 34th 
residential unit after that, thus obtaining a sample of 675 residential 
units. The male employees in the selected units were interviewed; in 
almost every case there was only one such employee per unit. In a few 
cases in which the unit had been allocated to a female employee she was 
interviewed. In the whole sample there were only three such cases. The 
aim was to interview as many as possible out of the 675 selected employees 
but it was hoped that we would be able to interview at least 600. This 
it was considered would give a more reliable and up-to-date sample than 
picking the male electors from the three years old electoral roll. The 
steel plant works in three shifts -- morning, evening and mid-night -- and 
two in three workers engaged on the operation side were available at
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home during day time. As identification of the selected homes and 
contacting the respondents was relatively easy in Bhilai we were able to 
obtain complete interviews with 621 respondents, or ninety-two per cent 
of the sample.
On the other hand in Raipur the numbering of residential units 
was inadequate. Houses were large and were often divided into several 
households and families were large and complex. Some new houses were not 
numbered at all and on some houses new numbers were affixed along with 
old numbers and this led to confusion. Fortunately an up-to-date draft 
electoral roll by the local municipal council for the forthcoming municipal 
election was made available by the Secretary of the municipal council. Out 
of a total of 46,077 male electors in Raipur city area, 675 were selected 
by following the same method as in Bhilai. Here again the aim was to 
interview as many as possible. In practice, however, it was found that 
locating respondents was much more difficult in Raipur than in Bhilai. 
Despite strenuous efforts we were able to complete only 567 interviews.
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TABLE A.2
Migrants to Indian Cities Classified by Broad 
Age-Groups, and Male Migrants as Percentage 
of Total Migrants
Cities Migrants
in
thousands
Age-Groups Males as 
percentage 
of total 
migrants
Females per 
100 males in 
total
population
0-14
%
15-34
1
35-39
%
60+
%
Greater-
Bombay 2667 15.0 51.4 29.5 4.1 64 55
Calcutta-
City 1542 14.3 48.6 32.8 4.3 69 45
Old Delhi 1306 19.4 48.6 26.4 5.6 57 77
Madras 643 15.6 48.4 30.1 5.9 54 84
Ahmedabad 584 18.7 46.2 30. 7 4.4 57 76
Hyde rabad 284 21.0 48.3 25.8 4. 9 53 90
Bangalore 461 18.2 48.2 27.7 5.9 54 86
Kanpur 481 15.5 49.6 30.0 4.9 59 70
New Delhi 199 23.9 45.8 26.6 3. 7 60 68
All other 
cities 8630 19.9 46.3 27.9 5.9 54 85
Source : Computed from Census of India 1961, Volume 1, India,
Part II-C (iii), Migration Tables, pp. 190, 206, 224, 
242, 258, 274, 290, 306, 322-548, and 566.
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TABLE A ,7
Inter-Generational Income Mobility Between Grandfather, 
Fathers and Respondents (Bhilai and Raipur)
Economic status 
of grandfather 
and father
Respondent's monthly income in rupees
Rs200 or less Rs201-400 Rs401+ Total
Bhilai
G.F., F. rich 2 11 7 20
G.F., F. middle 37 221 80 338
G.F., F. poor 54 114 7 175
G.F., rich, F. 
middle or poor - - 26 16 42
G.F., poor, F. 
middle or rich 1 27 18 46
Total 94 399 128 621
Raipur
G.F., F. rich 14 16 11 41
G.F., F. middle 85 105 50 240
G.F., F. poor 123 26 8 157
G.F., rich, F. 
middle or poor 27 32 17 76
G.F. poor, F. 
middle or rich 23 18 12 53
Total 272 197 98 567
Note : This table is based solely on the subjective assessment
by the respondents of the economic status of their 
grandfathers and fathers in classifying them as 'rich', 
'middle' or 'poor'. All figures in the table are 
absolute numbers.
G.F. stands for 'grandfather' and F. stands for 
'father'.
210
TABLE A.8
Present Occupation of Respondents by their First 
Occupation (Bhilai and Raipur)
First occupation Present occupation
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Bhilai
1. Administrators 1 1
2. Professionals 2 31 -- 1 1 35
3. Businessmen -- -- 5 2 2 1 10
4. Lower civil 
servants 11 7 4 82 23 34 161
5. Skilled
workers 1 9 1 1 27 1 40
6. Semi-skilled
workers 1 7 — 3 42 117 .  - 1 — 171
7. Cultivators
8. Manual
labourers — 1 1 10 6 73 _  _ 112 — 203
9. Others
10. Total 16 55 11 99 101 226 -- 113 -- 621
Raipur
1. Administrators 4 1 1 6
2. Professionals 1 19 1 1 1 23
3. Businessmen 1 -- 81 4 -- 3 2 1 3 95
4. Lower civil 
servants 3 6 19 120 11 2 1 3 14 179
5. Skilled
workers — 2 4 _  _ 11 1 18
6. Semi-skilled
workers 11 4 7 40 3 2 67
7. Cultivators -- -- 2 2 -- 1 23 6 -- 34
8. Manual
labourers _ — 11 5 4 15 2 90 3 130
9. Others r 15 15i 
•
1 
o
i 
«—i
i
Total 9 28 130 136 34 61 28 103 38 567
Note : Occupational categories at top (present occupation) should
be read as indicated on thp left side (first occupation).
All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
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TABLE A . 9
P r e s e n t  Monthly Income o f  Responden ts  by T h e i r  
F i r s t  Monthly Income ( B h i l a i  & R a ipur )
F i r s t  income P r e s e n t  m on th ly  income i n ru p ee s
p e r  month 1 2 3 4 5 6 T o t a l
B h i l a i
1. RslOO o r  l e s s 2 82 169 65 15 17 350
2. RslOl to  200 - - 10 82 70 20 29 211
3. Rs201 to  300 - - - - 5 4 4 25 38
4.  Rs301 t o  400 - - - - - - 2 - - 9 11
5. Rs401 to  500 - - - - - - - - 1 7 8
6. Rs501 + - - - - 2 - - - - 1 3
T o t a l 2 92 258 141 40 88 621
R a ipu r
1. RslOO o r  l e s s 114 120 70 33 14 16 367
2. RslOl  to  200 3 27 43 21 14 16 124
3. Rs201 to  300 5 - - 17 12 3 8 45
4.  Rs301 to  400 - - 1 - - - - 3 7 11
5. Rs401 to  500 1 1 - - - - 1 4 7
6. Rs501 + - - - - - - 1 - - 12 13
To t a l 123 149 130 67 35 63 567
Note : Income c a t e g o r i e s  a t  the  top  ( P r e s e n t  income)
sho u ld  be r e a d  as  i n d i c a t e d  on t h e  l e f t  s i d e  
( F i r s  t  i n c o m e ) .
A l l  f i g u r e s  i n  the  t a b l e  a r e  a b s o l u t e  numbers .
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TABLE A.10
Present Monthly Income of Respondents by Their 
Present Occupation (Bhilai 6c Raipur)
Present Present monthly income in rupees
occupation RslOO 
or less
Rs 101 
to 200
Rs201 
to 300
Rs301 
to 400
Rs401 
to 500
Rs501+ Total
Bhilai
Administrators 
6c professionals 2 3 66 71
Businessmen -- -- 1 3 2 5 11
Lower civil 
servants — 14 38 32 13 2 99
Skilled workers -- -- 22 44 21 14 101
Semi-skilled
workers 9 155 60 1 1 226
Manua1 
labourers 2 69 42 -- -- -- 113
Total 2 92 258 141 40 88 621
Raipur
Administrators 
6c Professionals 1 2 10 11 13 37
Businessmen 10 26 32 14 9 39 130
Lower civil 
servants 6 36 59 25 9 1 136
Skilled workers -- 6 11 11 3 3 34
Semi-skilled
workers 21 27 9 4 61
Cultivators 1 8 9 1 2 7 28
Manual
labourers 48 45 8 2 103
Others 37 -- -- -- -- -- 38
Total 123 149 130 67 35 63 567
Note : All figures in the table are absolute numbers
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TABLE A . 12
Expans ion  o f  E l e c t o r a t e  and P l a c e  Where Voted
E l e c t i o n Voted
h e re
Voted
e l s e ­
where
T o t a l
v o t e r s
Too young 
t o  v o t e
Did n o t  
v o t e
T o t a l
non ­
v o t e r s
B h i l a i
(N-621)
1957 34 124 158 314 149 463
1962 345 24 369 71 181 252
1967 465 3 468 4 149 153
R a ipu r
(N-567)
1957 208 39 247 226 94 320
1962 313 32 345 113 109 222
1967 385 13 398 17 152 169
Note : A l l  f i g u r e s  i n  t h e  t a b l e  a r e  a b s o l u t e  numbers
Note : 
Percentages of those who did not reply to the question on party choice in 1967 and those who
did not vote in 1967 are worked out against total number of respondents in each category. 
Percentages for the voters of each party are worked out against the total number of voters 
in that category.
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TABLE A.13
Party Choice in 1967 by Age, 
Religion, Caste and Income
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TABLE A. 14
Party Choice In 1967 by Occupation. Literacy. Asaoclatlonal Membership, and 
Perception of One's Own Welfare
BhHal Raipur
Characteristic
of Total No reply Party choice in 1967 Total No reply Party choice in 1967
Respondents (N) Not voted 
X
Congress
X
Jana
Sangh
%
Communist
X
Others
X
(N) Not voted 
X
Congress
X
Jana
Sangh
X
Others
X
Occupation
Administrators 
& professionals 71 41 52 31 7 10 37 24 61 18 21
Businessmen 11 27 12 76 - 12 130 21 57 27 16
Lower civil 
servants 99 19 55 19 22 4 136 36 61 24 15
Skilled 101 30 42 13 31 14 34 32 61 17 22
Semi-skilled 226 24 46 19 22 13 61 33 63 10 27
Cultivators -- -- -- - - - 28 21 64 -- 36
Manual labourers 113 17 63 17 17 3 103 27 73 8 19
Others — — — — -- — 38 50 63 26 11
Literacy 
No schooling 95 12 60 14 20 6 93 22 64 10 26
Some schooling 217 23 55 17 17 11 222 30 68 15 17
High school 
completed 309 30 44 23 24 9 226 34 56 27 17
Associational
membership
Trade union 
member 201 17 50 20 22 8 133 32 50 32 18
Cultural associ­
ation member 165 30 39 22 28 11 67 28 77 13 10
Non-member 255 27 58 18 15 9 367 31 65 14 21
Is life better? 
Yes, better 362 28 55 18 16 11 222 31 64 18 18
No change, now 
worse 259 21 45 22 26 7 345 29 62 18 20
Total 621 25 51 19 21
_____ d
567 30 63 18 19
Note : Percentages of those who did not reply to the question on party choice in 1967 and
of those who did not vote in 1967 are worked out against total number of respondents 
in each category. Percentages for the voters of each party are worked out against 
the total number of voters in that category.
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TABLE A.15
Party Opposed by Party Supported
Party Party opposed
supported No
reply
Congress Jana
Sangh
Communists Other
parties
Total
Bhilai 
No reply 34 3 4 7 4 52
Congress 60 -- 99 125 51 335
Jana Sangh 8 20 -- 52 9 89
Communists 1 57 44 -- 14 116
Other parties 3 10 5 8 3 29
Total 106 90 152 192 81 621
No reply 43 4 5 13 -- 65
Congress 86 -- 115 103 25 329
Jana Sangh 8 33 -- 35 6 82
Communists 2 23 17 -- 5 47
Other parties 5 14 15 7 3 44
Total 144 74 152 158 39 567
Note : All figures in the table are absolute numbers.
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TABLE A . 16
P a r t y  Choice  i n  1967 by P a r t y  S u p p o r te d
P a r t y  
s u p p o r t e d
P a r t y c h o i c e  i n  1967 T o t a l
No r e p l y  
Not v o t e d
Congress Jana
Sangh
Communists O th e rs
B h i l a i
No r e p l y 19 13 8 4 8 52
Congress 90 201 17 12 15 335
J a n a  Sangh 18 8 r  57 2 4 89
Communists 23 8 5 77 3 116
O the r  p a r t i e s 4 6 4 2 13 29
T o t a l 154 236 91 97 43 621
Raipur
No r e p l y 27 29 3 - - 6 65
Congress 101 191 15 - - 22 329
Ja n a  Sangh 15 11 54 - - 2 82
Communists 15 10 - - - - 22 47
O th e r  p a r t i e s 11 9 1 - - 23 44
T o t a l 169 250 73 - - 75 567
Note : A l l  f i g u r e s  i n  t h e  t a b l e  a r e  a b s o l u t e  numbers .
in the table are absolute
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